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My study of the political economies of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
began in 1970 as a freshly minted captain in the U.S. Army. I served as an
intelligence officer in the Strategic Research and Analysis Section of
Headquarters, Military Advisory Command, Vietnam. Working under
cover as a “topographical engineer,” my duties included the supervision of
a small, dedicated group of highly educated analysts, detailed to brief the
commander-in-chief daily on the impact of political events on the military
conduct of the war. In attempting to understand and explain the organi-
zation and operation of the so-called Viet Cong Infrastructure, I earned
the equivalent of an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies to accompany
advanced degrees in international relations earned earlier at the Graduate
School of International Studies, University of Denver. At the same time, I
grew increasingly disenchanted with the American role in Southeast Asia.
Out of that disillusionment grew a lifelong fascination with the often trou-
bled, ever-changing political economies of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Following my tour in Vietnam, I resigned my commission and pursued
a dual career in academia and international commerce, living much of the
next two decades in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. I returned to
Southeast Asia in 1987, living first in Hong Kong and later in Bangkok.
Employed as a regional manager for Caterpillar Inc., I traveled widely
throughout the region, most especially in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
My duties varied widely from mine clearing operations on the Poipet-
Battambang road to drafting reports on the political economies of Cambo-
dia and Laos to testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in 1991 in support of lifting the multinational embargo and resuming mul-
tilateral aid to Vietnam. Eventually, I returned to the United States and
took early retirement to work full time as an author and independent
scholar. In recent years, I have continued to travel frequently to Cam-
bodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Based on research begun in the 1970s, this book explores the economic
and political reforms implemented by the governments of Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam over the last three decades. A focal point is the different
paths to reform taken by three neighbors long considered to be intimately
related, if not a single entity. The impact of their divergent reforms on
regional plans for economic development through the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations in general and the Greater Mekong Subregion in
particular is a secondary focus. Grandiose schemes abound and publicists
tout success; however, as is often the case, the devil is in the detail.
In writing about a diverse geographical area, I have followed a simple
rule regarding the spelling of place names discussed. I have tried to use the
most common contemporary spelling even when this means that current
usage is at variance with earlier decades. Fortunately, the difference in
most cases between present and past usage is not great. The official title of
the state and government of Cambodia is an exception as it has varied
considerably over the last four decades. Unless reference to a specific
regime adds clarity or emphasis, I have generally referred throughout the
book to the country and government simply as Cambodia. Widely known
Vietnamese toponyms like Hanoi or Danang are recorded as a single word
while less well known place names like Ben Tre or My Tho are cited in
their common Vietnamese form. The terms “Laos” and the “Lao People’s
Democratic Republic” or “Lao PDR” are used interchangeably as they
are in English-language publications by the Vientiane government. The
term “Lao” is used to denote citizens of the Lao PDR as well as ethnic
Lao. The different usages should be apparent in their context. The full
complement of diacritical marks is not used as a matter of printing conve-
nience. Where references to place names are contained within quotations
from earlier periods, I have retained the contemporary usage.
In the course of completing this book, which has been in progress for
almost two decades, I have received assistance from a variety of sources
which have facilitated access to materials and information in many differ-
ent ways. The library staffs at Carnegie Mellon University, Knox College
and Bradley University have been especially gracious of their time and
talent over a prolonged period. I would also like to thank the staff at the
Orientalia Section in the Library of Congress and at the U.S. National
Archives in College Park, Maryland for their research support. I am grate-
ful for the assistance I received at the Bibliothèque Nationale and the
Archives Nationales in Paris and the Centre des Archives, Section Outre-
Mer, in Aix-en-Provence. The library staffs at Georgetown University,
Northern Illinois University and Yale University also facilitated selected
aspects of my research endeavors.
Over time, I have become indebted to a large number of teachers and
scholars whose research and writing, often accompanied by counsel and
guidance, have shaped my own thinking. While a mere listing of names
cannot do justice to their manifold contributions, I would like to take this
opportunity to recognize some of them. The late Mikiso (Miki) Hane,
Szold Distinguished Professor Emeritus of History and a gifted scholar
and talented teacher, first sparked my interest in Asian studies when I was
an undergraduate student at Knox College. Peter Van Ness later helped
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grow my understanding of Asia when I was a graduate student in inter-
national relations at the University of Denver. My Vietnamese language
training commenced at the Defense Language Institute at Ft. Bliss, Texas
under the strict tutelage of some wonderfully warm and caring Vietnamese
teachers who succeeded in inculcating in me a love of the culture as well as
the language of Vietnam. Major Arnold Catarina, a foreign area officer
specialist on Southeast Asia and officer commanding during my Vietnam
tour, was an informed teacher and a sensitive individual, highly knowl-
edgeable about the region but serving in an impossible situation.
Among those active in Vietnamese studies, I would like to thank espe-
cially Douglas Allen, Melanie Beresford, Mark Philip Bradley, Pierre
Brocheux, Nayan Chanda, Patrice Cosaert, Henrich Dahm, Dang T. Tran,
William J. Duiker, Adam Fforde, Frances Fitzgerald, Frédéric Fortunel,
Nick J. Freeman, Bernard Gay, Ellen J. Hammer, Daniel Hémery, Hue-
Tam Ho Tai, Huynh Kim Khanh, Neil L. Jamieson, John Kleinen, Gabriel
Kolko, Börje Ljunggren, David G. Marr, Albin Michel, Patrice Morlat,
Martin J. Murray, Ngo Van, Ngo Vinh Long, Nguyen Van Canh, Milton E.
Osborne, Eero Palmujoki, Douglas Pike, Doug J. Porter, Gareth Porter,
Lewis M. Stern, Philip Taylor, Carlyle A. Thayer, Tran Thi Que, Andrew
Vickerman, Vo Nhan Tri, Vu Tuan Anh and Alexander Barton Woodside.
In Lao studies, I would like to acknowledge Yves Bourdet, Kennon
Breazeale, MacAlister Brown, Jean Deuve, Arthur J. Dommen, Grant
Evans, Geoffrey C. Gunn, Mayoury Ngaosrivathana, Pheuiphanh Ngaosri-
vathana, Jonathan Rigg, Martin Stuart-Fox, Christian Taillard, Joseph L.
H. Tan, Mya Than, Leonard Unger, William E. Worner and Joseph J.
Zasloff.
I am grateful for inspiration and assistance in Cambodian studies from
Elizabeth Becker, Jacques Bekaert, David P. Chandler, Chang Pao-Min,
Ros Chantrabot, Justin Cornfield, Jean Delvert, Thomas Engelbert, Craig
Etcheson, Alain Forest, Christopher E. Goscha, Evan Gottesman, Caro-
line Hughes, Karl D. Jackson, Raoul M. Jennar, Ben Kiernan, Judy
Ledgerwood, Michael Leifer, Marie Alexandrine Martin, Stephen J.
Morris, Sorpong Peou, François Ponchaud, David W. Roberts, William
Shawcross, Serge Thion, Thu-huong Nguyen-vo, John Tully and Michael
Vickery.
In Laos, a number of friends, sponsors and colleagues have assisted me
in a variety of ways over the years, including Bounleuang Insisienmay at
the Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Bountheuang Mounlasy, Bountiem
Phissamay and Bounnhang Sengchandavong at the Ministry of External
Economic Relations, Himmakone Manodham, Oudone Vathanaxay and
Phetsamone Viraphanth at the Ministry of Communication, Transport,
Post and Construction, Khamphan Simmalavong at the Ministry of Com-
merce, Khamphou Laysouthisakd at the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Liang Insisiengmay at the Tax Department, Noktham
Ratanavong at the Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, Sitaheng Ras-
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phone at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Sommano Pholsena
at the Ministry of Industry.
Richard M. Millar and Maurice Dewulf with the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, William F. Beachner and Geoffrey W. Hyles with the
United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Randall C.
Merris with the Asian Development Bank, and Arne Hansson and Martin
Kerridge with SWECO contributed helpful information and insight on
development issues in Laos. From the private sector, I would like to thank
Olle Andersson with SweRoad, Lee Bigelow with the Hunt Oil Company,
Chanphéng Bounnaphol with Entreprise Oil, Harold Christensen and
Panh Phomsombath with Lao Survey and Exploration Services, Ted Gloor
at Petrotech, Bjarne Jeppesen at Champion Wood Investment, Thommy
Johansson with Skanska International Civil Engineering, Sumphorn Man-
odham at Burapha Development Consultants and Virachit Philaphandeth
at Phatthana Trading Company for their assistance in understanding
contemporary socioeconomic issues. I also owe a real debt to Jonathan
Rigg at the University of Durham for his support of my work in Laos.
In Vietnam, I owe a special thanks to Ambassador Le Van Bang who
was in the gallery when I testified before the U.S. Senate in 1991 and has
continued to be a source of both inspiration and guidance. I also want to
thank Dao Minh Loc at the Ministry of Water Resources, Le Dang Doanh
at the Central Institute for Economic Management, Le Ngoc Hoan at the
Ministry of Transport, Nguyen Dinh Lam at the National Coal Export-
Import and Material Supply Corporation, Nguyen Minh Thong at the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, Pham Chi Lan and Nguyen
Duy Khien at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Tran Danh
Tao and Tran Ngoc Hien at the Ho Chi Minh National Academy for Polit-
ical Science. Virginia Foote at the United States–Vietnam Trade Council
has provided welcome support and assistance, including the organization
of numerous personal interviews in Vietnam, for many years.
In Cambodia, I would like to thank several people for assistance at dif-
ferent times, including David W. Ashley when he worked in the Ministry
of Economics and Finance, Sophal Ear and Michael Hayes, editor of the
Phnom Penh Post.
An earlier version of part of Chapter 4 appeared in Asian Affairs:
Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs vol. 24, no. 3, October 1993,
pp. 304–14 and in Asian Affairs: An American Review vol. 21, no. 4,
Winter 1995, pp. 227–40. An earlier version of part of Chapter 5 appeared
in Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 17, no. 3, December 1995, pp. 265–81
and in Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 19, no. 2, September 1997, pp.
172–89. I would like to thank Triena Noeline Ong, Managing Editor of
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Michael Sheringham, editor of Asian
Affairs: Journal for the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, and Jannette
Whippy, managing editor of Asian Affairs: An American Review, for their
assistance both in guiding the above articles through publication as well as
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for their gracious consent to reproduce the material here in a revised and
updated form.
From the beginning to the end, my family has shared with me both the
frustrations and the rewards of this project. In the process, we have all
enjoyed the opportunity to travel widely in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Therefore, I would like to dedicate this book to my wife, Carol, and our
sons, Alexander and Nathan.
Ronald Bruce St John
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1 Same space, different dreams
“Indochine” is an elaborate fiction, a modern phantasmatic assemblage
invented during the heyday of French colonial hegemony in Southeast
Asia. It is a myth that never existed and yet endures in our collective imagi-
nary.
Academic Panivong Norindr, Phantasmatic Indochina, 1996
I’d bet my future harp against your golden crown that in five hundred years
there may be no New York or London, but they’ll be growing paddy in
these fields, they’ll be carrying their produce to market on long poles,
wearing their pointed hats.
British Novelist Graham Greene, The Quiet American, 1955
It’s the tragedy of a small nation, to have to depend on foreigners.
Vietnamese Novelist Ma Van Khang, Against the Flood, 2000
Southeast Asia by the middle of the nineteenth century had become an
arena of imperial rivalry between Britain and France. There was growing
interest in both countries in exploring the regions that abutted China
because the fabled riches of the Middle Kingdom were believed to be a
potential source of enormous commercial opportunity.1 A British army
officer in 1837 traveled from Burma into China in search of future trade
routes between newly established British colonies and the Chinese empire.
Two decades later, a French expedition departed Saigon with orders to
explore the Mekong River to the fullest extent possible in an effort to dis-
cover an effective means to join, on a commercial basis, the upper reaches
of the river with Cochinchina.2
Epic in concept and execution, early explorations of the Mekong
highlighted the practical difficulties involved in harnessing the river and
promoting commercial development. In consequence, as the historian
Milton Osborne has noted, the colonial administration in Indochina even-
tually adopted a more realistic view of the French role as well as the real
potential for subregional trade and development in Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam.
The grudging recognition, at the beginning of the twentieth century,
that the Mekong could not become the major commercial artery
hoped for by so many Frenchmen coincided with the end of what they
and their metropolitan admirers frequently called “The Heroic Age”
of colonialism in Indochina. . . . Central to the use of the term was the
view that with the passing of the heroic age Notre Indochine had
become a settled group of French possessions. What now existed, the
publicists proclaimed, was a territorial ensemble in which the
prospects for economic success were real, made greater by the rapid
expansion of rubber estates in the 1920s, and the necessary firmness of
colonial rule was balanced by the worth of France’s civilising mission.3
Disparate states
Imperialists, colonialists, internationalists and nationalists, for almost two
centuries, have shared a vision of economic and political union in
Indochina. Discounting the reality that Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are
three very different countries, numerous individuals and groups have pro-
moted various levels of subregional cooperation and development since
the middle of the nineteenth century. Most recently, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank and other international bodies have advanced the concept of a
Greater Mekong Subregion, integrating Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thai-
land, Vietnam and the Yunnan Province of China into a joint development
zone.4
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam sit squarely in the middle of this nascent
development zone; consequently, sustained economic progress in these
three states is vital to the success of more ambitious plans for both subre-
gional and regional integration. All three states have moved, to a greater
or lesser degree, from centrally planned to market economies in recent
years. But political reform has been slower and less uniform than eco-
nomic reform. The ongoing efforts of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to
recreate themselves raise important internal and external issues. Is it real-
istic to think Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam can duplicate the economic
success of the booming industrial “Tigers” of Asia in the 1980s and early
1990s? How far can economic development progress in these three states
without concomitant political change? Do past and present attempts at
Indochina-wide cooperation facilitate or hamper efforts at subregional and
regional development? What is the future economic and political role of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in the region and the world?
Cambodia, located in the center of Southeast Asia, bordered on the
west by Thailand, on the east by Vietnam, on the north by Laos and on the
south by the Gulf of Thailand, is a relatively small country, slightly smaller
than the state of Oklahoma. Unlike its giant neighbors to the east and west
whose populations are much larger, the population of Cambodia is less
than 13 million people. Khmers comprise over 90 percent of the
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population, Vietnamese 5 percent and ethnic Chinese 1 percent. The Cam-
bodian economy is dominated by small-plot agriculture with some 80
percent of the labor force engaged in rice cultivation.5
Slightly larger than Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Lao PDR) approximates the size of the state of Utah and is bordered by
Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand and Vietnam. It is the only landlocked
country in Southeast Asia. At the time the French annexed Laos in the
late nineteenth century, it was divided into several principalities. Number-
ing no more than six million people today, it is the least populous country
in the Indochinese Peninsula with a population less than half that of Cam-
bodia and only 7 percent that of Vietnam. Laos has the lowest population
density in the subregion, but one of the highest rates of population growth.
The Lao are the dominant ethnic group in Laos but account for a much
smaller proportion of the total population than is true of the dominant
ethnic groups in Cambodia and Vietnam. Ethnic composition, together
with the fact that a large number of its citizens live outside the lowland,
Buddhist-centered cultural universe, differentiate Laos from Cambodia
and Vietnam. Theravada Buddhism is the main religion in Laos. But
unlike neighboring Cambodia and Vietnam where the vast majority of the
people are ethnic Khmer or ethnic Vietnamese as well as Buddhist, less
than 60 percent of the people in Laos are ethnic Lao and Buddhist with
the remainder composed of diverse minorities practicing animism.6
Subsistence agriculture accounts for approximately half the GDP of
Laos and provides 80 percent of total employment; nonetheless, arable
land constitutes only 3 percent of land surface. The infrastructure of the
Lao PDR remains primitive with no railroads, a rudimentary albeit
expanding road system and limited internal and external telecommunica-
tions. Electricity is widely available only in urban areas. Historically, Laos
has depended heavily on trade with neighboring Thailand. Sharing the
Mekong Basin with six neighbors, Laos occupies 26 percent, Thailand 23
percent, China and Myanmar collectively 22 percent, Cambodia 20
percent and Vietnam 9 percent. Despite a well-endowed natural resource
base, including forests, water and minerals, the Lao PDR remains one of
the world’s least developed states.
Vietnam is bordered on the west by Cambodia and Laos, on the north
by China and on the east by the South China Sea which the Vietnamese,
sensitive to Chinese maritime claims, term the East Sea. Vietnam is 40
percent larger than Laos and almost twice the size of Cambodia. With a
population exceeding 80 million, there are six Vietnamese for every Cam-
bodian and 14 for every Lao. A poor and densely populated country,
Vietnam has achieved substantial economic progress in recent years;
however, the economic reforms implemented by the government origin-
ated from an extremely low base. The Vietnamese economy is more diver-
sified than that of either Cambodia or Laos with 35 percent of GDP from
industry, 25 percent from agriculture and 40 percent from services.
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French plan for Indochina
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, France brought together in
l’Union Indochinoise the five distinct territories of Annam, Cambodia,
Cochinchina, Tonkin and eastern Laos, areas that were not tightly integ-
rated at the time and enjoyed no common political life or cultural heritage.
Cambodia and Laos were strongly influenced by Indian civilization while
Annam, Cochinchina and Tonkin owed much to China. The hill tribes in
the subregion were a people apart, attached only loosely to Annam, Cam-
bodia, Laos and Tonkin. French rule did little to promote subregional
integration as a contemporary French observer noted at the end of World
War II:
French Indo-China is thus a hotchpotch of very different peoples. A
Cambodian, for example, differs far more from an Annamite than an
Englishman does from an Italian. There is a much greater difference
between a Laotian living on the western slope of the Annamite
Cordillera and an Annamite on the eastern than there is between a
Savoyard and a Piedmontese living on opposite sides of the Alps.
These different peoples dislike one another and do not live at peace
voluntarily.7
In establishing the Indochinese Union, the French created a new geo-
political entity, reversing demographical and geographical patterns long
characteristic of the subregion. The peninsula of Southeast Asia was
broken by mountain chains, river valleys and coastal plains that generally
ran north and south. There were the Irrawaddy, Menam and Mekong river
valleys; the Arakan, Chan, Tenasserim and Annamite mountain ranges;
and the coastal plains of Vietnam. Ancient Burmese, Annamite, Lao and
Siamese invasions followed the river valleys and coastal plains moving
north to south. Where Siam was built on the Menam Valley and Burma on
the Irrawaddy and Sittang valleys, French Indochina was built south to
north and east to west on the Mekong River and the coastal plains of the
South China Sea.8
After occupying the region, the French moved initially to “civilize” the
disparate peoples of Indochina on the assumption their benign task was to
assimilate them into French culture and civilization. “Only gradually did it
become apparent that haphazard and piecemeal attempts to gallicize the
Indochinese resulted chiefly in their demoralization.” The subsequent
policy of association through the Indochinese Union proved contradictory
as it sought to maintain the cultural integrity of the indigenous population
within a framework of total economic, political and social domination by
the French. The administrative, fiscal and legal policies implemented by
the colonial government undermined native family units and created a
dependent peasant proletariat. French education imbued the privileged
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few with ideals of equality, political freedom and self-government, but the
political machinery established by the French prevented adequate political
representation of native interests. “This situation, which included the
usual European attitudes of superiority, could hardly build up the capaci-
ties and self-respect of the Indochinese or lead them wholeheartedly to
accept either their own or French civilization.”9
The growing unrest in Indochina spurred movements for change
throughout the subregion. Ranging in approach from mild reform to
violent revolution, these movements were driven by a reservoir of unrest
as well as growing nationalist sentiments. In the inter-war years, opposi-
tion to French rule took the form of legal and illegal political groups and
actions including secret societies, nativistic religious cults and isolated acts
of terrorism.10 French officials clung tenaciously to an economic policy that
viewed Indochina largely in terms of its usefulness to France. In so doing,
French political policy wavered between strict repression and meaningless
concessions that served to fuel nationalist discontent. In the process, “the
people of Indochina suffered in almost indescribable ways from the bar-
baric nature of French colonialism.” Even the liberal Popular Front
government in France in 1936–8 proved unable to reverse traditional colo-
nial policies as it was forced to compromise virtually all the reforms it did
propose for Indochina.11
Although French rule of Indochina was anything but benign, some of
the barriers between the peoples of the subregion did begin to erode
under French administration. For example, half a million Vietnamese,
encouraged to do so by the French, settled in Cambodia during the
colonial era and eventually came to dominate certain sectors of the local
economy like fishing on the Tonlé Sap, rubber plantation labor and skilled
crafts in the towns. Moreover, hundreds of Vietnamese at any given point
were employed in the colonial civil service. Cambodia was also closely
linked economically with Cochinchina during the colonial period. Because
Cambodia had no deep water port, colonial trade controlled by the French
passed through Saigon.12
To the north, French administrators realized the economy of land-
locked Laos could not develop without a modern transportation system.
Consequently, they built a road the entire length of the Mekong Valley,
linking Luang Prabang in the north with Pakse in the south. Other roads
were constructed through the mountains to the east, linking Laos with
Vietnam and the South China Sea. Unfortunately, a proposed project to
build a railroad from Savannakhet to the Vietnamese coast never materi-
alized.13
The desire of the French “to carry out a colonial civilizing mission pro-
duced a certain unity of policy” in Cambodia and Cochinchina as well as
elsewhere in the subregion; nonetheless, it must be emphasized that “the
comparison is chiefly one of contrasts” both in terms of fundamental social
differences and French methods of government.14 Paul Doumer, governor
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general of Indochina from 1897 to 1902, carried out an aggressive adminis-
trative reorganization that produced strong centralized leadership from
Hanoi as well as from the résidents supérieurs in the provinces; however,
he failed to create an entirely homogenous political or administrative
entity. For example, in the highlands of Annam, Cambodia, Laos and
Tonkin, the French negotiated separate deals with local tribal leaders,
created new political entities and organized the population for purposes of
tax collection and conscript labor. In the main, the French mostly pre-
served existing structures throughout Indochina either because they
lacked the manpower to administer modified structures or because locals
resisted French efforts to change them. As the distinguished historian,
Arthur J. Dommen, later emphasized, the result was a hodgepodge of dis-
parate administrative structures and services.
So French Indochina consisted of, on the east, a Vietnam divided into
three parts consisting of a colony and two protectorates under the
nominal suzerainty of the emperor, and on the west two protected
kingdoms and a handful of directly administered provinces forming a
bulwark against Siam. Even this scheme, a hodgepodge not much less
heterogeneous than the British dominions in North America in the
previous century, was to be further complicated by large-scale recruit-
ment of Vietnamese cadres into the Indochinese civil service and by
encouragement of Vietnamese migration into Laos and Cambodia.
These developments led, in turn, to a lively debate about whether the
inhabitants of these diverse territories owed an allegiance to
“Indochina,” or indeed whether there was such an entity at all.15
Indochinese Communist Party
Marxism-Leninism entered French Indochina in the inter-war period via
Vietnam. The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), founded in Hanoi in
1930, was the product of Soviet initiatives to form a communist party to
combat French colonialism throughout the subregion. Under the leader-
ship of Ho Chi Minh, the communist parties operating in the north, center
and south of Vietnam merged into a single communist party and adopted
the slogan “Complete Indochinese Independence!.” With the exception of
a brief period between February and October 1930, this slogan would
define the revolutionary domain of Vietnamese communism until a few
days before the August Revolution in 1945. The ICP was officially recog-
nized by the Comintern, an organization in Moscow for promoting
communism abroad, in April 1931. Encouraged by the Soviet Union, Viet-
namese revolutionaries toiled over the next decade with little success to
recruit members in Cambodia and Laos.16
Dictated from abroad, the Vietnamese vision of an Indochina-wide
communist movement was illusory from the outset. The thinking of young
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Vietnamese activists focused on Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina; and if
such thinking occasionally expanded westward to Cambodia or Laos, it
was almost always limited to the Vietnamese communities found there. As
a result, the Vietnamese residents of Cambodia and Laos, as well as Thai-
land, formed the bulk of early recruits. Opposed to French imperialism,
Vietnamese revolutionaries talked much of the need for radical reform but
seldom mentioned the roles of their Cambodian and Lao counterparts.
For example, Indochinese Communist Party cells were established in
Phnom Penh in late 1930 with others established later in Kandal, Kratie
and Kompong Cham; however, they all acted sporadically and none was
ever linked systematically with the larger Party network operating in
Cochinchina or elsewhere. In addition, the Party cells established in Cam-
bodia were generally led by Vietnamese who, according to an internal
study of the Cambodian Party:
had difficulties with the [Cambodian] language, customs, and enemy
[French] repression. But the main problem was that the ICP did not
reach into Cambodian masses. Party bases had not yet taken hold in
Cambodia and they had not yet succeeded in making the cause of the
ICP the chief cause of the Cambodian people. This weakness can be
attributed to the ICP’s failure to understand clearly the ethnic ques-
tion (van de dan toc) . . . and thus Party members in Cambodia only
made efforts to work among the overseas Vietnamese populations,
without paying attention to the matter of reaching into the masses of
Cambodian workers, peasants, intellectuals, and working peoples in
general. . . . Every Party cell [in Cambodia] was filled with overseas
Vietnamese, with only one party member (an alternate) being Cambo-
dian. Even the question of organizing the masses was effectively
limited to working among the overseas Vietnamese. In such a situ-
ation, one could not have a truly nationalist movement [in
Cambodia].17
French efforts to breathe life into their vision of Indochina stimulated
and reinforced nascent Vietnamese concepts of an Indochinese nation.
Vietnamese nationalists prior to the arrival of the French generally held
traditional Vietnamese notions of economic and political space, but those
ideas mingled after 1887 with the geopolitical entity the French shaped in
the form of l’Indochine française. French promotion of colonial policies
that emphasized the Vietnamese content of the union also encouraged the
Vietnamese to think in terms of Indochina. The employment of Viet-
namese in lower level bureaucratic postings throughout the colonial
administration had the same effect.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that by the 1930s, the Lao and
Cambodian bureaucracies were remarkably dependent, at the ground
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level, on Vietnamese civil servants. In turn, this increasing number of
literate Vietnamese bureaucrats working in western Indochina
allowed for publication of numerous Vietnamese-language papers,
distributed widely among the expanding Vietnamese communities in
Lao and Cambodian urban centres. Meanwhile, French business inter-
ests in Laos and Cambodia preferred tapping the dynamic Vietnamese
labour force to work on their plantations and mines or for building the
Trans-Indochinois transport system. In an irony which was not lost on
several Vietnamese writers at the time, by targeting the Vietnamese in
the Indochinese education system, by staffing the Lao and Cambodian
bureaucracies with Vietnamese, and by sending thousands of Viet-
namese labourers to Cambodian rubber plantations and Lao mines,
the French had facilitated the Vietnamese rethinking of the space
around them.18
Despite inducements for an Indochina-wide, anti-colonialist movement,
Vietnamese political activities in Cambodia and Laos remained at relat-
ively low levels. In Cambodia, the recruitment problems referred to
earlier, combined with a brief relaxation of French controls on political
expression in 1936–9, resulted in the dissolution of secret, Vietnamese-led
Party structures. Vietnamese revolutionary work in Laos was more pro-
ductive but largely confined to the Vietnamese communities already in
existence there. As early as the end of World War I, anti-colonialists from
north-central Vietnam had begun using Vietnamese communities in Laos
as stepping stones to key resistance bases in Thailand. Significantly, most
of these bases were located in the northeastern part of Thailand as
opposed to further south on the Thai–Cambodian border. Consequently,
when the Indochinese Communist Party came to life in 1930, it inherited
an active network of liaison bases in western Lao towns like Vientiane,
Savannakhet and Thakhek. Laos became a corridor for Vietnamese revo-
lutionaries working in Thailand in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but Viet-
namese efforts to recruit the Lao themselves were not much more
successful than their work with the Cambodians.19
Northern Vietnamese played a key role in the creation of the Siamese
Communist Party in 1930; and a special revolutionary organization known
as the Indochinese Assistance Section served briefly as the ICP’s Central
Committee following heightened French repression in north-central
Vietnam in the 1930s. In addition, Vietnamese communists operating in
Laos and Thailand established a provisional Lao Regional Committee to
oversee revolutionary activities ranging from northern Vietnam to north-
eastern Thailand and Bangkok. Southern Vietnamese communists
attempted unsuccessfully to establish a similar network running from
Cambodia to Thailand in the mid-1930s. The French crackdown on south-
ern communists in the wake of the failed 1940 uprising in Cochinchina
made the success of additional efforts even more difficult.20
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At the beginning of World War II, Vietnamese communists attempted
to incorporate Cambodia and Laos more closely into their revolutionary
activities. With a promise of self-determination, they sought to situate
both Lao and Cambodian revolutionaries within two Vietnamese-led
political bodies, the National United Anti-Imperialist Front of Indochina,
and following the planned revolution, the Federal Government of the
Democratic Republic of Indochina. Two years later, having breathed new
life into the Vietnamese Independence League or Viet Minh, Vietnamese
revolutionaries organized in 1941 a Cambodian Independence League and
a Lao Independence League. The three organizations collectively were
intended to form part of a larger body which the Vietnamese envisioned to
be the Indochinese Independence League. The subsequent failure to
establish a viable Indochinese Independence League proved a crucial
juncture in Vietnamese communist thought about Indochina. From this
point forward until Saigon fell in April 1975, “Vietnamese communist dis-
course on Indochina would be dominated by this strategic maxim attach-
ing overriding importance to access to rearguards in Laos and Cambodia
as a means to securing Vietnam’s western flank.” Viewed as a prerequisite
for communist action in Vietnam, the “Indochinese Battlefield” was put in
motion.21
The dialog among Vietnamese communists as to the limits of revolu-
tionary action in Indochina continued into the period following the Japan-
ese overthrow of the French in March 1945. When the Viet Minh came to
power in August 1945, they could easily have proclaimed a Republic of
Indochina; instead, Ho Chi Minh on 2 September 1945 revived his 1930
Vietnamese line, announcing creation of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. The slogan “Complete Indochinese Independence!” was also
quietly changed to “Complete Vietnamese Independence!.” The rationale
behind the decision to revert to the Vietnamese line remains a matter of
conjecture. Given the recognized discrepancies in Indochinese base-
building, the Vietnamese were surely concerned with the tactical dangers
associated with creation of a Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese Repub-
lic, especially in terms of regional relations with China and Thailand.
Nevertheless, tension between the Indochinese and Vietnamese lines per-
sisted in the wake of the August Revolution. For example, National Salva-
tion, the official publication of the Viet Minh, soon carried the new slogan
“Complete Vietnamese Independence!” but the ICP’s Revolutionary Flag
continued to call for “Complete Indochinese Independence!” well into the
postwar period.22 Even after the Indochinese Communist Party became
the Vietnamese Workers’ Party in 1951, “the Indochinese model remained
the guiding geo-political state structure for the top Vietnamese communist
ideologues in the Vietnamese Workers’ Party.”23
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French Indochinese Federation
At the end of World War II, the French government hoped to regain its
former influence and position in Indochina. On 24 March 1945, French
officials announced a plan long in preparation that called for creation of an
Indochinese Federation within the French Federal Union. Couched in
general terms, the declaration indicated that Indochina would become
autonomous, although the French government would still control its
foreign interests. The proposal called for the Indochinese people to
become citizens of both the new Indochinese Federation and the existing
French Federal Union; however, the process for defining citizenship was
left for future determination. While provisions were made for a state
council and an elected assembly, both had only advisory powers, and the
declaration did not suggest a radical change in the representation of
indigenous as opposed to French interests. The Indochinese Federation
also promised additional economic freedoms, increased education, more
effective labor policies and less discrimination. In addition to the rationale
found in public pronouncements, at least two other considerations motiv-
ated the French proposal. First, Paris felt it must offer Indochina singular
inducements to return to the French community, if for no other reason
than to counteract the impact of a Japanese offer of independence.
Second, the French government was very concerned that its World War II
allies would propose an international trusteeship for Indochina if France
did not make a serious gesture of liberalism.24
Despite a plethora of evidence to the contrary, one of the myths
advanced at the time by proponents of a revived French Indochinese Fed-
eration was that colonial rule had been benign and that a federation would
return peace to the subregion. As the French geographer Pierre Gourou
noted in glowing terms:
Out of various mutually alien and hostile elements France molded a
peaceful whole from which domestic wars were excluded. Irrespective
of France’s right to intervene in Indo-China, the fact is that she brought
about a state of affairs which, viewed in terms of the peaceful relations
established among the peoples of the Federation, was certainly not
undesirable. Accordingly, the Federation deserves to survive.25
Considered in Paris to be a statement of good intentions, the French
government felt the creation of an Indochinese Federation marked the
beginning of a new era. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault
remarked only three days later that “France has no lessons to learn from
anyone in such matters.”26 While independent observers generally dis-
agreed with the arrogant attitude of the French foreign minister, most of
them recognized the proposed Indochinese Federation marked a new
departure in French colonial policy.
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In pursuit of subregional federation, French authorities concluded a
modus vivendi with Cambodia on 7 January 1946. Acknowledging King
Sihanouk’s autonomy in internal affairs, the agreement provided for a
French high commissioner, French advisers at ministerial and provincial
levels, and French control over defense, foreign affairs and minority popu-
lations. Power over matters of subregional concern was to be shared by
the government of Cambodia and the Indochinese Federation. While the
agreement was not particularly generous, the promise of semi-autonomy
for Cambodia represented a significant change from the indirect but total
control previously exercised by France over the Cambodian protectorate.27
Taking the Franco-Cambodian agreement as a model, a subsequent
French pact with Laos in effect restored the latter’s prewar status. A pro-
visional modus vivendi, concluded on 27 August 1946, formally endorsed
the unity of Laos as a constitutional monarchy within the French Union.
But the arrangement involved only a limited devolution of authority as the
French again remained responsible for defense and foreign affairs as well
as for a variety of other functions from customs and postal services to
meteorology and mines. The real power in Laos rested not with the prime
minister but with the French commissioner, who retained the right to veto
even royal decrees.28
A more significant pact, signed by Vietnamese and French authorities
on 6 March 1946, followed the modi vivendi signed with Cambodia and
Laos. Concluded after six months of difficult talks, this agreement recog-
nized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a free state forming a part
of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union but with its own
government, parliament, army and finances. In addition, Paris agreed to
ratify decisions made by the Vietnamese people in a popular referendum
on the union of the three Vietnamese provinces of Nam Ky (Cochinchina),
Trung Ky (Annam) and Bac Ky (Tonkin). In signing this agreement, the
Vietnamese erroneously thought the French would consider Cochinchina
to be an integral part of the Republic of Vietnam, at least until such time
as the promised referendum directed otherwise. Less than three months
later, the French announced the establishment of an independent
Cochinchinese Republic within the Indochinese Federation and the
French Union. This move to maximize French power in Cochinchina met
with very strong objections from the Vietnamese government in Hanoi
and contributed to the failure of otherwise promising negotiations.29
While Indochina remained their guiding structure, the French later
transformed the still-born Indochinese Federation into the Associated
States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Nationalists in Cambodia and
Laos proved reluctant to join the Indochinese Federation because the
structure left the Vietnamese numerically, and thus politically, predomi-
nant. “The dominant role the Vietnamese had played in building
Indochina was no longer acceptable for consolidating postwar Laotian and
Cambodian states.” In this regard, it was no accident that both the Lao
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and the Cambodians had demanded local as opposed to federal control
over immigration and security affairs as a precondition for joining the
Indochinese Federation. These were viewed as key juridical tools in over-
turning what both governments viewed as the “prewar ‘Vietnamisation’”
of Cambodia and Laos by the French.30
Special relationships
Vietnamese communists actively engaged in revolutionary work in Laos as
early as the 1930s; nonetheless, the essence of the “special relationship”
that developed between them and their Lao counterparts was forged in
the three decades after World War II.31 During these difficult years of
struggle against the French and Americans, the revolutionary elite of the
neighboring states developed close ties based on common ideology and
shared revolutionary experience. With many senior Lao cadre educated in
Vietnam or married to Vietnamese, historic ties were cemented by the
personal relationships forged between members of the two communist
movements.32
After 1975, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam formalized the close relationships developed over
the previous years in a series of agreements, the most important of which
was a 1977 treaty of friendship and cooperation. In conjunction with these
agreements, all important areas of decision making in the early years of
the Lao PDR government, from foreign policy to economic planning to
military security, were strongly influenced by Vietnamese advisers or
made with Vietnam very much in mind. Some observers characterized the
prevailing Lao–Vietnamese relationship as a form of Vietnamese colonial-
ism. On the contrary, it was more a situation in which, after decades of
common struggle, Lao officials felt natural in consulting with their Viet-
namese counterparts as to what was best for the Lao People’s Revolution-
ary Party (LPRP), for Laos and for Indochina as a whole. In this regard,
the Kaysone Memorial Museum, created after the death of Kaysone
Phomvihane in 1992, literally spoke volumes about the close nature of the
Lao–Vietnamese relationship. Most of the books on display in the per-
sonal library of the former General Secretary of the LPRP were in Viet-
namese, as were his personal notes on a table.33
Concrete revolutionary action by Vietnamese communists in Cam-
bodia, unlike the Lao experience, did not predate the end of World War
II. The reasons for this difference are not completely clear, but the Viet-
namese certainly placed greater strategic emphasis on northern Laos and
northeastern Thailand than they did on eastern Cambodia. In any case,
the failure of southern Vietnamese communists to form bases in Cam-
bodia before World War II hampered attempts to influence events there
after 1945. At the same time, the Vietnamese communists were the only
real allies the Cambodians had for much of the period between the
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Geneva Conference in 1954 and the overthrow of the Sihanouk govern-
ment in 1970.34
Suffering heavy losses in 1954–9, the Cambodian communist leadership
pushed Hanoi to adopt a new course of action that would include armed
struggle against the Sihanouk regime. North Vietnam adamantly opposed
this policy because Sihanouk’s neutrality protected the western flank of
Vietnam and was thus of enormous strategic importance. A June 1965
meeting in Hanoi between the Secretary General of the Cambodian com-
munist movement and various Vietnamese communist officials marked an
important turning point in Cambodian–Vietnamese relations. When the
Vietnamese again refused to take up armed struggle against the Sihanouk
government, the Cambodians resolved to separate from their Vietnamese
patrons and to carve out a revolutionary program that was uniquely Cam-
bodian albeit strongly influenced by the Vietnamese example.35 This policy
decision, which contributed to an often uneasy Cambodian–Vietnamese
alliance over much of the next decade, eventually led to the establishment
of Democratic Kampuchea in 1975.
In the late 1960s, a number of significant developments also occurred
internationally which affected events in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet
dispute entered a more acute phase reflected in a growing rivalry between
Moscow and Beijing throughout the subregion. In turn, the escalation of
the Second Indochina War forced Vietnam to depend increasingly on the
more sophisticated military assistance available from the Soviet Union. As
one result, the Soviets eventually replaced the Chinese as the main supplier
of military goods to Vietnam. A related source of tension was the rap-
prochement between China and the United States, a move Hanoi viewed as
a betrayal. As Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated, Beijing responded
by shaping Cambodia into a tool to contain the expansion of Vietnamese
influence in Indochina. In supporting an independent and neutral or pro-
Beijing Cambodia, China hoped to block Vietnamese attempts to dominate
the subregion as well as Soviet efforts to expand their influence in
Indochina, long an integral part of China’s security environment.36
Throughout this period, the communist leadership in Hanoi continued
to favor an Indochinese federation; however, given the international polit-
ical climate, they avoided any public discussion of their support. The
Soviet ambassador to Vietnam in a February 1973 political report to
Moscow outlined what he considered to be Hanoi’s longer term objectives:
The program of the Vietnamese comrades for Indochina is to replace
the reactionary regimes in Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh with
progressive ones, and later when all Vietnam, and also Laos and Cam-
bodia, start on the road to socialism, to move toward the establish-
ment of a Federation of the Indochinese countries. This course of the
VWP [Vietnam Worker’s Party] flows from the program of the former
Communist Party of Indochina.37
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Two years later in the wake of the collapse of Saigon, several factors
combined to force Hanoi to undertake a tactical retreat. First, the Viet-
namese were reluctant to jeopardize an increasingly uneasy relationship
with China, a state which had long laid claim to a role in determining
Cambodia’s future. Beijing was clearly committed to an independent Cam-
bodia as evidenced by its material and ideological support for the Khmer
Rouge insurgency and its nominal head, Prince Sihanouk. Second, Hanoi
realized that the successful creation of an Indochina Federation would be
dependent on Vietnam’s ability to control the military and political situ-
ation in both Cambodia and Laos. The Khmer Rouge purge of Khmer
Viet Minh in the early 1970s preempted internal control of the Cambodian
revolution. And the Khmer Rouge seizure of Phnom Penh two weeks
before Hanoi took Saigon precluded a fraternal Vietnamese invasion of its
neighbor under the guise of assisting the Khmer Rouge to liberate Cambo-
dia. The leadership in Hanoi may have hoped in 1975 for a resurgence of
pro-Vietnamese elements within the Khmer Rouge leadership, but this
was not to be the case.38
With revolutionary movements now in power in Cambodia and Laos,
Vietnam was left to bide its time as it continued to emphasize the special
relationship existing with its Indochinese neighbors. At the Fourth Party
Congress in 1976, for example, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
stressed the importance Vietnam placed on solidarity and fraternal friend-
ship with Cambodia and Laos:
We attach high importance to the solidarity between the three coun-
tries: Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The close solidarity between the
three countries is of vital importance to the three nations, and a strong
source of inspiration for the struggle waged by the peoples in South-
east Asia for genuine peace, independence, democracy and
neutrality.39
When the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, under Vietnamese tute-
lage, later replaced the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, Cambodia and
Vietnam immediately concluded a 25-year treaty of peace, friendship and
cooperation modeled closely after the Lao–Vietnamese pact signed two
years earlier. The Cambodian–Vietnamese treaty attached great import-
ance to the tradition of friendship between the Cambodian, Lao and
Vietnamese peoples and pledged to strengthen this long-standing relation-
ship.40
Mekong TVA
With the conclusion in 1954 of the First Indochina War, American policy
makers began to develop plans to thwart the spread of communism in
Southeast Asia through regional economic development projects centered
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on the Mekong River. The central objective of such projects, as detailed in
a proposal prepared by the National Security Council in 1956, was to
“deny the general area of the Mekong River Basin to Communist influ-
ence or domination.”41 The exact manner in which the U.S. government
planned to accomplish its stated objective was left unclear in this and other
early documents since there was only limited technical information avail-
able about the river or its tributaries.
In formulating policy, the Eisenhower administration drew upon a
study, Reconnaissance Report–Lower Mekong River Basin, issued in
March 1956 by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Proposing a variety of
potential sites for hydropower development, this 36-page report included
five detailed appendices and constituted a thorough examination of the
available data.42 It also reflected a view popular in American policy-
making circles that the lower Mekong River, defined as the river from the
Burmese border to the South China Sea, could be developed along the
lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a system of dams and
other engineering works initiated by the Roosevelt administration in the
1930s. A treasure trove of information, the Bureau of Reclamation report,
thereafter, became one of the basic Mekong documents.43
At the time, the U.S. government was aware of and concerned with the
growing involvement in the area of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East (ECAFE), a regional United Nations body. ECAFE had
published in May 1952 an 18-page document entitled “Preliminary Report
on Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water Resources,
Development of the Mekong – An International River” that offered excit-
ing possibilities for subregional development along the Mekong. Washing-
ton desired to be the prime mover in the greater Mekong subregion, an
area of the world American policy makers had come to view as having
great strategic importance. In the face of U.S. opposition, ECAFE later
sponsored an independent survey of the Mekong in 1956 and produced a
report in 1957, entitled “Development of Water Resources in the Lower
Mekong Basin,” that influenced plans for subregional development for
many years.44
The 1957 ECAFE study reiterated many of the arguments found in its
1952 report and reprinted in full the recommendations of the 1956 Bureau
of Reclamation study. To exploit the Mekong’s resources, the 1957 report
called for the construction of a series of five dams on the mainstream of
the river. The recommendations reflected a broad consensus at the time
that the construction of large dams on the Mekong should be a major part
of any plan to exploit the river’s resources. In so doing, the 1957 ECAFE
report suggested the proposed projects would generate exports, principally
electric power and rice, worth an estimated $300 million annually. As a
related benefit, the report argued that all of the projects, even those
located in a single country, would benefit two or more countries in the
subregion.45
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The U.S. government promoted the idea of a Mekong TVA for most of
the following decade. From his first trip to Saigon in 1961, for example,
Lyndon B. Johnson was intrigued with the idea of developing the river to
provide food and power on a scale so large as to dwarf even the TVA.46
President Johnson saw a future for the lower Mekong basin similar to his
vision of the Texas hill country some four decades earlier when dams had
first been built to bring electricity, water and hope to poor American
farmers. It was a future full of new houses, schools, hospitals and roads.47
In a key speech on Vietnam delivered at Johns Hopkins University on 7
April 1965, President Johnson coupled his resolve to continue the fight
against communism with an offer of $1 billion to develop the lower
Mekong basin.
These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impover-
ished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through
until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often
wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early
age of 40.
The American people have helped generously in times past . . . and
now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of
man in that conflict-torn corner of our world. . . .
The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in
this area. . . . And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of
the United Nations [would] initiate, as soon as possible, with the coun-
tries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.
For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar Amer-
ican investment in this effort as soon as it is underway.48
A recognized master of pork-barrel politics, Johnson believed he could
buy communist support with a little old-fashion patronage. The president
outlined in his speech a UN project to promote regional economic devel-
opment by constructing dams along the Mekong in Cambodia, Laos, Thai-
land and Vietnam. Riddled with doubts, as was often the case with
Johnson, the president commented after the speech, “old Ho can’t turn me
down.” But he later told staff members: “If I were Ho Chi Minh, I would
never negotiate.”49 One year later, Johnson commented in a speech to the
American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO): “I want to leave the footprints of America in Vietnam.” He
added: “We’re going to turn the Mekong into a Tennessee Valley.”50 The
future as envisioned by President Johnson was filled with promise if only
Hanoi would stop its crazy war and join in the task of improving Viet-
namese society.
President Johnson’s pledge in Baltimore to commit $1 billion in eco-
nomic aid to develop the lower Mekong basin was still-born. The North
Vietnamese government never responded officially to Johnson’s proposal
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to turn the Mekong into an Asian TVA.51 However, Premier Pham Van
Dong did emphasize in a speech before the UN General Assembly the
following day that his government was prepared to negotiate only on the
basis of the four points contained in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on
Vietnam. In so doing, he specifically ruled out UN participation in any
initiative or plan.52
Mekong Committee
Founded in 1957 under UN auspices, the Committee for the Coordination
of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, generally known as the
Mekong Committee, was charged with promoting regional projects
throughout the lower Mekong basin. A child of the Cold War, committee
membership consisted of the four riparian states located on the lower
course of the river (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam), all of which
were dependent on U.S. aid. A fifth riparian state, Burma, expressed no
interest in membership; and in the early years of the Cold War, no thought
was given to Chinese participation.53
Governed by one representative each from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Vietnam, half the staff of the Committee was drawn from the four
member states and half were foreign experts. The Mekong Committee had
a statute, Statute of the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the
Lower Mekong Basin, to which the four member governments subscribed
and which they envisioned one day would become a charter for a Lower
Mekong Basin Authority. The primary function of the Mekong Commit-
tee was to establish priorities for the various projects envisioned for the
subregion.54
Reflecting the determination of the U.S. government to play a major
role in the area, a reconnaissance team led by Lieutenant General
Raymond A. Wheeler, a retired officer in the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, completed a survey in late 1957 of the lower course of the Mekong.
The Wheeler Report called for a basin-wide development plan and sug-
gested several sites for mainstream dams. Its recommendations for the
location of dams paralleled those of the 1956 ECAFE report. Accepted by
the Mekong Committee in February 1958, the Wheeler Report largely
shaped the work of the Committee until the Second Indochina War ended
any hope of completing major development projects on the Mekong
itself.55
In its early years, the Mekong Committee performed an important role
in a subregion torn by conflict. At a time when the four member states
often bickered with one another, committee members met three or four
times annually to discuss the challenges and opportunities of the river.
Moreover, they were able to raise over $100 million from 26 countries, 15
international organizations, four private foundations and several private
business enterprises. Reflecting American interests, the United States was
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the largest contributor, and an American became administrative head of
the Mekong Committee. Contributions were used to study the flow of the
river, possible dam sites on the mainstream and tributaries, and the socio-
economic patterns of the 25 million people living in the four member
states.56
Even as the war escalated in Indochina, the Mekong Committee in 1970
commissioned a team of independent consultants to create a comprehen-
sive 30-year development plan. Known as “The 1970 Indicative Basin
Plan,” the resulting study constituted a detailed plan for integrated devel-
opment through the year 2000. Identifying 180 possible projects, the plan
called for mainstream and tributary endeavors to generate electric power,
control flooding, increase irrigation and improve navigation on the
Mekong. Implementation of the plan was later thwarted by growing
regional instability. The end of the Second Indochina War subsequently
brought new forms of government to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam which
severely impeded the work of the Mekong Committee. All three states
failed to appoint plenipotentiary members in 1976 and 1977; and although
Laos and Vietnam renewed their participation in 1978, the Khmer Rouge
regime in Cambodia did not. The governments of Laos, Thailand and
Vietnam later formed an Interim Mekong Committee in January 1978;
however, subregional political conditions throughout the 1980s were not
conducive to substantive progress.57
Conflicting dreams
In the process of creating l’Indochine française, the French government
ended traditional patterns of subregional relationships that the peoples of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam had enjoyed with China and Thailand
(Siam), replacing them with the outlines of an emerging French colonial
space. Between the two world wars, Indochinese revolutionaries adopted
this revised geopolitical framework and sought to fashion from it an
Indochina-wide revolutionary movement. Neither the French nor their
revolutionary opponents were wholly successful in these competing
endeavors; nonetheless, French policy remained largely unchanged
throughout the First Indochina War.
During the Second Indochina War, the approach of the United States
and its Western allies to economic development in the Mekong Basin, in
terms of direction and emphasis, largely mirrored the French view, as
opposed to more traditional demographical and geographical patterns.
Focused on the Mekong Valley and east-west communication and migra-
tion, the Americans promoted large-scale, multi-country projects with a
strong emphasis on dam construction on the Mekong and its tributaries.
The growing intensity of the war eventually doomed significant practical
progress in this regard; however, economic development plans developed
in the 1950s and 1960s would be revisited before the end of the century.
18 Same space, different dreams
American interest in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam waned with the end
of the Second Indochina War, leaving its communist rulers free to con-
tinue after 1975 their efforts to promote Indochina-wide cooperation and
unity. The concept of a unified French Indochina proved apocryphal
before 1975 as would the vision of an Indochina-wide communist move-
ment after 1975. However, communist dreams of a monolithic Indochina
would affect the economics and the politics of the region for much of the
next two decades.
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2 Rush to socialism
In our society, there are only two respectable types of people: the prole-
tariat – avant-garde of our society, the beacon of the revolution – and the
peasantry, faithful ally of the proletariat in its struggle for the construction
of socialism. The rest is nothing. The merchants, the petty tradespeople,
they’re only exploiters.
Vietnamese Novelist Duong Thu Huong, Paradise of the Blind, 1988
Peace? Damn it, peace is a tree that thrives only on the blood and bones of
fallen comrades. The ones left behind in the Screaming Souls battlegrounds
were the most honourable people. Without them there would be no peace.
Vietnamese Novelist Bao Ninh, The Sorrow of War, 1991
The special, pure, consistent, exemplary and rarely-to-be-seen relationship
that has bound Vietnam to Laos constitutes a factor of utmost importance
that has decided the complete and splendid victory of the revolution in
each country.
Joint Lao–Vietnamese Statement, 1976
In Cambodia, Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge on 17 April 1975; and
in Vietnam, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese Army on 30 April 1975.
In contrast, the communist march to complete power in Laos was more
deliberate and less violent. King Savangvatthana was pressured to sign a
decree on 13 April dissolving the National Assembly, but the Pathet Lao
did not declare Vientiane “completely liberated” until August. And it was
only in early December 1975 that the monarchy was abolished and the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic formed.
With the conclusion of the Second Indochina War, the governments of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam quickly initiated “socialist” revolutions. The
speed of implementation was particularly surprising in Vietnam where the
communists had long promised a gradual reunification of North and
South. The communist government in Laos took a more relaxed approach
to the social transformation of the countryside; however, it soon followed
the Vietnamese example, implementing its own program of economic
reforms. In Cambodia, Khmer Rouge radicalism led to an orgy of death
and destruction as the government of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–8)
returned that hapless state to Year Zero. An unintended victim of the
accelerated march to socialism in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was the
notion of a fraternity of communist states in Indochina.1
Policy vacillation in Vietnam
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), before the sudden collapse
of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), had long hinted that reunification of
the country would take place in stages over a period of a decade or more.
Consistent with this thinking, the “Program of the South Vietnam
National Liberation Front” in December 1960 called for the progressive,
peaceful reunification of Vietnam.
The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify
the fatherland by peaceful means. The South Vietnam National Liber-
ation Front undertakes the gradual reunification of the country by
peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations and discussions
between the two zones on all forms and measures beneficial to the
Vietnamese people and their fatherland.2
In mid-1968, the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, a
pro-NLF coalition of noncommunist intellectuals and political figures,
adopted a manifesto affirming that South Vietnam would be “an
independent and fully sovereign state with a foreign policy of nonalign-
ment” and that “national reunification cannot be achieved overnight.”3
The “Action Program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government,”
announced in June 1969, later repeated the call for gradual reunification.
The unification of the country will be achieved step by step through
peaceful methods and on the basis of discussions and agreement
between both zones, without coercion by either side.4
Soon after the fall of Saigon, the communist leadership in Hanoi
reversed course and decided at the 24th Central Committee Plenum,
meeting in July–August 1975, to eliminate the South Vietnamese regime
and to proceed with immediate reunification. Excluded from this decision,
the National Liberation Front and Provisional Revolutionary Government
were obliged in November 1975 to vote themselves out of existence. The
decision to proceed with the immediate reunification of North and South
Vietnam ignored “the political, psychological, moral, and economic differ-
ences between the North and the South and among Vietnam’s various
peoples,” setting the stage for five long years of failed experiment in the
South.5
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Hanoi’s decision to proceed to immediate reunification, as Robert K.
Brigham stressed in his landmark study of guerilla diplomacy, was the
product of a long-standing debate.
The division of Viet Nam in 1954 posed unique problems for the
revolution, compelling it to adopt twin goals: to develop socialism in
the North and to wage a war of liberation in the South. These two
goals often competed for limited resources and at times were mutually
exclusive. Whereas some Party members granted primacy to socialist
development in the North and so sought to protect northern interests,
southerners saw national liberation as the Party’s priority and acted
accordingly. The result was an often fierce debate within the Party
that led to the South’s estrangement at the war’s end.6
Nationwide elections in April 1976 selected a national assembly which
approved in June a government for the newly unified Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. Later in the year, the Fourth Party Congress, meeting in Hanoi
in December 1976, laid out extremely ambitious, totally unrealistic goals
for the complete socialist transformation of the South by 1980.7
North versus South
When Vietnam was reunified in 1975, the North Vietnamese economy had
already achieved a high degree of socialism. Most peasants were members
of cooperative units, and the bulk of staple food production was carried
out by these cooperatives. The industrial segment was also well incorpo-
rated into the socialist sector. The state owned relatively modern indus-
trial plants at the central and provincial government levels. Cooperatives
at the district level, or within agricultural cooperatives, ran handicrafts. On
the other hand, the development of a relatively high level of socialization
of ownership was not accompanied by the development of truly effective
forms of socialized production. A limited understanding of the economic
problems created by this paradoxical situation had begun to emerge by the
end of the war. However, full recognition was not widespread because the
difficulties of managing a wartime economy and the availability of foreign
aid had understandably diverted attention from them.8
Unfortunately, the program formulated in Hanoi for the economic
transformation of South Vietnam took the establishment of similar institu-
tions in the South for granted. Not only did like institutions not exist, the
condition of the agricultural sector in the South at the end of the war was
very different from that of the North in 1954 or even in 1975. A series of
land reform programs had been implemented in the South in 1956–74
which largely enabled farmers to overcome problems of high land rents
and skewed land distribution. The land distribution program implemented
in South Vietnam in 1970, known as the “land-to-the-tiller program,”
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redistributed 1.3 million hectares of agricultural land to more than 1
million farmers. Completed in 1974, the results of this program compared
favorably to those of the land reform program implemented in North
Vietnam in the 1950s. Agriculture in the South was also more highly
mechanized than in the North; and in many rural areas in the South, the
division of labor was more highly specialized with well developed produc-
tion servicing and marketing systems.9
Despite these differences, the transition model followed in the South
after 1975 was very similar to that followed earlier in the North, a model
Swedish economists Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder rightly noted had
already led to hardships there.
Following a similar procedure to that adopted in the north after 1954,
the authorities sought to bring about the “Socialist Transformation” of
the south, which essentially meant the imposition of the institutional
models of the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]. In large-scale
industry, factories were brought under the direct control of central
Ministries who sought to manage them according to central-planning
methods, allocating quantity targets for output and requiring that pro-
duction units submit to the administrative allocation of inputs and
outputs. Pressure was brought to bear upon the Mekong delta peas-
antry for them to join cooperatives and “production collectives.” In
the centre of the country these measures were quickly successful, but
in the south, and especially Ho Chi Minh City, they encountered con-
siderable resistance. . . .10
In a keynote address to the National Assembly in July 1976, General
Secretary Le Duan provided an official, albeit unimaginative and uncon-
vincing, explanation of how the socialist North and the nonsocialist South
could march together down the road to socialism.
We must immediately abolish the comprador bourgeoisie and the
remnants of the feudal landlord classes, undertake the socialist trans-
formation of private capitalist industry and commerce, agriculture,
handicraft and small trade through appropriate measures and steps.
We [must] also combine transformation and building in order actively
to steer the economy of the South into the orbit of socialism and integ-
rate the economies of both zones in a single system of large-scale
socialist production.11
But if the model was no longer appropriate to the North itself, the
special conditions existing in the South created even greater problems
there. At the time, these difficulties either were not well understood
or were ignored by the Hanoi leadership. As a result, it seems clear in
retrospect that the main motives for Hanoi’s uncompromising line were
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political as opposed to economic. Tran Thi Que, a senior researcher at the
National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities of Vietnam, later
described how the economic process of agricultural collectivization was
held captive to the political process.
It could be said that the collectivization process, or in other words, the
process of changing the form of production in accordance with polit-
ical objectives, was very successful in meeting its official targets. But
behind those successes were concealed many factors of instability
which were constantly challenging the cooperative form of organi-
zation and, to a certain extent, these factors were recognized by the
authorities. However, due to the absolute confidence placed in the
model, no correct appraisal was made of the nature of the problem
and no effective measures were taken to deal with these problems,
whose growth was to lead to the ultimate weakening of the collec-
tivization model.12
The main cause for the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in
Vietnam after 1975 was the decision to impose the economic development
strategy followed in the North after 1954 on the South in a wholesale, pre-
cipitate manner. In support of this conclusion, Vo Nhan Tri, head of the
World Economy Department at the Institute of Economics in Hanoi in
1960–75, cited the overemphasis on heavy industry as well as the strong
opposition to agricultural collectivization in the South.13 In addition,
enormous socioeconomic problems faced southern Vietnam at the end of
the war, including extensive war damage and the breakdown of basic eco-
nomic systems and institutions. Social dislocations ranged from war
refugees, prostitution, drug addiction and unemployment to hostile polit-
ical elements.14
Nonetheless, it soon became clear to Vietnamese inside and outside the
Communist Party that a substantial proportion of the economic problems
in the South could not be attributed to colonialism, imperialism or war.
Instead, they were the product of the Party’s counterproductive economic
policies. On this question, the Vietnamese leadership in the immediate
postwar period was generally split into two broad tendencies. On the one
side, conservative elements demanded ideological purity and insisted on
the immediate transformation of the economy in the South to socialism.
On the other side, moderates or pragmatists favored granting concessions
and offering capitalist incentives, most especially to increase agricultural
production in the South. Consequently, as the ideological winds shifted,
regime policies vacillated from token liberalism in 1975–6 to rigidity in
1976–8 and back again after 1980 to limited private trade and manufactur-
ing along with practical incentives for farmers.15
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Transition to socialism
After decades of struggle, members of the Vietnamese Communist Party
were understandably in a rush to implement socialism throughout the
country. In line with this thinking, as the Hanoi government realized the
scope of the problems it faced in the South, so the answers appeared to lie
in tighter control of the wayward southerners. This point was later
emphasized by Philip Taylor in his superb study of contemporary southern
Vietnamese society:
The attempt to extend North Vietnamese political culture into the
unfamiliar social terrain of the southern half of the country was
accompanied by a sustained critique of the way of life associated with
the former regime. Such criticisms were based on the assumption that
the DRV, despite having unfolded under very different circumstances,
embodied an authentic model for the newly unified Vietnamese
people.16
Initially, the new regime pursued a policy of economic restoration in
the South; however, the Party Central Committee in August 1975 declared
the nation’s economy had entered a period of transition to socialism. This
new phase of revolution, namely the socialist revolution, aimed at liberat-
ing the nation from hunger and the working people from the exploitation
and oppression of capitalists and feudalistic landlords. The X-1 Campaign,
launched in August 1975, targeted landlords, big businessmen and war
profiteers who had collaborated with the United States and the Saigon
regime. The first currency reform, enacted one month later, replaced the
old piaster with a new southern dong. In theory, all piasters held by
private citizens in the South could be exchanged for the new currency. In
reality, each family possessing less than one million piasters was allowed to
exchange no more than 100,000 piasters with the remainder deposited in
the Central Bank. In consequence, this initial currency reform was not
really a reform at all but rather the first step in the socialist revolution.17
The Fourth National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party,
meeting in December 1976, adopted the Second Five-Year Plan (1976–80),
aimed at a socialist transformation of the South. To achieve this result, the
entire country was focused on achieving a so-called “leap forward” in agri-
culture while at the same time vigorously developing light industry. In the
plan, heavy industry appeared to take a secondary role in support of the
development of agriculture and light industry; nevertheless, its actual role
remained ambiguous. In effect, the thrust of the Second Five-Year Plan,
officially designed to unite the two halves of the country, was to leave the
rich South concentrating on agriculture and the North on industry. In this
regard, the plan took little notice of the resistance of the peasantry in the
South to collectivization, and it was overly optimistic in thinking the land
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would generate sufficient surpluses to fund industrialization. It also under-
estimated the damage inflicted on the country by decades of war and was
wildly optimistic in its expectations for international funding for postwar
economic reconstruction. Embarking on an early unification of Vietnam and
thereby forcing the South to adopt the economic practices of the North, the
leadership in Hanoi reduced the capability of the Vietnamese economy to
expand output at the very time that expansion was most needed.18
Predictably, the decision in 1976 to pursue a rapid socialist trans-
formation in the South along northern lines precipitated an economic
crisis throughout the country. A variety of policies and actions contributed
to the developing emergency. They included forced collectivization in agri-
culture, an inefficient and rigid administrative supply system, price distor-
tions and a tax system heavily biased in favor of distribution and
cooperativization. In the first full year of the Second Five-Year Plan,
industrial output reached a respectable growth rate of 10.8 percent, but
Gross Social Product grew only 4.4 percent. This poor result was due
largely to the dismal performance of agriculture. The production of food
crops declined from 13.5 million tons in 1976 to 12.6 million tons in 1977,
contributing to a 5.7 percent decline in agricultural output.19
Priority to heavy industry, which had long occupied a central role in the
socialist grand scheme for Vietnam, was officially deferred in the postwar
period due to the exigencies of the situation in the South. The Second
Five-Year Plan relegated development of heavy industry to second place;
and in the Third Five-Year Plan (1981–5) and the Fourth Five-Year Plan
(1986–90), it slipped to fourth place. The reality of the situation, on the
other hand, was far different from the declared intention of the planners.
In 1976–82, Gross Fixed Investment (GFI) in heavy industry grew at an
annual rate of 10.2 percent while GFI in light industry fell at an annual
rate of 9.2 percent. In terms of investment, the priority accorded to heavy
industry was clear, irrespective of claims to the contrary in successive five-
year plans. Nevertheless, its capital productivity in 1976–9 declined at a
rate of 18 percent per annum. In 1980–2, capital productivity continued to
decrease an average of 3.2 percent annually while that of light industry
increased by 24.8 percent.20
Economist Tran Thi Que accurately explained the discrepancy between
expressed priority and actual practice in the following terms:
It is clear that the country’s leaders realize the primary importance of
agriculture, not only for its own sake, but for the development of
other sectors of the economy as well. Nevertheless this seemed to be
an awareness only in theory with the expressed intentions to concen-
trate resources to achieve a leap forward in agriculture, existing only
in official documents. In practice, the first priority was given to indus-
try. Agriculture seems to be providing resources rather than receiving
investment because of lower economic investment effectiveness.21
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The Vietnamese leadership agreed in November 1975 to a step-by-step
approach to the collectivization of all sectors of the southern economy. In
agriculture, this was understood to mean peasants would first be asked to
join labor-exchange teams and later to form low-level cooperatives which
would eventually be upgraded. In an abrupt policy reversal, the Commu-
nist Party decided at its Second Plenum in July 1977 to accelerate the pace
of collectivization. The declared aims of the new program were to steer
peasants toward large-scale socialist production, eradicate rural exploita-
tion, mechanize agriculture and mobilize resources for irrigation. Private
ownership of land was abruptly ended, and the option to join labor-
exchange teams disappeared. Implementation of agricultural collectiviza-
tion was relatively successful in the central coastal provinces and central
highlands of Vietnam. Further south, the peasants strongly resisted collec-
tivization. They objected in particular to a social welfare burden requiring
them to support a large number of nonproductive members like Party
cadre, the unemployed and the poor.22
Even though the government continued into the 1980s to push for
enhanced collectivization, the failure of the program was obvious to
independent observers by the beginning of the decade. Of the relatively
small number of cooperatives established in the South by the end of 1979,
most had disintegrated or existed only pro forma barely one year later. At
the same time, agricultural production continued to deteriorate, mostly
due to the dampened individual initiatives that resulted. In a country in
which the agricultural sector accounted for some 50 percent of GDP, and
in which over 80 percent of the population was living in rural areas, the
Vietnamese government in 1976–80 was forced to import 5.6 million tons
of food.23
The postwar economic crisis also impacted negatively on Vietnam’s
international trade position as the trade deficit increased an average of
14.8 percent in 1976–9. The deterioration in the balance of trade was due
in part to the multiple exchange rate system and the exchange controls
adopted by the government. The multiple exchange rate system encour-
aged importation and gave incentives to expatriates to send goods, instead
of hard currency, to relatives in Vietnam. The system thus defeated any
attempt to improve export capability or to promote import substitution. In
addition, the persistent overvaluation of the Vietnamese dong discouraged
sales overseas as well as the supply of exports by local producers since the
latter were paid domestic prices for their products.24
Recognizing the importance of exports, the Vietnamese government was
slow to acknowledge the deterioration in its external trade position. Foreign
Trade Minister Dang Viet Chau, as late as December 1978, was still painting
a positive albeit totally inaccurate picture of export performance.
In the last three years, our economy has achieved remarkable
progress. As a result, our exports have increased rapidly. In 1976 they
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surpassed those of the two zones taken together before reunification,
and in 1977 they increased by over 40 percent as compared with 1976.
I can say with firm confidence that in the current five-year plan
(1976–1980), our exports will probably grow at the average annual
rate of over 40 percent. . . . The prospects for our foreign trade are
very bright.25
China, Kampuchea and Vietnam
Foreign policy decisions also impacted directly, and for the most part neg-
atively, on the performance of the Vietnamese economy in the immediate
postwar era. By 1977, the People’s Republic of China had ended all eco-
nomic aid of any consequence to the Hanoi government. At the same
time, expanded Chinese military aid to the Khmer Rouge encouraged the
latter to increase attacks against Vietnamese border provinces. Vietnam
responded by invading Kampuchea in late December 1978, and Beijing
retaliated by invading Vietnam in mid-February 1979. Premier Pham Van
Dong in a February 1979 interview outlined the official Vietnamese posi-
tion on the growing conflict with China.
The root cause of the tense situation at the border between Vietnam
and China is Beijing’s hegemonistic ambitions regarding Vietnam and
the other Southeast Asian countries. An independent, unified and
socialist Vietnam is a big obstacle to this ambition. That is why, since
the Vietnamese people’s spring 1975 victory, Beijing’s policies toward
us have become increasingly hostile. On the other hand, the Beijing
leadership incited the Hoa [ethnic Chinese] in Vietnam to riot. It con-
ducted sabotage and cut aid to cause difficulties to Vietnam, and at the
same time it intensified armed provocations at the Vietnam–China
border and launched an anti-Vietnam campaign of propaganda
throughout the world.26
While Pham Van Dong’s official statement addressed the public aspects
of the dispute, other elements were more complex and deep-seated. The
genesis for the border disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam stretched
back to 1869–1942 when the French administration redrew the borders of
Indochina, often to the disadvantage of Cambodia. Well before seizing
power in 1975, Khmer Rouge forces had attacked Vietnamese border vil-
lages. Those attacks increased in number and intensified in scale as the
paranoia of the Pol Pot regime grew after 1975. Over the same period, the
Hanoi government had begun to tilt toward the Soviet Union in its
competition with China.27 Analyst Stephen J. Morris best captured the
cluster of factors, including the clash of regional ambitions, that impacted
on Sino-Vietnamese relations in general and the Vietnamese decision to
invade Cambodia in particular.
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The background cause was the imperial ambition of Vietnam’s leader-
ship, which had always wished to dominate the entire region of what
was formerly French Indochina. The immediate or triggering cause,
without which the invasion was unlikely to have taken place, was the
provocative military attacks upon the communist Vietnamese by the
communist Cambodians. These attacks occurred intermittently over a
five-year period, peaking in 1977–78.
Among the secondary factors relevant to the outbreak of the war
was North Vietnam’s foreign policy behavior during the previous
decade. By aligning itself with the Soviet Union, in a process that
began in the late 1960s at the height of China’s conflict with the Soviet
Union, North Vietnam had needlessly antagonized China. Vietnam’s
subsequent decision to purge and begin to expel its ethnic Chinese
minority population and to join the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet-dominated economic bloc, further
antagonized China.28
The adverse impact on Vietnamese economic development of the over-
lapping conflicts with China and the Khmer Rouge was considerable and
proved to be much greater than anticipated in Hanoi. The six northern
provinces of Vietnam were largely destroyed by the Chinese invaders. The
conflicts with China and Cambodia also diverted a large percentage of the
population from productive development activities to nonproductive mili-
tary affairs as well as displacing large numbers of Vietnamese citizens.
Finally, in response to the invasion of Cambodia and the resulting pressure
from the U.S. government, the capitalist countries cut off virtually all eco-
nomic assistance to Vietnam. The loss of both Chinese and Western aid
was disastrous for a country heavily dependent on foreign resources. In
the end, the total cost of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cam-
bodia remains difficult to quantify; however, it likely served to retard Viet-
namese economic development for at least a decade.29
The Chinese invasion of Vietnam had an especially deleterious impact
on the Chinese community in Vietnam which enjoyed a significant pres-
ence in the Vietnamese economy. Well before the Europeans arrived,
ethnic Chinese played an active role in many sectors of the Vietnamese
economy, including commerce, mining and handicraft. The French colo-
nial administration practiced a “divide and rule” policy in which they pro-
moted a separate status for the Chinese minority, a practice that sparked
both envy and animosity among the Vietnamese majority. The French
welcomed this friction between the Chinese and Vietnamese communities
as it reduced the antagonism of the two peoples toward the French,
enabling the latter to play the role of peacemaker.30
With the departure of the French, the Ngo Dinh Diem government, in
an attempt to break what it viewed as a Chinese stranglehold on the South
Vietnamese economy, extended its control over the Chinese, seeking to
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integrate them into the Vietnamese community. In 1956, all Chinese born
in Vietnam were granted Vietnamese citizenship and expected to take
Vietnamese names. At the same time, all non-Vietnamese nationals were
forbidden to engage in 11 occupations, all of which were dominated by the
Chinese community and most of which related to retail trade. The impact
of these measures was contradictory as the government appeared to push
the Chinese out on the one hand and to welcome them in on the other.
The Chinese community refused to believe it would be treated on an equal
footing with the Vietnamese in matters of trade and was furious with
having what it considered to be an inferior nationality thrust upon it. Viet-
namese businessmen, on the other hand, complained the Chinese strangle-
hold on trade actually had been strengthened instead of broken. After a
period of internal resistance, most Chinese complied with the citizenship
requirement, and the Chinese community largely retained its traditional
position in the Vietnamese economy.31
The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in 1975 heightened the
vulnerability of the Chinese community to a government in Hanoi intent
on a rapid transformation from capitalism to socialism. The prosperous
business community in southern Vietnam suffered in toto, but it was the
Chinese contingent that suffered the most. Victimized in the restructuring
of the Vietnamese economy, the deteriorating international situation
aggravated local conditions for the Chinese because the government in
Hanoi viewed them as a potential fifth column. Following a series of meas-
ures undertaken against the ethnic Chinese community, General Secretary
Le Duan was able to boast, in an October 1977 conversation with the
Soviet ambassador to Vietnam, that the Hoa community no longer posed a
threat to the Vietnamese leadership. Whereas ethnic Chinese had previ-
ously controlled 80 percent of economic activity in the South, Le Duan
indicated that basic positions in the industrial sphere were now firmly in
the hands of the “people’s authority.” The fallout from Chinese involve-
ment in the dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia prompted an exodus
of refugees from Vietnam in the second half of the 1970s, a large number
of whom were ethnic Chinese, further exacerbating Sino-Vietnamese
relations.32
In Laos, old habits continue
The government and people of Laos have enjoyed a long, involved history
of foreign aid dependence. From 1968 to 1973, over $74 million in foreign
aid annually was pumped into the Royal Lao Government (RLG), making
the Lao nationals living in the Vientiane-controlled zone among the
highest per capita aid recipients in the world. Unfortunately, most of this
money was spent, not in developing the economy, but to feed war refugees
and to maintain a high standard of living for the small foreign community.
Members of the traditional aristocracy reaped special benefits from the aid
30 Rush to socialism
bonanza with many of them growing wealthy by channeling aid to their
own purposes. Unfortunately, few of the aid dollars corralled by the elite
were invested in productive ventures with most dissipated on luxury
goods.33
The abrupt termination of U.S. aid in 1975, combined with an end to
multilateral budgetary assistance, resulted in the virtual collapse of the
economy in the former Vientiane-controlled zone. From this perspective,
as the anthropologist Grant Evans has emphasized, it was the Second
Indochina War, and not internal social change, which led to revolution in
Laos.
It was not internal social change that led Laos to revolution, but
America’s commitment to rolling back communism in neighboring
Vietnam, which in turn made it imperative for the North Vietnamese
to support the Pathet Lao and thence led to U.S. intervention in Lao
political affairs throughout the 1950s and 1960s to ensure that only
solidly pro-U.S. governments ruled in Vientiane. Thus, because of the
foreign policy priorities of the world’s strongest state the Lao lost
control of their destiny.34
In the Pathet Lao-controlled zone, massive U.S. bombing destroyed
once prosperous villages and reduced many peasants to subsistence
living.35 Guerrilla leaders presided over a primitive economy in a limited
area that received large amounts of commodity assistance from China, the
Soviet Union and North Vietnam.36 At war’s end, the communist leader-
ship of the newly formed Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)
inherited a virtually bankrupt state. The flight to Thailand of a substantial
segment of the country’s limited skilled personnel, together with severe
droughts in 1976–7, added to the misery of the Lao people. Rampant infla-
tion plagued the new state as postwar expenditures increased, revenues
declined, the movement of goods to market slowed and newly created
state enterprises operated at a loss.37
Ideologically, the Lao PDR viewed suppression of the laissez-faire
economy as an essential stage in its consolidation of the socialist revolu-
tion. Nevertheless, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), at the
outset, wisely eschewed the path of radical socioeconomic transformation
and instead promised gradual change. Unlike in Cambodia and to a lesser
extent in Vietnam, there was no headlong rush to a social transformation
of the countryside. Instead, Lao peasants were encouraged to embrace a
collective way of life and to form solidarity and labor-exchange units
through which they would learn to appreciate the advantages of forming
cooperatives.38
Once the LPRP assumed power, it took time for the flow of non-
military aid to regain momentum. That said, the total value of commodity
aid received by Laos in the 1975–8 period was estimated at more that $100
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million with project aid and technical assistance worth an additional $126.5
million. The sources of revenue for the Lao PDR, as early as 1977, mir-
rored those of the previous regime in that foreign aid accounted for 81
percent of the total. Approximately 60 percent of multilateral aid came
from the United Nations with the remaining 40 percent sourced from
OPEC financial agencies. Multilateral aid rose significantly in 1978, largely
reflecting increased lending by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and
the World Bank through the International Development Association.39
Bilateral assistance from socialist states remained an important source
of aid for Laos after the new government took power in December 1975.
The Soviet Union proved the dominant player in this regard, especially
after 1978, when both China and North Korea suspended bilateral assis-
tance. Following a January 1978 Comecon delegation visit to Laos, fresh
agreements on economic and technical assistance were concluded with the
USSR as well as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Later expanded
to cover Poland, these agreements became increasingly sector oriented as
the aid effort intensified. In terms of bilateral aid from nonaligned states,
Sweden was the most prominent donor and the first to make a significant
contribution after independence. Australia, France, Japan, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom also contributed aid in the early years of
the revolution. The U.S. government, despite the socialist orientation of
the Lao PDR, extended modest amounts of food aid annually in 1977–9.
The Vietnamese presence in Laos, dominant in the military sense by the
end of the decade, later led to charges that food aid, both from the East
and the West, was diverted to feed Vietnamese military and civilian
advisors.40
Economic reform in Laos
Following a secret two-day meeting of the Congress of People’s Represen-
tatives in early December 1975, the general public was told the six-
century-old monarchy had been abolished and replaced by the Lao PDR.
The full rationale behind the abrupt timing of this announcement
remained a matter of speculation; however, it was surely influenced by the
simultaneous decision in Hanoi to proceed with the immediate reunifica-
tion of North and South Vietnam. The severe economic impact of the
blockade Thailand imposed on Laos from November 1975 to January
1976, following an exchange of fire along the disputed border, also likely
impacted the decision. Evidence of limited, active resistance to the regime,
especially among selected ethnic minorities, may also have encouraged the
accelerated move to the next phase of the revolution. At the time, an esti-
mated 30,000 Vietnamese troops were stationed in Laos to help deal with
the insurgents.41
The Lao PDR announced in 1976 that it intended to build an independ-
ent, national economy that would progress, step by step, toward socialism
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without first passing through a stage of capitalist development. Its initial
program consisted of three core elements. First, the government planned
to reduce the service sector in favor of the state sector, implying the
nationalization of some private sector assets, together with the implemen-
tation of measures to control petty traders. Second, it intended to develop
the state sector, including banking, internal trade, transportation and
export trade. Third, it planned to emphasize the agricultural sector, includ-
ing the development of irrigated rice production, multiple cropping and
the rationalization of labor use. In industrial policy, the government aimed
to maintain existing artisanal and industrial production, construct agro-
industries and develop the mining and hydropower sectors. Finally, the
Lao PDR announced its intent to reduce the nation’s dependence on the
flow of goods through Thailand and to increase trade through Vietnam.42
The economic reforms introduced in the second half of the 1970s
focused on the marketing and distribution systems, property rights and the
agricultural taxation system. Not all reforms were implemented at the
same time, with changes in the marketing system and tax policies preced-
ing reform of the property rights system. Laos established in 1976 a public
trading network and made inter-provincial trade a state monopoly.
Salaries and wages of civil servants were kept at low levels as were govern-
ment-subsidized prices of basic commodities, like rice, fish sauce and
kerosene, sold in newly created state stores. Two price systems emerged
with the administrative price system, consisting of prices fixed by the
government in the public distribution network, paralleling a free market
system determined by conditions of supply and demand. As the economy
deteriorated, the government also implemented a series of strong fiscal
measures. The Vientiane kip in June 1976 was demonetized and replaced
by the Liberation kip at a conversion rate of 20 to one. As poor budgetary
discipline and state enterprise deficits combined to expand the money
supply, the Lao PDR introduced additional measures to improve bud-
getary discipline, control monetary expansion and reduce state enterprise
losses.43
Significant changes in the agricultural taxation system, intended to gen-
erate revenues to support the state apparatus and to supply the state distri-
bution network with basic foodstuffs, accompanied reforms made to the
marketing and distribution systems. In October 1976, the Lao PDR intro-
duced a progressive tax that took up to 30 percent of a farmer’s rice pro-
duction. Non-rice crops, when they provided the principal source of
income, were taxed at a flat rate of 8 percent. In its defense, the commu-
nist government had little option but to turn to taxation to replace the
budget subsidy provided by the United States before 1975. At the same
time, the introduction of new agricultural taxes, without a concerted effort
to explain their need, soured relations with the very Lao peasantry the
government claimed to represent. In contrast, the previous regime had not
collected rice taxes; and with landlordism not a serious problem in Laos,
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few farmers had ever paid rents in kind. The unpopularity of rice taxation,
together with an equally unpopular rice purchase policy in which the
government purchased rice at below market prices, fostered distrust with
the subsequent policy of collectivization. In retrospect, the agricultural tax
policy proved the clearest signal to date that the government planned a
new role for Lao peasants in the nation’s economic development.44
Dissatisfaction with the agricultural tax program was so widespread that
government officials were forced to defend publicly the new policies, an
unusual tact in the Lao PDR. An article in Sieng Pasasonh, the Party
journal, exemplified the official government line.
We must make it clear to our people that paying agricultural taxes to
the state now is different from paying taxes to the reactionary clique
in the past. Then it only served to increase the wealth of a group of
persons or their men and did not help the nation or the people; today
it contributes to national construction and to the improvement of the
people’s living conditions.45
The Lao PDR in March 1978 launched an interim three-year develop-
ment plan, intended to bring state planning in line with the five-year plan-
ning cycle of Vietnam and the Comecon states. The objective of the plan
was to attain by 1980 self-sufficiency in food grains, most notably rice. The
government planned to achieve this goal by increasing the cultivated area,
expanding irrigation and increasing yields. To accomplish these targets,
the government allocated new funds to industry and manufacturing to
increase inputs to agriculture as well as to accelerate the processing of
timber. Reflecting geopolitical concerns, the government also emphasized
a variety of transport and communications projects, including construction
of an all-weather road to Vietnam.46
Social and political reform in Laos
As the Lao PDR struggled to remake the economy, it embarked on a con-
certed effort to reestablish Lao cultural identity and national sovereignty.
The immediate need was “to integrate the many scattered villages and dis-
tricts into a single country with a common identity,” a task never before
accomplished. Divided into principalities at the time of the French
takeover, the creation of the modern Lao state was the product of French
concessions to Lao sovereignty in the 1946–54 period when Laos was
recognized as an independent state. At that time, dialogue centered on the
king and Buddhism.47
In contrast, post-1975 discourse evidenced a new, socialist world in
which the king had abdicated and Buddhism was no longer recognized as
the state religion. The revolutionary government first sought to duplicate
throughout Laos the administrative structures in place in the liberated
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zones before 1975. This process involved increased control by political
cadre, a thorough reorganization of village administration, creation of
mass organizations at village level and emphasis on political correctness.
The increased political and social control that resulted prompted an esti-
mated 300,000 people, approximately 10 percent of the population, to
make their way to refugee camps in Thailand. It took the Lao PDR many
years to recover from this loss of much of its educated citizenry. Govern-
ment policies regarding national integration had far-reaching con-
sequences for ethnic minorities in particular. Attempts to rationalize
upland farming and to promote paddy rice production led to the reloca-
tion of upland villages to lowland areas. While some ethnic minorities had
supported the Pathet Lao during the war, others sided with the Royal Lao
Government and concerns for the political reliability of the latter motiv-
ated some relocations. Implementation of the relocation policy resulted in
social disruption, and in some cases high mortality. Associated promises of
land clearance and school and clinic construction were not always kept.48
Buddhism occupied a central place in the nationalist ideologies of other
Southeast Asian states, like Cambodia and Thailand, but not in Laos
because it was the religion of the ethnic Lao population only and not that
of hill tribe groups. A major wartime achievement of the Pathet Lao was
their elaboration of a nationalist ideology that recognized ethnic minori-
ties as part of the Lao nation. Once in power, the new regime moved
quickly to bring Buddhism under its influence. The Buddhist sangha was
reorganized in 1976 with the supreme patriarch displaced by a committee
from the newly created Lao United Buddhist Association. Regime milit-
ants, arguing monks were part of the unproductive, former ruling class
because they were dependent on alms, forced them to till their own
gardens. This injunction, together with food shortages in 1976–7, led
monks to abandon their wats with some becoming forest monks. In turn,
many believers, concluding monks who worked were not really monks,
stayed away from their wats. As a result, a revival of both spirit worship
and consultations at the village level took place in the early years of the
revolution. It thus proved ironic that a policy aimed at mobilizing Bud-
dhism for state ends led to a revival of “superstitious practices” outside the
wats as well as the alienation of many lowland Lao.49
In promoting change, the Lao PDR recognized the importance of sym-
bolism. In December 1975, a series of resolutions related to the Lao lan-
guage, national anthem and national flag were adopted in an effort to
reconstruct the past. The new national anthem, for example, replaced ref-
erences to Buddhism and to a singular Lao race with references to all Lao
ethnic groups. At the same time, the music of the old anthem was retained
in an apparent effort to maintain phonic continuity. Over time, “through
gesture after gesture, the new regime distanced itself from the old regime,
and then embarked on modifying old rituals and symbols and creating new
ones.” The Lao PDR implemented dramatic breaks with the past, such as
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abolishing the monarchy, but also adjusted to existing realities. For
example, Vientiane kip notes were destroyed in ceremonial burnings in
June 1976 and replaced with the new Liberation kip. But old stamps
remained in use, as long as the word “kingdom” was crossed out so that
only “Laos” remained. Unlike its comrades in Cambodia and Vietnam, the
Lao PDR also decided it was unnecessary to rename the streets of the
main cities of Laos.50
Agricultural collectivization campaign
At the outset of 1977, the Lao PDR appeared to be preparing for a relat-
ively slow, steady march to socialism. Not yet in command of the country-
side, its administrative reach was limited and its control of the economy
fragile. With the overall situation poised to improve, external and internal
events combined to spur the regime to take more aggressive measures. A
deterioration in relations with Thailand led to another blockade in 1977.
Growing tensions between Vietnam, the closest ally of Laos, and both
China and Democratic Kampuchea, further increased the insecurity of a
landlocked state seemingly surrounded by threatening powers. Serious
natural calamities compounded the impact of mounting international ten-
sions to lead the LPRP leadership to initiate an accelerated economic and
social transformation of the countryside.51
Official pronouncements in the second half of 1977 promoted the col-
lectivization of agriculture; and in early 1978, the Political Bureau of the
LPRP announced a formal policy of collectivization based on the creation
of village-based cooperatives. The government had made no mention of
cooperatives when it came to power in late 1975, but the increased use of
both mutual aid groups and solidarity teams paved the way for the launch
of the new program. Officials emphasized economic reasons for the
change, arguing collectivized agriculture would boost production by
increasing the amount of land under cultivation and facilitating the use of
irrigation and technology. Ideological and political considerations were
also cited in support of the decision to establish cooperatives.52
The socialist transformation of agriculture in Laos focused on the cre-
ation of village-based cooperatives, as opposed to land reform, leading to
the formation of over 1,732 such units by the end of April 1979. By the time
the program was suspended three months later, the government claimed
2,800 cooperatives existed, incorporating some 25 percent of peasant famil-
ies. The program also involved the creation of a few state farms; however,
the emphasis of the movement was on rice cultivation which occupied some
85 percent of all agricultural land. The rapid growth of village-based coop-
eratives resulted in declining agricultural outputs and increasing peasant
resistance. Opposition to the policy took a variety of forms, including
smuggling to Thailand, destruction of agricultural output, emigration and
cultivation in remote areas where administrative control was lacking.53
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In response, the Lao PDR in mid-1979 abruptly suspended the forced
creation of agricultural cooperatives and called for the consolidation of
existing ones. At the same time, the government accommodated those
peasants who had been forcibly organized and now wished to withdraw.
The manifold reasons for the failure of collectivization have been grouped
by historian Martin Stuart-Fox under a few central headings.
These include peasant attachment to traditional lifestyles, lack of
understanding of the value of cooperatives, fear of effects of joining,
the shortage of trained cadres, their failure to understand and imple-
ment the Central Committee directive and their use of coercion,
failure of the government to provide material support, and the effec-
tiveness of anti-government propaganda in exploiting peasant distrust
of government motives.54
The decision to suspend the creation of agricultural cooperatives, when
coupled with reforms in the agricultural taxation system, signaled a major
policy shift. The basic error as Kaysone Phomvihane, Prime Minister and
General Secretary of the LPRP, admitted in late 1979 was that the govern-
ment had adopted an over-centralized model of socialism in which the
state sector was unable to fulfill its prescribed role. Socialism remained the
ultimate goal of the Lao PDR, but increased production and an improved
standard of living were recognized as immediate needs for the stability of
the regime.55
In this regard, it should be remembered that the Lao PDR decision to
embark on an ambitious program of agricultural collectivization followed
in the wake of a similar decision in Vietnam. There was a limited eco-
nomic rationale for the policy in southern Vietnam; however, there was no
possible justification for its introduction in Laos, except ideological convic-
tion in the superiority of the socialist mode of production. Given the
extent of small-scale, individual landholdings in Laos, any widespread
move towards collectivization necessitated careful preparation and intro-
duction if it was to have any chance of success; however, this was never
done. Consequently, widespread peasant opposition to collectivization,
especially when it was preceded by unpopular changes to rice taxation and
purchase policies, was to be expected. By mid-1979, both the Soviets and
the Vietnamese were counseling the Lao PDR to suspend the program
indefinitely. Of some 2,800 cooperatives organized after 1978, as few as 65
retained any organizational basis by 1980.56
Heightened economic reform
The decision to terminate plans to collectivize Lao agriculture a little more
than a year after their announcement represented a clear victory for prag-
matism over ideology. Food production was now accorded the number
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one priority in an effort to reduce imports and overcome the nation’s food
deficit. Coming as it did halfway through the interim three-year plan, the
abandonment of the policy of collectivization heralded similar rethinking
on the broader economic front. The change was recognized officially in
December 1979 in the Seventh Resolution of the Supreme People’s
Assembly. In a truly remarkable document, the regime candidly admitted
its shortcomings and announced sweeping economic reforms to address
the problems arising from earlier policy decisions.
In guiding economic activities, we have failed to firmly grasp and
implement the details of the economic line, plan and policy of the
party and state. We still have some weak points in organizing the
implementation of the plan and policy. In addition, there has been a
delay in formulating many necessary plans on economic activities.
Some plans or systems on economic activities, which we have
already adopted, do not conform with the true situation in the
country.57
The package of reforms embodied in the Seventh Resolution touched
virtually every aspect of the Lao economy. In the current stage of eco-
nomic development, General Secretary Kaysone admitted, recourse would
have to be made to both capitalist and socialist economic laws in an effort
to promote economic growth. The government officially recognized five
separate economic sectors – individual subsistence, joint state-private,
private capitalist, collective or cooperative, and state-socialist – all of
which would have to be developed for the welfare of the nation. In short,
the government agreed to recognize private investment by small traders as
well as the investment of private capital in larger enterprises, either pri-
vately run or operated in conjunction with the state.58
In line with the overall objectives of the Three-Year Plan (1978–80), the
Seventh Resolution emphasized agricultural production in particular.
In the immediate future, all cantons, districts and provinces must
review their past experiences in implementing plans for agricultural
production, outline new plans and tasks for 1980, organize a thorough
implementation of the above-mentioned measures together with peri-
odic inspections, and pay attention to learning from 1979 lessons in
mobilizing the people to set up agricultural cooperatives to prepare
for the 1980 production season. . . .59
Among the steps introduced to stimulate the production and distribu-
tion of goods, the most significant initiatives liberalized restrictions on
private participation in manufacturing, commerce and internal trading.
The government called for private involvement in communications and
transportation in order to overcome bottlenecks in state procurement and
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distribution services. And it made major concessions in the area of internal
trade where past policies had been especially restrictive. In an effort to
boost agricultural production, curtail inflation and improve the overall
economic climate, the Lao PDR reduced the tax on rice. The Seventh Res-
olution also introduced important new reforms in pricing, finance and eco-
nomic management. In so doing, the government admitted that it was
unable to control prices. In an unexpected currency reform, the Bank kip
replaced the Liberation kip, implementing an effective devaluation of 60
percent against the U.S. dollar.60
The Seventh Resolution represented a major policy reorientation in the
Lao PDR’s transition to socialism, and its central themes were reiterated
at the Party’s Third Congress in 1982 and Fourth Congress in 1986. The
revised LPRP economic strategy legitimized small-scale capitalism and
petty commodity production; however, the state sector still controlled the
“commanding heights” of the Lao economy. A significant policy shift, the
Seventh Resolution did not constitute a basic reappraisal of capitalism.
For the communist leaders of Laos, “the long-term superiority of socialism
over capitalism remained unquestioned.”61
Subregional collaboration
Vietnam began to characterize its relations with Laos as a “special rela-
tionship” well before the Pathet Lao came to power in late 1975. With the
establishment of the Lao PDR, Hanoi reaffirmed this symbiotic relation-
ship, together with its view of Indochina as a strategic unit, retracing the
roots of the Indochinese Communist Party back to the 1930s. Vietnamese
General Secretary Le Duan put special emphasis on the strategic interde-
pendence of the two states: “Neither of our two countries could live and
work in peace, independence and freedom, so long as the security and ter-
ritory of the fraternal country was threatened and encroached upon by
imperialism.” His remarks reflected the threat to Laos and Vietnam posed
by Thailand, because of its collusion with the United States, as well as
Hanoi’s growing suspicion of China.62 General Secretary Kaysone offi-
cially endorsed the “special relationship” in a visit to Hanoi in February
1976:
The special relationship . . . is the great, constantly consolidated and
enhanced comradeship between two Parties which both issue from the
Indochinese Communist Party. . . . The special, pure, consistent, exem-
plary and rarely-to-be-seen relationship that has bound Vietnam to
Laos constitutes a factor of utmost importance that has decided the
complete and splendid victory of the revolution in each country. This
is also the firmest basis for the solidarity and cooperation between the
two Parties and the two countries, and for the victory of the revolution
in each country in the new stage.63
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The close economic and political relationship enjoyed by Laos and
Vietnam, in which Vietnam remained the dominant external power within
Laos, was cemented in a 25-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in
July 1977. The second article of the pact accorded Vietnam legal justifica-
tion to maintain large numbers of Vietnamese advisers in Laos.64 The two
states also concluded a border delimitation treaty, forming a joint border
commission which divided the frontier into 19 sectors and completed a
pilot demarcation in March 1979. The remainder of the frontier was
demarcated between July 1979 and August 1984.65
On the first anniversary of the Lao–Vietnamese Friendship Treaty,
Kaysone issued a statement publicly committing Laos to the Vietnamese
side in the latter’s disputes with both Cambodia and China.
We once again reaffirm that we always stand by the struggle to defend
their [the Vietnamese people’s] independence, sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity against threats, pressures, trouble-making, provocation,
violation, slander and sabotage, committed by the imperialists and the
international reactionaries.66
In December 1978, a large-scale Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia
ended almost four years of Khmer Rouge rule. The Chinese government
responded in February 1979 with a three-week punitive attack on the
northern border provinces of Vietnam. In response, Laos denounced
China by name for the first time in March 1979, and its rhetoric against
China was soon indistinguishable from that of Vietnam. In April 1979, Lao
PDR President Souphanouvong outlined the accusations against China:
The Chinese powerholders who are pursuing a counterrevolutionary
policy of regional hegemony and big-nation expansionism. . . . are ruth-
lessly carrying out schemes to swallow up our country as well as
Vietnam and Kampuchea so as to proceed with annexing other coun-
tries in Southeast Asia. . . . We must maintain high vigilance against the
adventurous, warmongering schemes of the Chinese powerholders.67
Lao PDR officials complained of alleged Chinese aid to anti-
government rebels, especially Hmong remnants of General Vang Pao’s
army, as well as the resettlement of Lao refugees in Yunnan province near
the Lao border. One of the reasons for the December 1979 currency
reform was the fear Beijing, which held the printing plates for the Libera-
tion kip, might sabotage the Lao economy by circulating illegally printed
currency. Given the vehemence of its propaganda campaign, China took a
surprisingly indulgent stance toward the Lao PDR, largely blaming
Vietnam and the Soviet Union for the provocative statements of the
LPRP.68
In its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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(ASEAN), Laos continued to follow the lead of Vietnam. Following the
communist takeover in Laos, the governments of both Laos and Vietnam
proclaimed their desire to improve relations with the ASEAN member
states but denounced ASEAN itself as an American-sponsored, anti-
communist body. And they later decried an ASEAN resolution calling for
creation of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality after it was introduced
at a summit of nonaligned nations in August 1976. Attitudes began to
change as the decade ended and the growing rift with China led Laos and
Vietnam to seek a more active, harmonious involvement in regional
affairs, a policy supported by the Soviet Union.69
A joint Lao–Thai communiqué in January 1979 promised to transform
the Mekong into a river of peace, friendship and mutual benefit. Neverthe-
less, Thailand in mid-1980 used a shooting incident on the Mekong as a
pretext to again close its border with Laos. Thailand probably took this
action more as a means to display its opposition to Vietnam’s occupation
of Cambodia than as a punitive measure against Laos. The border closure
also signaled Bangkok’s displeasure with a recent Vietnamese strike at
Khmer refugee camps inside Thailand. Finally, it encouraged Vientiane to
reconsider its close ties with Hanoi and to recognize the importance of
friendly relations with Thailand. While the Chinese government firmly
supported Thai policy, it continued to stress its friendship for the Lao
people, claiming its grievances were with the Lao PDR leadership. Two
months later, Thailand reopened two border crossings near Vientiane,
citing humanitarian concerns for the Lao people.70
The evolving nature of the Lao–Vietnamese relationship led many sea-
soned Southeast Asian observers to conclude that Laos by 1980 had sacri-
ficed its independence to its larger, stronger neighbor to the east.
Academics Brown and Zasloff, referring to Kaysone’s statement on the
first anniversary of the conclusion of the Lao–Vietnamese Friendship
Treaty, together with other official utterances, spoke of Hanoi’s “domina-
tion” over Laos.
The national interest of weak little Laos, if she could act indepen-
dently, would be to remain neutral in a conflict between her two
powerful neighbors, Vietnam and China, and to steer a middle course
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Laos’s forthright assumption of the Viet-
namese and by extension the Soviet side in this conflict seems to have
resulted from Vietnamese pressure, presumably with Soviet endorse-
ment.71
In turn, historian Arthur J. Dommen argued that “Vietnam has replaced
France as the colonial power in Indochina” with Laos essentially “a satel-
lite of Vietnam.” At the same time, he rightly viewed Hanoi’s policy
toward Laos as reflective of a return to the concept of a unified
Indochina.
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The stationing of Vietnamese troops in Laos today is obviously aimed
at defending the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
economic and cultural construction not of Laos, but of a Greater
Vietnam, envisioned by Ho Chi Minh’s successors and supported by
the Soviet bloc. This Greater Vietnam will make Laos far more a part
of Vietnam than the Indochinese Federation Ho envisioned when his
preoccupation was the expulsion of the French.72
Vietnam leads – Laos follows
Throughout history, successful revolutionaries have often proved more
adept at war and revolution than at peace and reconstruction. This proved
to be the case in Vietnam. By early 1979, it was increasingly clear to
outside observers that the economic policies developed in the North and
fostered on the South were not addressing the economic and social prob-
lems of the newly unified country.
The crisis of 1979–80 above all affected the central state management
system. Western and Chinese aid cuts reduced directly the volume of
resources controlled by the state trading monopolies. At the same
time bad weather and resistance to the collectivization drive in the
Mekong delta made it extremely difficult for the authorities to secure
rice supplies. There was a sharp fall in domestic supplies of staples to
the state in 1978 and 1979. At the same time, imports fell off as
Western countries and China responded to the deterioration in inter-
national relations and the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of
Kampuchea in the winter of 1978–79.73
While the Communist Party Central Committee eventually initiated tenta-
tive steps in the direction of economic reform, years would pass before
there was a broader recognition in Vietnam that the rush to unite the North
and the South under a single communist government was a major historical
error. As Gareth Porter, a noted Vietnam scholar, later concluded:
A separate Southern regime would have avoided the policies of forced
collectivization of agriculture and elimination of the Chinese-
dominated trading system by confiscating the assets of merchants and
sending the merchants to the countryside. It would have established
business links with the overseas Chinese communities in East Asia
and maintained a freer press that might have prodded the party
leadership to begin the process of economic and political reform much
sooner than it did.74
In short, a separate regime in the South after 1975 would have put
Vietnam in a much stronger position in the late 1970s to implement the
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economic and social reforms that, because of forced unification, it was
eventually able to adopt only in the late 1980s.
The full extent to which internal policies in Laos trailed Vietnamese
decisions in the first half-decade of the revolution was remarkable. Com-
paring the sequence of events in Laos and Vietnam in the period 1975–80,
major domestic policy decisions in Laos almost invariably followed similar
decisions in Vietnam. This was definitely true in the case of agricultural
policy in Laos where a decision to move forward with an accelerated drive
toward collectivization in 1977–8 was soon followed by an abrupt decision
to suspend the same movement. Other economic policies implemented in
Laos after 1976 also mirrored Vietnamese practice as did the decision to
relax economic controls and move toward a market economy in 1979. In
the colorful words often employed in the official communications of both
states, Laos and Vietnam were like “lips and teeth.”75 Given the close cor-
relation between the Lao and Vietnamese approaches, in both domestic
and foreign policy, the Seventh Resolution of the Lao People’s Revolu-
tionary Party, introduced in December 1979, suggested the beginning of an
important new emphasis by the Lao PDR to develop Lao solutions to Lao
problems.
Interrelated to a certain degree, it must be recognized in the end that
the post-1975 revolutions in Laos and Vietnam were undertaken in vastly
different circumstances. As they evolved, each assumed a singular charac-
ter. Consequently, the economies of Laos and Vietnam remained signific-
antly different in important areas from the agricultural sector to
investment policies to the management of state enterprises. A comparative
look at selected aspects of economic and political reform in these states
directs attention to the unique approach to economic growth each
pursued. It also highlights the different rules, regulations and procedures
in place or coming into place. Such policy differences threatened to inhibit
the ability of their respective economies to participate fully in the growing
number of proposals for subregional and regional development later
advocated by private and public bodies.
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3 Tentative reforms
The king of the mice agreed to pay the woodcutter a gold coin daily not to
cut down the tree where he lived. The woodcutter’s wife told him to fell the
tree because the mouse-king hid a pile of gold underneath it. The wood-
cutter did as he was told, but there was no gold to be found, and the
mouse-king had run off, too. That night, the mouse-king and some of his
subjects crept up to the woodcutter’s house and took back the gold pieces
he had collected earlier, so he was soon as poor as ever.
“The Woodcutter and the Mouse-King,” Cambodian Folk Tale
My life seems little different from that of a sampan pushed upstream
towards the past. The future lied to us, there long ago in the past. There is
no new life, no new era, nor is it hope for a beautiful future that now drives
me on, but rather the opposite. The hope is contained in the beautiful pre-
war past.
Vietnamese Novelist Bao Ninh, The Sorrow of War, 1991
On the economic front, we also indulged in subjectivism, failed to grasp
economic laws and to strongly promote the people’s mastery as a motive
force.
LPRP General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane, 1982
The governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam cautiously initiated in
1979 a limited process of economic reform. Predictably, the output of
many of these reforms was soon compromised by internal, ideological
debates over the optimum pace and direction of socialist transformation.
Consequently, this first wave of reforms yielded disappointing results,
setting the stage for renewed efforts in the second half of the decade.
At the time, all three states faced related development challenges;
therefore, it was not surprising that many of the reforms implemented
appeared on the surface similar in origin, sequence and substance.
Selected reform programs were interrelated to some degree; however,
they were mostly undertaken in different circumstances, and each gradu-
ally assumed a unique character. The ongoing emphasis by the communist
leadership in all three states on their “special relationship” added to the
confusion. Official statements implied the three neighbors were proceed-
ing down parallel development paths when the reverse was more often the
case.
Early reforms in Vietnam
It was clear by early 1979 that the economic policies instituted in Vietnam
after 1976 were not reducing the serious economic and social problems
facing the newly unified country. The industrial sector had ceased to grow;
food production was erratic; GNP was barely equal to that of 1976; and
population growth had reduced the per capita GNP figure. When General
Secretary Le Duan acknowledged the difficult situation Vietnam faced at
the outset of the 1980s, he placed the blame squarely on the socialist
policies pursued by the Party after 1975.
The deep root cause of the difficulties in the economy and daily life is
the following: Our economy is still primarily one of small production,
and moreover suffers the extremely heavy aftermaths of prolonged
war and of colonialism. . . .
On the other hand, the difficulties have also stemmed from short-
comings and mistakes of the party and state agencies, from national
down to grass-roots levels, in economic leadership and management
and in the running of our society.
In some definite aspects, these shortcomings and mistakes in
leadership and management have mainly caused or aggravated the
social and economic difficulties in the past years. The party Central
Committee sternly criticizes itself before the congress.1
In response to the deteriorating situation, the Sixth Plenum of the Party
Central Committee, meeting in August 1979, retreated from its policy of a
rapid socialist transformation of the economy and initiated instead a policy
of cautious economic reform. Criticizing what was described as a “haste
tendency,” the Vietnamese leadership took steps to provide incentives to
producers, to encourage individual initiative, and to grant greater auto-
nomy to local authorities and production units. Reflecting the power
wielded by conservative Party elements, this initial attempt at economic
reform was limited in scope.
To encourage production establishments to fully use all their potential
for producing as many goods, especially consumer goods, as possible
. . . on 2 August [1979] the Council of Ministers promulgated the
following policies:
Boldly encourage state-owned, collective and privately-run produc-
tion establishments to accelerate the production of commodities which
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are not under state control and which are not produced with state-
supplied materials.
Local economic units are authorized to establish direct relations
and contracts with each other in order to accelerate production and
circulation of these goods.
State enterprise, joint state-private firms and collectively, and pri-
vately, run economic units will be allowed to purchase agricultural,
forestry and fishery by-products as well as other locally available raw
materials which are not under state control for the production of com-
modities, provided that they do not involve themselves in competitive
buying of those raw materials for which the state has planned the
buying in the localities concerned.2
The Party’s call for greater economic efficiency, less central control and
more attention to individual interests stimulated a number of concrete
changes in the Vietnamese economy.3
In both agriculture and industry, “spontaneous bottom-up” reforms were
the first steps taken to adjust to the new economic conditions. Peasants in
Vinh Lac district of Vinh Phu province had initiated the output contract
system in 1967–8. It was later adopted in the late 1970s by a cooperative in
Do Son district of Haiphong city. Severely criticized by Vietnamese officials
at the time, the Party now endorsed the output contract system as an inno-
vative effort to raise production. Under Instruction 100 CT, widely known
as Contract 100, the Party Central Committee in January 1981 made the
output contract system national policy. Contract 100 proved to be the initial
legal document in the economic reform of Vietnamese agriculture.4 As
economist and Vietnam expert Melanie Beresford later observed, “the
adoption of this system [the output contract system] represented a virtual
revolution in official thinking on collective agriculture.”5
The government aimed to keep the cooperative agricultural system
intact but to enhance the role of individual initiative and productivity in
both output and reward systems.6 The driving force of Contract 100 was its
return to peasant households of control over some links in the farm pro-
duction process.7 Through a production group or cooperative, the output
contract system allocated plots of land to individual farmers; and a deliv-
ery quota, based on average yield over the last three years, was then estab-
lished for each farmer. The cooperative furnished the farmer with
adequate inputs to achieve the contracted output level. But household
farms retained for sale in the free market all output in excess of the
preestablished delivery quota.8
At the outset, the Contract 100 system was limited in application to
northern and central Vietnam. Due to continuing opposition to agricul-
tural cooperatives, the Party was unwilling to implement immediately this
new form of contractual arrangement in the South. Consequently, there
was a specific reservation in Instruction 100 CT:
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For cooperatives in the mountainous regions and cooperatives and
production collectives in the south, the Ministry of Agriculture will,
along with the provinces, study and give specific guidance on the
proper application of the various forms. With regard to the contract-
ing out of production quotas to groups of workers, or individual
workers, experiments must be made with this form before expanding
its application.9
Ignoring the spirit if not the letter of this directive, a number of districts in
the South proceeded to assign output contracts without the endorsement
of the central government. The result was highly positive as yields
increased as did the willingness of peasants to take part in collective
duties. In response, the Party Secretariat issued a communiqué in Novem-
ber 1981 which authorized implementation of the output contract system
in southern Vietnam.
Contract 100 had a positive impact on rice production which grew annu-
ally at a rate of 2.8 percent in 1982–7 compared to 1.9 percent in the
1976–81 period. Most of this increase was due to an increase in output per
hectare as opposed to an expansion in the area cultivated. In the South,
aggregate rice output increased by 2.5 million tons from 1980 to 1987 while
the corresponding increase in the north was around two million tons for
the same period. The Contract 100 system undoubtedly served Vietnam
well in the formative years of economic reform; however, as agronomist
Vo-Tong Xuan later recognized, notable drawbacks led to its eventual
replacement in 1987.
The success of the contract system could not be sustained over the
long term due to the following reasons: 1) top-down planning on land
use and crop choice without consideration of farmer preferences and
local market conditions; 2) the government’s frequent inability to
procure all the contracted production at harvest time; 3) as a con-
sequence, seasonal surpluses at the farm gate led to a crash in private
rice price in several regions, which, while benefiting the urban poor,
had severe negative effects on farmers; 4) the persistence of central-
ized input supplies resulted in inadequate and untimely provision of
inputs to farmers; and 5) lack of security of land tenure resulting in
inadequate farm-level investments for maintaining long term land pro-
ductivity.10
At the same time, it must be emphasized that the strengthening of land
use rights for Vietnamese farmers at this point in the reform process con-
tributed mightily to the economic resurgence later in the decade. The new
approach reversed a process of nationalization and collectivization that
started in 1954 and accelerated in the 1960s in the North and after reunifi-
cation in the South. It culminated in a clause in the 1980 constitution that
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all land belonged to the state. The decommunalization of agriculture
began as early as 1981 with the household officially replacing the farm
cooperative as the basic economic agent in agriculture. General Secretary
Le Duan ratified this policy shift in a 1982 report to the Fifth Party Con-
gress in which he spoke of the need “to correctly combine the building of
the central economy with a vigorous development of local economies in a
unified national economic structure.”11 The cooperative retained indirect
control over the activities of the farming household; however, households
were allocated specific plots of land on short-term contract in return for a
portion of the crop and their contribution of labor to production on com-
munal lands.12
In the Vietnamese industrial sector, bottom-up reform may have begun
as early as 1977 although no specific instances were recorded. Individual
factories in this period began to apply the term “fence-breaking” (pha rao)
to their efforts to break through the constraints of the central planning
system. When materials were short, factory managers were known to sell
goods on the open market in order to raise cash to buy supplies or to pay
bonuses to raise worker productivity. Technically illegal, the use of initi-
atives became more and more widespread. In January 1981, Vietnam
enacted Decision 25/CP, providing guidelines for the development of both
initiatives and financial autonomy in state enterprises. Recognizing earlier
practices, these initial reforms in the industrial sector allowed factories to
acquire and employ resources as necessary to increase their supply outputs
as long as they reported all activities outside the official plan.13
The bottom-up reforms in agriculture and industry generated both posit-
ive and negative results. Gross industrial output, like agricultural output,
increased significantly from 1979 to 1982, triggering a fairly rapid economic
recovery in the early 1980s. By raising agricultural productivity, the output
contract system expanded the range of products available on the free
market while greater autonomy for state enterprises meant a higher per-
centage of sales at market prices. Predictably, the demand for goods grew
more rapidly than the supply which fuelled inflation. The higher prices of
the free market also meant the government had to raise the salaries of
government employees as well as the purchasing prices for which the state
bought goods from various agricultural and production units. In June 1981,
the Vietnamese government granted substantial salary increases which only
served to push up further prices in the free market. The rate of inflation
nearly doubled in 1979 and by 1982 approached 90 percent, erasing any
gains from public sector wage and salary increases. So-called “negative
phenomena,” such as smuggling, speculation and corruption, accompanied
the run-up in inflation. The Hanoi leadership associated such negative phe-
nomena with Ho Chi Minh City which had captured 37 percent of the
country’s gross industrial product by 1982. In response, a Council of Minis-
ters resolution in September 1981 limited the free market activities of state
industries, a decision impacting most heavily on Ho Chi Minh City.14
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Fifth Party Congress
Conservative elements at the Fifth Party Congress in March 1982, gener-
ally pleased with the economic results of the limited reforms introduced
but concerned with their downstream ideological ramifications, directed a
retreat from the so-called “reformist tendency.” With the opening phase
of economic reform drawing to a close, cautious Party leaders moved to
correct what they saw as some of the most acute imbalances and to curb
some of the more undesirable side-effects of reform.15 In opening remarks
to the congress, Central Committee member Truong Chinh signaled the
need to reevaluate Party policies.
This fifth congress of our party will review the implementation of the
line set forth by the fourth congress, correctly assess achievements and
shortcomings, recognize the actual prevailing economic and social
conditions and analyze the causes of successes and difficulties. It will
also set forth the main economic and social orientations, tasks and
targets for 1981–85 and for the 1980s.16
Reflecting the shift in policy, Nguyen Van Linh, Party Secretary in Ho Chi
Minh City, was removed from the Politburo and the Central Committee
Secretariat.17
In early 1983, the government issued new directives in an attempt to
slow both the rate of inflation and the resurgence in private trading. It also
imposed steep taxes on private enterprises operating in sectors considered
nonessential to the growth of production. And it introduced a new system
of taxation in agriculture intended to encourage cultivation efforts in the
collective sector. In the South, the drive to collectivize agriculture con-
tinued, accelerating in 1984–5. The government clearly viewed the collec-
tivization of the main grain surplus area of Vietnam as an essential part of
its overall development strategy. Responding to the renewed emphasis on
collectivization, many farmers in the South destroyed their crops and
abandoned the farm sector altogether. In a related move, the government
in 1983 revoked the freedom of industrial enterprises to buy and sell
outside official channels.18
Despite the on-again, off-again approach, this initial period of economic
reform had a positive impact on the Vietnamese economy. Real GDP per
capita rose in 1980–5 even as the population continued to grow. The agri-
cultural sector performed well as agricultural production, employment,
labor productivity and capital productivity all increased in the wake of
reform. Employment and capital productivity in the industrial sector grew
faster than in the pre-reform period, but growth in production and labor
productivity actually slowed. The private sector in industry gained the
most while the socialist sector and heavy industry were less able to take
advantage of the opportunities opened by the reforms. The transportation
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sector, in particular, was left untouched by the reforms; and similar to
what had happened in Cambodia and Laos, it later became a development
bottleneck in Vietnam. Finally, inflation worsened as the state sector, at a
growing disadvantage in competition with the private sector, groped to
adjust to the new economic mechanisms. As various reform measures
generated upward pressure on prices, the central bank expanded the
money supply, seemingly oblivious to its inflationary impact.19
The Eighth Plenum of the Fifth Central Committee, meeting in June
1985, once again combined personnel shifts with major policy change. The
Party reinstated Nguyen Van Linh first to the Politburo and later to the
Central Committee Secretariat. In turn, new economic policies adopted by
the Party moved the economy from central planning toward a market
system. The Party abolished state subsidies with future wages and salaries
to be paid on a straight cash basis. State enterprises were instructed to
implement socialist accounting measures and to fix prices on the basis of
costs. The amount of currency in circulation was a cause for concern;
unfortunately, subsequent currency reforms were ineffective and inflation-
ary. Following this preliminary series of reforms, the rate of inflation from
September 1985 to September 1986 surged to 700 percent, threatening a
major defeat for the reformers. Instead, the failure of currency and price
reforms prompted the government to enact even more radical reform
measures the following year.20
Origin, timing and scope of reform in Vietnam
The origin of the economic reform movement in Vietnam quickly became a
controversial subject and remained one for many years. One school of
thought argued that Vietnamese economic policies were heavily influenced
by China, even in periods of open hostility between the two neighbors. This
was a major theme in Vo Nhan Tri’s study of Vietnamese economic policy
after 1975. He argued the policies of land reform and cooperativization
implemented by the Party in 1955–75 were inspired by Maoist thought and
practice and executed under the close guidance of Chinese advisers. He
also contended the Stalinist-Maoist model of development continued to be
implemented, despite piecemeal and makeshift measures adopted after
1979, until late 1986. Tri concluded the leadership of Vietnam, “until 1986
was much more influenced by Mao than by Marx.”21
Carlyle Thayer, on the other hand, argued the main impetus for reform
in Vietnam came from within the Party.
It is clear from field work conducted in Vietnam that the main impetus
for reform and change in Vietnam is coming from within the Vietnam
Communist Party itself, both as a reaction to events in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, but more particularly as part and parcel
of the internal processes of doi moi begun in 1986.22
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Vu Tuan Anh also stressed that Vietnam did not follow external models in
charting its reform process; instead, it slowly worked out its own reform
scenario.
The nature of Vietnam’s reforms was not merely one of switching
from an old model that no longer worked to one borrowed from
another country. . . . As there is no ready reform scenario or general
“road map” available that Vietnam could use as a guide, it has to work
out its own short-term action plans, treading slowly and tentatively,
and ready to shift gear when necessary.23
The question of the timing of the reform process in Vietnam, often tied
closely to the issue of origin, also generated considerable controversy. The
Pacific Basin Research Institute argued that a conservative backlash to the
1979 reforms occurred in 1982. In their words, “draconian” measures were
introduced in late 1982 which led to a return to a more orthodox Marxist-
Leninist model, lasting until mid-1985. At that time, a resolution of the
Eighth Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee on price,
wages and currency reintroduced production incentives and price liberal-
ization measures.24 Dang T. Tran made a related point in emphasizing that
liberalization policies introduced after 1979 promoted competition and
market processes but did not go far enough.25 In turn, Thayer rightly
argued the impetus for economic reform in Vietnam dated back to the
later half of the 1970s although very little was accomplished prior to
1986.26
Neither the issue of timing nor the question of Chinese influence can be
resolved conclusively. However, the clear success of Chinese economic
reforms by 1986, coupled with the success of Vietnam’s East Asian non-
socialist neighbors, did not go unnoticed in Hanoi. On the contrary, these
events surely influenced post-1979 decisions in favor of economic reform.
In turn, Vietnamese efforts to reform economic policies influenced similar
plans, first in Laos, and later in Cambodia.
Collectively, the economic reforms introduced in Vietnam in 1979 had a
positive impact on the Vietnamese economy. Tentative steps in the direc-
tion of economic liberalization promoted market processes and competi-
tion, rewarded efficiency in the private sector, and penalized the state
sector for rigidity, inefficiency and wastefulness. That said, the administra-
tive supply system remained intact, and structural changes introduced to
raise productivity did not go far enough. The government also failed to
eliminate multi-tier price and multiple exchange rate systems. Ideological
checks also remained in place. The first round of economic reforms were
mostly piecemeal, makeshift measures that could best be described as
minor surgery when major surgery was required. Throughout the first half
of the decade, much of the Party leadership appeared to be residing in a
halfway house between growing disillusionment with the development
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strategy in place and a serious commitment to a new approach.27 In this
milieu, the most promising development in Hanoi was a growing apprecia-
tion that the old policies were bankrupt and significant reforms desper-
ately needed.
First Lao five-year plan
The year 1981 proved to be highly significant in the history of the Lao
PDR as it marked the outset of the First Five-Year Plan (1981–5). On 6
January 1981, General Secretary Kaysone presented to the Supreme
People’s Assembly a five-year plan for economic and social development
which was unanimously approved two days later. Although Laos was not a
member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the presentation
of the plan was timed to coincide with the long-term plans of the Comecon
states, most especially the Soviet Union and Vietnam. On the surface, the
plan was balanced, pragmatic and not overly ambitious. However, the
failure of the government to achieve the goals of the Three-Year Plan
(1978–80), the economic foundation for the 1981–5 plan, led contemporary
observers to question whether even the modest goals articulated in
January 1981 could be met.28
The First Five-Year Plan, better known as the Eighth Resolution of the
LPRP Central Committee, together with Ordinance 408 of the Lao PDR
Council of Ministers, issued on 28 November 1980, established in broad
outline the goals and priorities of the government for the first half of the
decade. In presenting the plan, Kaysone highlighted the achievements of the
regime over the previous five years, particularly the period of the interim
three-year plan, in the face of what he termed the counter revolutionary
alliance of American imperialism and Chinese international reactionism. He
admitted the country faced severe economic problems, such as poor man-
agement experience, a shortage of educated cadre, poor use of labor and the
failure to implement economic policies. But Kaysone suggested such prob-
lems were largely the product of the particular stage of transition to social-
ism in which the Lao PDR found itself. Drawing lessons from the past, he
underscored the need to understand the Party line, improve management,
strengthen internal unity and promote international solidarity with Kam-
puchea, Vietnam, the USSR and other socialist countries.29
General Secretary Kaysone stressed two fundamental objectives in the
five-year plan. First, the government aimed to “normalize the material and
cultural life of the people of all nationalities.” Second, it planned to “con-
centrate on building those enterprises which are strategically important to
our [the Lao] economy and national defense, with the aim of gradually
and firmly building material and technical bases for the national
economy.”30 To achieve these objectives, Kaysone highlighted seven
priorities: promote agricultural production, build strategically important
enterprises, consolidate the economic bases of state enterprises, train
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economic managers and technicians, complete the literacy campaign, con-
solidate and restructure the organizations managing the economy and
state, and acquire and efficiently utilize foreign economic assistance.
Thereafter, a government slogan repeated ad nauseam called on the Lao
people to “fulfill the two objectives and seven priorities.”31
The targets for the First Five-Year Plan, published in Council of
Government Ordinance 408 on 28 November 1980, were difficult to assess
as they were conveyed as percent increases over unstated production
figures for 1980. For example, the government expected gross social
product to increase by 65–68 percent in 1981–5 while national income
from domestic production would grow 38–40 percent. Total agricultural
production was targeted to increase 23–24 percent over the period with
gross industrial production expected to double. The five-year plan
emphasized a number of strategic initiatives, all of which aimed at redu-
cing Lao dependence on Thailand for the purchase and transshipment of
goods. These projects included completion of Route 9 as an all-weather
road linking Laos and Vietnam, construction of a cement factory north of
Vientiane as well as oil pipelines from Vietnam to Laos and the creation
of a motorized transport unit for the import-export of goods.32
The five-year plan accorded first priority to increasing agricultural and
forestry output. A related goal of the interim three-year plan had been
self-sufficiency in food production, and Kaysone openly admitted this had
not been achieved. On the contrary, Laos remained a net food importer
even after some 10 percent of the population fled the country in the wake
of the communist takeover. Ordinance 408 set clear goals for increases in
agricultural production but not specific targets for increases in forestry
production. Nevertheless, the export of timber, together with electricity
from the Nam Ngum Dam, constituted major sources of foreign exchange.
Brown and Zasloff later estimated the completion of the second phase of
the Nam Ngum Dam enabled Laos to increase its annual export earnings
from around $2 million in 1978 to more than $8 million the following year.
Moreover, even after Thailand closed its border with Laos in 1980, elec-
tricity continued to flow.33
General Secretary Kaysone also emphasized the rights and duties of
state-owned enterprises to contribute to the success of the five-year plan
through what he termed a “system of balanced and profitable manage-
ment.” Following approval of capital investment and production goals,
state enterprises would be granted considerable autonomy in manage-
ment. They would be free to establish labor requirements, wage incre-
ments, marketing and pricing policies, and levels of reinvestment. This
decentralization of authority and decision making was to be extended to
all areas of the economy with managers and technicians largely freed of
the political controls of the past. “Administrative organizations such as
ministries,” Kaysone emphasized, “shall not directly interfere in produc-
tion management work and the business of an enterprise.”34
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In addition, the five-year plan called for stricter management in con-
struction and a more efficient use of investment funds. In the area of
foreign trade, the plan foreshadowed a further easing of restrictions. On
the one hand, official state policy continued to call for transactions with
foreign countries to be conducted on the basis of a gradual state monopoly
of foreign trade. On the other, the five-year plan allowed for private trade
at border crossings as long as government monopolies were respected,
duties paid, and there was no hoarding. Internal trade was also liberalized.
The government called on state trading enterprises to increase purchases
from individual farmers and cooperatives. On the crucial issue of retail
pricing, Kaysone indicated the government would continue its two-price
policy. The plan also called for increased private enterprise participation
in a number of key economic sectors. Kaysone summarized its goal as “the
socialist transformation of capitalist industry, trade and agriculture,”
arguing it provided “a method aimed at ensuring victory for socialism in
the struggle of who is overcoming whom during the bypassing capitalism
stage in our country.” In short, Lao capitalists would be used, manipulated
and transformed as state enterprises and cooperative forms were
advanced.35
Finally, Kaysone emphasized the success of the First Five-Year Plan
was dependent on Laos continuing to receive foreign aid and investment.
He described economic cooperation with fraternal countries as strategic-
ally significant because it would provide the capital necessary to build the
material and technical foundations of socialism. Consequently, solidarity
with the Soviet Union, as well as with Cambodia and Vietnam, were ingre-
dients essential to success.
We affirm that our relations, solidarity and all-round cooperation with
the great USSR and other fraternal socialist countries are the corner-
stone of our foreign policy and a solid guarantee for our cause of
national defense and socialist construction.36
At the same time, Kaysone cautioned that Laos could not expect unlim-
ited amounts of foreign aid. On the contrary, diplomatic work would be
required to obtain contributions from sources outside the socialist bloc.
He also stressed the need for national unity, a reflection of ongoing
Chinese and Lao-exile efforts to exploit ethnic differences to undermine
the government.37
Disappointing results in Laos
The rural reforms introduced after 1980 concentrated on the three policy
arenas, marketing and distribution, property-rights and taxation, most
affected by the socialization policies implemented in the latter 1970s.
Reforms began gradually over the next decade with modifications to
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agricultural taxation preceding changes in the marketing and property-
rights systems. And reforms to property-rights focused on user rights as
opposed to private ownership. Predictably, the reforms enacted had only a
limited impact on agricultural performance. The agricultural sector con-
tinued to be an extensive albeit low productivity system characterized by
low input and output. Irrigation was rare, double cropping scarce and land
quality highly variable. The forestry and rice subsectors, in particular, per-
formed poorly while selected non-rice subsectors, together with livestock,
experienced stronger growth. Supply and demand factors, like ineffective
agricultural services and weakly developed marketing opportunities, com-
bined to result in the low productivity characteristic of Lao agriculture.
The situation prevailing in the rural areas strongly contrasted with that in
urban areas where economic reforms raised living standards. The poor
economic results achieved in Laos also contrasted with the experience of
other socialist countries like China and Vietnam.38
External factors outside the control of the government, such as
droughts and floods, impacted negatively on agricultural performance.
However, government policies in areas like pricing and resource allocation
were the principal cause of low growth. The resulting poor performance
was compounded by insufficient coordination and sequencing of reforms
within the agricultural sector as well as between rural reforms and those
implemented in macroeconomic and other areas. Inadequate transporta-
tion and communication systems, because they discouraged regional
specialization and trade, also contributed to the problem. The geographi-
cal, social and economic realities of Laos, most especially rural isolation in
mountainous districts, constituted serious impediments to the rapid devel-
opment of a socialist economy.39
In the public sector, a gradual process of economic decentralization
began after 1979 in which state enterprises, previously little more than
government departments, became semi-autonomous. They developed
their own internal accounting systems and began dealing with the state
and state-owned firms as external rather than internal agents. Political
Bureau Resolution 11, introduced in mid-1981, instructed state enterprises
to meet a dozen compulsory plan targets, determined by supervising
authorities. Beyond these targets, the state enterprises assumed a new
degree of operating autonomy and retained 10 percent of their profits for
reinvestment. The government in 1983 granted selected enterprises addi-
tional autonomy that allowed them to keep 40 percent of their profits and
a proportion of overseas earnings as well as to engage in limited direct
sales on the open market. The Lao government later expanded these
measures with the result that by 1988 a majority of state-owned firms had
become, in effect, autonomous state enterprises.40
That said, five separate and distinct forms of economic organization
coexisted in Laos by the mid-1980s. First, there was a state sector consist-
ing of the largest industrial firms, the banking sector and state farms,
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together with state construction, transportation and trading enterprises.
Second, there was a collective economy mostly consisting of agricultural
cooperatives. Next, there was a relatively small individual economy made
up of self-employed farmers, handicraft producers and small traders.
Fourth, the capitalist economy consisted of industrial, trading and trans-
portation companies owned by private entrepreneurs in larger towns like
Vientiane. Finally, there was a state-private economy representing joint
ventures between state and private capital. General Secretary Kaysone
openly recognized this plethora of economic structures, suggesting they
might coexist for some time:
in our country there are still nearly all the modes of production, from
primitive to contemporary modes of production, mankind has gone
through. All these sectors exert an inter-effect on one another, depend
on one another and remain united in an economy still in the period of
transition to socialism.41
On the other hand, despite the multitude of economic forms in operation
after nearly ten years of experimentation, there was little change in the
basic structure of the Lao economy. The relative share of state versus
private control of that economy also remained largely unchanged.42
At the macroeconomic level, the Lao PDR in the decade after the 1975
revolution pursued import substitution, accommodating fiscal and mone-
tary policies, and a fixed exchange rate system. High and persistent infla-
tion was one result of these policies with 56 percent being the average in
the 1980–6 period. High rates of inflation, combined with a fixed exchange
rate system, contributed to the overvaluation of the kip. A very restrictive
trade regime was another element of macroeconomic policy in this period.
High tariffs and quantitative restrictions on most imported products aimed
at protecting domestic industries and supporting the state apparatus. By
increasing the price of industrial goods, this restrictive trade policy nega-
tively altered terms of trade between the agricultural and industrial
sectors. Taken as a whole, the hostile macroeconomic environment pre-
vailing after 1975 restrained growth in agriculture, in particular, diluting
the impact of rural reforms.43
With the economic results of the First Five-Year Plan at best mixed, the
internal debate over the optimum process and pace for socialist trans-
formation intensified. The so-called “two-line struggle” pitted proponents
of a gradual pace of transformation against those Party members endors-
ing a rapid transition to socialist modes of production. The proponents of
a gradual pace of reform argued that a mixed economy, consisting of both
a state-owned-cum-cooperative sector and a state-private-cum-private
sector, was both an inevitable and indispensable step in the transition to
socialism. In turn, those conservatives supporting the extension of state
control over all facets of economic production and distribution argued the
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various attempts to liberalize the economy were nothing more than ideo-
logical backsliding that retarded the advent of socialism in Laos. Given the
failure of hard-line policies in 1976–8 and the LPRP’s endorsement of a
gradualist approach after 1980, the persistent dialogue over the appropri-
ate reform pace was a clear indication that no consensus had been
reached.44
External dependence
Politically, the close association of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party
with Cambodia, Vietnam and the Soviet Union heightened its isolation
from the nonsocialist world. However, as historian Martin Stuart-Fox has
emphasized, it did not reduce its dependence on other states.
The problem of dependency is one which Laos has always faced, and
the transference of that dependence from Western capitalism (particu-
larly the United States and Thailand) to Soviet socialism (particularly
the Soviet Union and Vietnam) has done little to reduce it. The
geopolitical reality is simply that Laos is underpopulated, militarily
and economically weak, yet strategically vital to the interests of its
neighbours. Consequently, it is so vulnerable to outside pressures that
the only realistic choice open to its leaders is which patron they prefer.
But this is a choice which depends internally not on economic, but
on political and ideological considerations, and externally on global
and regional power balances. Laos is now locked into both the
Vietnamese-dominated Indochina solidarity block (consisting of
Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos), and the Soviet camp, with all this
entails for Lao relations with China and the West, both of which have
provided considerable assistance for the Lao five-year plan.45
With the outbreak of hostilities between China and Vietnam, the Lao
government in March 1979 asked China to suspend its road construction
assistance and withdraw its road construction cadre. The Lao PDR’s close
alignment with Vietnam was the primary determinant in the subsequent
Chinese decision to terminate all economic assistance to Laos. For a time,
there was even concern that China might apply a “second lesson” on
Vietnam through northern Laos. Its close association with Vietnam also
entailed for Laos serious economic as well as political costs from the West.
The policy of the United States, China and the ASEAN member states, as
long as Vietnam occupied Cambodia, was to isolate Vietnam. A similar
albeit less stringent policy was applied to its Lao ally. As a result, Laos
received much less Western technical assistance and economic aid in this
period than would otherwise have been the case.46
Nonetheless, the Lao PDR remained heavily dependent on external
assistance throughout the period with foreign aid in 1982 estimated to be
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some 80 percent of its annual revenue. The Soviet Union was the principal
benefactor in the early years of the decade as it provided, with help from
its East European allies, approximately 60 percent of the country’s exter-
nal assistance in 1980. An August 1981 report from Moscow indicated the
Soviet Union intended to build some 54 economic projects in Laos in the
1981–5 planning period. In contrast, the Vietnamese economy was in such
dire straits that Hanoi provided little if any economic assistance. At the
same time, the 6,000 Vietnamese civilian advisers and up to 50,000 Viet-
namese troops stationed in Laos in 1984 made a strong political imprint on
the economic policies of the country. Sweden remained the most generous
Western donor with other Western states, including Australia, Japan and
France, also offering assistance. The International Monetary Fund was
Laos’s most important international agency donor in the first half of the
1980s, providing direct support as well as guidance. U.S. law prohibited all
but humanitarian aid to Laos; however, some food donations and medi-
cines were sent in years of hardship and in support of efforts to recover the
remains of U.S. servicemen.47
Even though the Lao government enjoyed some success in replacing
the United States with the Soviet Union and its socialist allies as primary
donors, its limited ability to absorb aid and achieve the self-generating
growth envisioned in the five-year plan remained a basic problem. The
paucity of skilled administrative, managerial and technical manpower was
a serious deficiency which the government was unable to overcome. This
was largely a self-inflicted wound as policy choices in the early days of the
regime drove away many well-trained professionals and administrators
from the former Royal Lao Government. At the same time, the Lao PDR
often made very poor use of the few experienced managers remaining.48
Internal political developments
A major political event in the brief history of the Lao PDR occurred in
April 1982 with the convening of the Third Congress of the Lao People’s
Revolutionary Party (LPRP). The Second Congress had been held a
decade earlier when the Lao communist movement was still locked in a
revolutionary struggle with the Royal Lao Government. In a remarkable
display of continuity, the Third Congress reconfirmed each of the seven
members of the Politburo, the top LPRP leadership since the late 1950s,
with only one change in formal rank between the fifth and sixth positions.
Unlike many communist regimes, the LPRP leadership eschewed a cult of
the personality, like Mao in China or Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, in favor of
a collective profile. In post-1975 visits to government offices, for example,
it was common to see group photographs of the total Politburo as opposed
to individual photos of Kaysone or other leading members. All 27 incum-
bent members of the Central Committee of the LPRP were also reap-
pointed with 28 new members elected to join them. In addition to bringing
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new talent to the senior echelons of the Party, the appointment of 28 new
members increased functional representation on the Central Committee,
especially in military and security affairs, and improved provincial
representation.49
The Lao PDR government was also reshuffled in 1982. Like the Party,
continuity and stability were the twin themes of governmental leadership
after 1975, and this was the first major reorganization in seven years. A
harbinger of change was the promulgation by the Supreme People’s
Assembly of a regulation in July 1982, providing for a change in the size
and organization of the Council of Ministers. When the new government
was formed in the fall of 1982, continuity was assured as there was no
change in the role of veteran leaders; however, the government was
revamped and enlarged in January 1983 in line with the new administra-
tive law. In March 1983, the middle echelons of the government under-
went a mini-purge following charges of corruption and other
irregularities.50
There were no comparable changes in Party structure; instead, the
LPRP focused on consolidating its organization in areas of strength and
expanding its apparatus in areas of weakness. To increase managerial and
ideological competence, senior cadre attended courses at the Party’s
Marxist-Leninist School while the Party newspaper was renamed Pasason
(The People) and its format modified to make it a more effective means of
communication. Considerable effort was also expended to strengthen the
Lao Front for National Construction, the umbrella body for mass organi-
zations, and Party affiliated groups like the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Youth Union. A first step toward writing a constitution was taken in 1984
with the creation of a constitutional commission. The country had been
without a constitution since the Congress of People’s Representatives met
in December 1975 to establish the organs of state power. Since that time,
LPRP decisions had the force of law for Lao citizens. The following year,
the Lao PDR completed a national census making it the first country in
postwar Indochina to generate fairly reliable data on the size and distribu-
tion of its population.51
At the same time, Laos began to relax its close control of Buddhism
with even Party members allowed to enter the monkhood for short
periods of time. In part, this “efflorescence of Lao Buddhism” was due to
the growing prosperity which resulted from the modest economic reforms
begun in 1979. Some of the surplus income generated in ensuing years
went toward the construction of new Buddhist monuments or the repair of
existing wats, both well-established, highly visible forms of merit-making.
While the revival of Buddhism was partially due to nascent economic
reforms, anthropologist Grant Evans was correct to suggest that it was also
motivated by “an accumulating existential crisis within the Lao leader-
ship.” With Marxist-Leninism largely quiet on issues like personal tragedy
and bereavement, Lao funeral rites were an area which witnessed “the
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gradual reemergence of non-secular Buddhist rituals at the level of the
state.” As early as 1980, the communist regime began to relax its control
over a number of traditional religious rituals. With the death in 1984 of
Prince Souvanna Phouma, a long-time advocate of neutralism and the
architect of three coalition governments in 1957–75, the Lao PDR was
finally ready for the high-style Buddhist funeral it accorded the Prince.52
Political economy of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea
When the Vietnamese Army reached Phnom Penh in early January 1979,
the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Council, a Council of Ministers
created to implement the directives of the ruling Kampuchean People’s
Revolutionary Party (KPRP), announced the formation of the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge
division commander who defected to Vietnam in October 1978, was
named president with most other leadership positions filled by dissident
Khmer Rouge cadre and the few surviving members of the Khmer Issarak
movement, formed in the 1940s. The new government was not recognized
by ASEAN or the United Nations and was denied economic assistance by
the Western powers.53
On 18 February 1979, Kampuchea and Vietnam concluded a 25-year
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation remarkably similar to that
signed by Laos and Vietnam less than two years earlier. Recalling histor-
ical ties between the two countries, the pact emphasized the need for the
signatories to develop and defend their enduring tradition of “militant
solidarity and fraternal friendship” against reactionary forces and inter-
national imperialists. The agreement also addressed the peaceful resolu-
tion of bilateral disputes, in particular the border issue. Finally, the
signatories attached “great importance to the long-standing tradition of
militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between the Kampuchean, Lao
and Vietnamese peoples” and pledged “to do their best to strengthen this
traditional relationship.” In so doing, the agreement confirmed the de
facto situation in Indochina, a close-knit, three-nation military alliance
under the leadership of Vietnam. The Kampuchea–Vietnam treaty was
soon followed by a similar pact between Kampuchea and Laos, completing
the third leg of the Indochina solidarity bloc.54
The People’s Republic of Kampuchea faced a difficult economic situ-
ation when it came to power in January 1979. Democratic Kampuchea
(DK) had succeeded in creating a classless society, but it did so at the price
of neglecting almost all sectors of the economy except agriculture and a
few related industries. Emphasizing poor peasants as the only worthwhile
class, the Khmer Rouge had ignored skilled, trained personnel when they
did not kill them. Basic infrastructure at all levels from roads to transport
to buildings had deteriorated. There were no banks, no currency, no
private exchange, no personal income and no taxes. In addition, there had
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been no written records, formal judicial proceedings, codified laws or con-
servation of archives in Democratic Kampuchea.55
The PRK government immediately reversed core DK policies. Early
socioeconomic restructuring in Cambodia, unlike in Vietnam and to a
lesser extent in Laos, was almost totally laissez-faire. Suddenly, there was
freedom of movement, freedom of work choice and freedom of trade. The
PRK later moved to create a mixed planned and market economy in which
currency, banking and commercial transactions would be restored. This
meant reviving the urban sector, schools, public facilities, formal adminis-
tration and personal possessions. Private ownership of land was not rein-
troduced; but the means of production, mostly draft animals, could be
owned privately. Land remained the property of the state, and it could not
be used for speculation or loan collateral. Equally important, it could not
be lost due to nonpayment of debt.56 As Michael Vickery later noted, the
Cambodian approach necessitated a class revolution of a very different
sort from that adopted in either Laos or Vietnam.
The PRK proposed to create from scratch a nonproductive adminis-
trative and service sector, reactivate and restore a small essential
industrial sector, and persuade the majority food-producing sector to
support the administration and industry with minimal return for the
immediate future. That is, the PRK inherited a truly classless society,
yet in order to move toward socialism they had to recreate social
classes.57
Religious tolerance was another policy arena in which the PRK distin-
guished itself from the Khmer Rouge. The DK regime had guaranteed
freedom of religious worship but also declared “reactionary” religion to be
forbidden. In practice, Buddhist monks were among the more prominent
victims of incessant DK purges; and it soon became evident that no ideo-
logy beyond the militant ideological purism of the Khmer Rouge was
really allowed. In contrast, the PRK stressed the right to freedom of
religion and pledged to help repair and maintain temples, pagodas and
historical relics destroyed by the Khmer Rouge. Despite official pro-
nouncements, however, only limited religious freedom existed in practice
after 1978 with significant restrictions frustrating full freedom of religious
rights. Among other disincentives, the PRK authorized only one pagoda
per commune, and only unproductive elderly men were allowed to take
the monk’s habit. Half of all offerings to the monks went to the
commune’s revolutionary committee, and all religious celebrations
required the approval of the authorities.58
As it moved to govern the country as opposed simply to presiding over
it, the PRK modified its initial laissez-faire approach. The 1981 constitu-
tion consecrated three distinct economic sectors: the state, cooperatives
and the family with the latter referring mostly to small-scale agricultural
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and artisan work. Industry, finance and transport remained in the public
sector which also retained a major role in the distribution of rice and other
necessities. The government established a system of central planning, with
physical production targets and administrative controls, and also deter-
mined key prices and wages. A private sector was subsequently added,
following the Fifth Party Congress in October 1985, in which individuals
could hire labor and invest funds in small-scale manufacturing. The PRK
introduced a new Cambodian riel in 1980 after a five-year period in which
there was no currency. The success of monetary and fiscal policies in
winning popular acceptance of the new currency, while avoiding extreme
inflation, evidenced a certain amount of intelligent planning, especially
when compared to Vietnam. At the same time, the Khmer Rouge aboli-
tion of currency continued to impact negatively on economic recovery in
that it reinforced Cambodian reluctance to use local currency as a store of
value, preferring gold, silver or U.S. dollars as accepted means of
exchange.59
The Cambodian government reintroduced taxation in 1983; neverthe-
less, a large percentage of its budget continued to come from aid and long-
term loans from the socialist states. As in Laos, this practice was consistent
with historical experience in that no Cambodian regime since independ-
ence in 1954, with the arguable exception of Democratic Kampuchea, had
survived on its own resources. Industrial and consumer goods, supplied
with the help of the Soviet Union and its allies, generated the revenues
necessary to pay government expenditures.60
Early PRK economic policies were strongly influenced by Vietnamese
advisors detailed to assist enthusiastic, albeit inexperienced, local leader-
ship in rebuilding the economy. An early history of the Kampuchean
People’s Revolutionary Party stressed that:
As an authentic Marxist-Leninist Party, our Party closely associates
authentic patriotism with brilliant proletarian internationalism [italics in
the text]. The line of the Party is to raise high the two banners of patri-
otism and international solidarity, solidarity with the Soviet Union
which is the strong bulwark of peace and socialism in the world, solid-
arity with every socialist country, solidarity with the revolutionary
forces and progressive forces in the world, and, foremost solidarity
with Vietnam to develop the alliance of the three countries of
Indochina.61
The extent of Vietnamese control over the PRK government was most
systematic in foreign affairs and defense policy, together with issues con-
cerning the expansion of the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party.
The influence of the Vietnamese was much less in policy areas such as tax
collection and the collectivization of agriculture. Moreover, a close exami-
nation of both government and Party documents suggests that KPRP
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emphasis on a long history of revolutionary struggle and cooperation with
its Vietnamese counterpart was often undertaken by the Cambodians with
some reluctance. In many cases, the constant allusion to close Kam-
puchean-Vietnamese relations “amounted to the simple repetition of
vague slogans, whereas, in parallel with this,” PRK officials stressed con-
stantly “the importance of preserving national independence and the
important role plaid [sic] by the Cambodian forces themselves.” Cambodi-
ans deeply resented any sign of Vietnamese superiority or condescension
and took care to present themselves always as on an equal footing with
their Vietnamese allies.62 As Chanthou Boua observed, having spent con-
siderable time in Cambodia in 1980–2, the activities of ethnic Vietnamese
were an especially sensitive issue in the 1980–1 period.
The presence of ethnic Vietnamese civilians in Kampuchea became a
subject of debate in 1981 when it was obvious that their movements
were getting out of control. Some were establishing themselves as
farmers, fishermen, traders and technicians. They included former
residents expelled by Pol Pot and Lon Nol, but many Khmer leaders
and ordinary people objected to their presence. . . . Differences con-
sisted of how and when to expell [sic] the migrants. One official told
me at the time: “It must be done discreetly and now is obviously not
the time for it.”63
Agricultural cooperatives in Cambodia
The restoration of agricultural production was the most urgent task facing
the new regime in Phnom Penh. The agricultural sector had long been
fragile due to a combination of irregular rainfall, limited water control and
poor quality soils. Modern implements and techniques were little
developed, fertilizers seldom used and high-yielding seed varieties virtu-
ally unknown.64 In response to the need to increase agricultural produc-
tion, the government organized agricultural producers into cooperative
units called production solidarity groups (krom samakki), a creative and
appropriate response to the demographic nightmare produced by the
Khmer Rouge. Official plans for the agricultural sector envisaged a three-
tier structure of progressively collectivized groups ranging from traditional
family farms to largely collectivized groups. The government continued to
advocate a policy of agricultural collectivization until 1989, but implemen-
tation of the policy was lackadaisical and poorly received throughout the
country.65
Designed to function as enlarged families providing economic and
moral support to all members, krom samakki responded to an equally
important problem, the disappearance of cadastral plans and plot demar-
cations in the wake of Khmer Rouge attempts to remodel the Cambodian
countryside. Production solidarity groups also served as instruments of
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government policy at local levels where the organizations facilitated polit-
ical control and indoctrination as well as military conscription. In theory,
each krom samakki consisted of 10–15 families tilling the land and sharing
the harvest. In practice, few communes were formed. The bulk of the
krom samakki functioned more like village mutual help groups with the
bulk of the land assigned to individual families. Farmers were permitted to
sell most of their produce on the open market after paying the 10 percent
production tax and reimbursing the state for seed, farm equipment and
fertilizer. In this sense, as Chanthou Boua has emphasized, they differed
from the land reforms implemented in Vietnam after 1979:
It is worth pointing out that the krom samaki, a form of what might be
called “advanced mutual aid teams” (“advanced” in the sense that the
land each team works is owned by it collectively), appear to have no
parallel in Vietnamese rural organization, which is now a mixture of
private farming, mutual aid teams, cooperatives and state farms. It
seems that the destruction of life and property under Pol Pot, the
security factor, and broad socialist ideological preconceptions, rather
than adherence to a strictly Vietnamese model, were the important
factors leading to the creation of the krom.66
Collectivized farming remained the ideal in Cambodia for much of the
next decade; however, statistics released throughout the 1980s revealed an
opposite trend in which production was increasingly dominated by indi-
vidual producers. Theoretically, all land belonged to the state, but admin-
istrators distributed parcels of 1,500–2,000 square meters to households to
use in addition to the plots they farmed as part of production solidarity
groups. In this regard, even the highest level of krom samakki corre-
sponded to a low level of socialist organization. When the PRK initiated
economic reform in October 1985, it formally legalized private land
ownership and recognized the right to inherit land. In the second half of
the decade, free markets were widely tolerated, both for agricultural
produce and manufactured goods. As one result, as the author observed
personally on many occasions in the 1987–92 period, a brisk trade grew up
along the Thai–Cambodian border.67
Isolation all around
After almost six years in power, the PRK enjoyed full diplomatic relations
with only 27 states, including all of the East Bloc states, except Romania
and Yugoslavia, and 11 states in Africa. In Asia, in addition to its Indo-
chinese neighbors and India, only Afghanistan and Mongolia, close allies
of the Soviet Union, recognized the PRK, and in Latin America, only
Nicaragua and Panama. Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations and other
international organizations was held initially by Democratic Kampuchea
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and later by the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK) established in June 1982. Norodom Sihanouk served as president
of the CGDK with Son Sann, a former prime minister and head of the
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), as vice president.
Khieu Samphan represented remnants of the Khmer Rouge in the role of
prime minister.68
Unlike Democratic Kampuchea, the diplomatic isolation visited on the
People’s Republic of Kampuchea was not self-imposed. On the contrary, it
was the product of a complex interplay of regional and global interests.
The Cambodian policy of most states reflected their policy toward
Vietnam. In turn, their policy toward Vietnam was more often than not a
result of their policy toward China. For example, the approaches to the
Cambodian conflict of both the United States and the Soviet Union were
driven generally by their respective attitudes toward Vietnam which were
strongly influenced, if not governed, by their China policies. The same
relationship generally applied to the policies of the ASEAN member
states, Europe and Japan.69
Less than a decade after the end of the Second Indochina War, the
ASEAN countries joined the People’s Republic of China to aid Cambo-
dian rebels against the Soviet-backed Heng Samrin regime. And the U.S.
government actively supported an ASEAN formula that called for Viet-
namese withdrawal from Cambodia followed by popular elections. The
ASEAN approach was adopted at a UN-sponsored conference in 1981
and gained strength the following year when noncommunist resistance fac-
tions joined forces with Khmer Rouge remnants to form the Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The creation of the CGDK
shored up the international coalition that had denied UN admission to the
PRK after 1979. International opposition to the PRK in turn isolated
Vietnam economically and helped restrain it militarily. The global cam-
paign against the PRK also checked Soviet ambitions in the region. The
USSR retained its bases in Vietnam at an estimated cost of $2 billion in
aid to Indochina. But its support of Vietnamese policy earned few other
dividends and generated considerable ill will throughout the region. Wash-
ington in turn played a secondary role, at least in public, supporting the
diplomatic initiatives of friendly Asian regimes working for a political set-
tlement.70
The ASEAN strategy incorporated a carrot-and-stick approach. On the
incentive side, it offered Vietnam a series of forums and formulas to
resolve the Cambodian issue, most of which centered on the final resolu-
tion adopted in July 1981 by the International Conference on Kampuchea.
This resolution called for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops
from Cambodia with internationally supervised, free elections to follow. In
so doing, ASEAN conceded that an acceptable political solution would
have to include provisions for Vietnamese security. The United States
later indicated that a Cambodian solution acceptable to ASEAN would
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open the way to normalized relations between Washington and Hanoi and
a resumption of Western aid to Vietnam. ASEAN disincentives included a
continuation of the policy of denying the PRK admittance to the United
Nations as well as ongoing pressure on UN member states to freeze assis-
tance and financial credits to Vietnam and to withhold diplomatic recogni-
tion of the PRK. UN support for the ASEAN approach was so strong that
Vietnam after 1983 no longer attempted to seat the Heng Samrin regime
at the United Nations. In a related disincentive, the ASEAN states
worked with China to forge the three-member CGDK and subsequently
provided its noncommunist elements with material assistance and
training.71
Checkered economic success in Cambodia
A serious crisis in agricultural procurement was an important consequence
of the PRK failure to secure complete political control of the countryside.
The state trading service as late as mid-1986 had failed to purchase one-
third of its planned target for 1985–6 despite the fact the harvest was
better than the previous year and almost as good as 1983–4 which was the
best since the late 1960s. For government employees, the situation was
critical as they relied on the state trading system for food. The rice short-
age fuelled inflation rates and price increases as government employees
turned to the private market for food. With no overall shortage in food
production in 1985–6, the procurement crisis in 1986 reflected the failure
of the government to control both state cadre, among whom corruption
was rampant, and the peasantry. The ongoing civil war, difficulties in
reforming the state procurement system and a prolonged drought in 1986
compounded problems in the agricultural sector, especially in rice produc-
tion.72
In turn, the industrial sector remained stagnant. In the best of times,
Cambodian industry produced only a limited inventory of goods, like beer,
cigarettes, cloth, paper, vehicle tires and soap. Output of even these basic
industries remained well below capacity in 1986 with more than 40 percent
of the country’s pre-1975 factories still inoperative. Operation of the
plants which had reopened was seriously hampered by shortages of raw
materials and spare parts due to scarce amounts of hard currency and the
PRK’s international isolation. Although industrial performance offered
little possibility for significant improvement in the immediate future,
developments in the communication and energy sectors offered some
promise for limited economic recovery in the longer term. Electric power
generation capacity increased as Soviet-funded power plants came into
operation. At the same time, road and waterway projects planned or
under construction promised improved access to Laos and Vietnam.73
Given the economic embargo in place, Comecon trade dominated Cam-
bodia’s external links in the mid-1980s. In its First Five-Year Plan
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(1986–90), Cambodia linked its future development to the economies of
Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries. Trade agree-
ments concluded in March 1986 projected a doubling in the volume of
PRK-USSR trade in 1986–90. In addition to Comecon, Cambodia also
maintained significant economic links with Laos and Vietnam. The minis-
ters of economic and cultural cooperation for Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam held their sixth annual conference in January 1986 and agreed to
cooperate in the areas of primary production, communications and trans-
port and to increase mutual trade. Based on the Laos-Vietnam experience,
so-called twin province agreements became an increasingly important part
of the total Cambodia-Vietnam relationship with Vietnamese provinces
providing aid and assistance to their “twins” in Cambodia. To generate
hard currency and promote an image of stability, the PRK regime in late
1986 again began to welcome tourists to Cambodia, especially to Angkor
Wat.74
In spite of the crisis in the agricultural sector, industrial stagnation and
diplomatic and economic isolation, the private sector of the Cambodian
economy was booming by the middle of the decade. In October 1985, the
Fifth Congress of the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party officially
recognized that the private sector was essential in the transition to social-
ism. Previously, only the state, cooperatives and the family had been sanc-
tioned as economic units. The National Assembly in February 1986
legalized the private sector; and shortly thereafter, the government began
collecting annual license fees, utility fees and rent, together with substan-
tially increased tax rates, from private businesses. The revitalized private
sector also benefited public sector employees as it provided a source for
supplementary income.75
Indochina ties
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam initiated market reforms in 1979 that broad-
ened in scope and impact in the coming decade. The revolution in the Lao
PDR, even as it continued to bear similarities to its Vietnamese counter-
part, increasingly assumed a Lao character as the decade progressed. In
Cambodia, the Vietnamese invaders replaced the Democratic Kampuchea
regime with a sympathetic government, consisting of Khmer Rouge defec-
tors and Cambodians who had previously sought refuge in Vietnam. Even
as the new Phnom Penh government restored many of the institutions
abandoned or destroyed by the Khmer Rouge, its control of political
issues and events remained tight. The situation left most Western
observers to agree with David Chandler “that Vietnam’s occupation of the
country fitted into a long-term strategic plan to join the components of
Indo-China into a Vietnam-dominated federation.”76 On the other hand,
economic reforms in Cambodia increasingly assumed forms outside the
Vietnamese model. Vietnamese communism, which had not influenced the
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revolution in Cambodia to the extent it impacted the Lao revolution in the
three decades after World War II, guided but did not dominate Cambodia
in the post-1979 period of Vietnamese occupation. Although the full
extent of Vietnamese influence in Cambodia in the first half of the 1980s
remains a contentious issue, it appears most appropriate to describe Cam-
bodia as a satellite but not a colony of Vietnam.77 Over time, the three rev-
olutions increasingly acted independently of each other even though a
high level of fraternal fellowship continued to characterize the Lao–
Vietnamese relationship in particular.
At the same time, the communist party leadership in all three states
perpetuated the fiction that their “special relationship” had deep historical
roots. In presenting the history of the Kampuchean People’s Revolution-
ary Party, PRK documents insisted on the importance of the links of mili-
tant solidarity shared by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as they struggled
for freedom, independence and socialism. Stressing that militant solidarity
had its origins in the colonial era when the three Indochinese countries
were subjected to the same colonialist yoke, KPRP historiography
emphasized that the KPRP had its origins in the Indochinese Communist
Party.78
Lao leaders, together with their Cambodian counterparts, professed
themselves to be in a common front with Vietnam against the Chinese
“expansionist hegemonists” who had by the early 1980s replaced French
colonialists and American imperialists as the primary threat to a united
Indochina. General Secretary Kaysone echoed the feelings of his neigh-
bors when he said:
We believe that solidarity and mutual co-operation and assistance
among Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia will be as firm as and last as long
as the Truong Son Mountain Range and the Mekong River.79
To guide the policies of its junior partners, the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam created a number of formal and informal mechanisms. Most
important were the special structures at the apex of each party organi-
zation to facilitate liaison among the fraternal Indochinese parties. Fre-
quent exchanges of high-level party and state officials took place as did
similar exchanges between advisory staffs in each country. The mounting
overlay of trilateral agreements, commissions and conferences included
semi-annual meetings after 1980 of the ministers of foreign affairs of Cam-
bodia, Laos and Vietnam as well as periodical Indochina summit meetings
after 1983. The three states also formed Committees for Economic Coop-
eration in 1983 which met twice yearly thereafter to coordinate economic
development policies. Indochina-wide committees were also established to
coordinate the policies of their national Mekong Committees within the
Interim Mekong Committee. Laos and Vietnam renewed their participa-
tion in the Interim Mekong Committee in 1978, but Cambodia did not
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rejoin until after the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement. One negative con-
sequence of the increasingly complex web of Indochinese relations,
seldom recognized at the time, was that it effectively blocked any possibil-
ity of wider regional cooperation with noncommunist neighbors like
Thailand.80
Hanoi maintained a fiction of political equality at these trilateral gath-
erings, but there was no question as to which state determined the policy
line. Long-term Vietnamese aspirations for Indochina-wide institutions
were more debatable. The Chinese government repeatedly charged that
the creation of each new institution moved Vietnam closer to its dream of
a Federation of Indochina; however, Hanoi’s explicit rejection of such a
formula, which reeked of the French colonial past, made this approach
appear impolitic and thus improbable.81 At the same time, it was clear that
Vietnam intended to remain the dominant power in the subregion.
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4 Reform accelerates
Our Party struggles for communist ideology; it is an organization of people
who fight with determination against oppression and exploitation, and who
have sacrificed all for our national independence, freedom, and reunifica-
tion.
Vietnamese Novelist Ma Van Khang, Against the Flood, 2000
As for political qualifications, the candidates must maintain a line of think-
ing that explicitly distinguishes friends from foes and a certain ability level
for implementing the line and policies of the Party and state.
Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Central Committee Secretariat, 1988
A small boat shouldn’t try to be like a large boat.
Cambodian Proverb
The economic reforms initiated by the governments of Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam at the outset of the 1980s enjoyed limited success but failed
to achieve many of the objectives set by the ruling communist parties.
Faced with disappointing results, officials in all three states elected to
accelerate reform efforts after 1985 in an effort to improve economic
performance and thus forestall political reform. The substance of this new
round of economic reforms varied in content and emphasis from state to
state; and while the results were generally encouraging, the decade ended
with much remaining to be done. Nascent political reform languished in
both Laos and Vietnam; however, in Cambodia, successful peace talks set
the stage for nationwide elections and important steps toward increased
political pluralism.
Doi moi in Vietnam
Economic reform, both as a theoretical and a practical concept, has
enjoyed a long history in Vietnam; nevertheless, the years 1985–6 remain
an important benchmark. The half-hearted reform measures pursued
throughout the first half of the decade were unsuccessful in containing
inflation and reducing serious fiscal imbalances. In response to the deterio-
rating situation, Vietnam introduced in 1985 price and currency reforms in
an attempt to stabilize the economy. Largely ineffective, these new meas-
ures marked the outset of fundamental changes in government policy.
Ultimately, the full extent of changes were reflected in resolutions adopted
by the Sixth Party Congress meeting in Hanoi in December 1986.
The package of reform measures adopted by Vietnam at the end of
1986 focused on six policy areas in an attempt to quicken the pace of what
the government termed doi moi (renovation). First, Hanoi established the
independent status of public enterprises with the intent they would
operate according to socialist accounting principles, a concept calling for
economic and financial independence. Second, price liberalization policies
moved the entire economic system from administratively determined
prices toward market determined prices. Third, ownership diversification
reforms encouraged nonstate ownership and provided for partnerships
between the state, cooperative and private sectors. Fourth, segments of
the economy were opened to commercial relations with foreigners with
attendant encouragement for foreign investment. Fifth, the Party strength-
ened both agricultural incentives and institutional support for agriculture
in a reversal of the earlier emphasis on the industrial sector. Finally,
Vietnam undertook a fundamental reform of the financial system to separ-
ate central banking and commercial banking functions. At the same time,
it implemented adjustments in official exchange rates and liberalized
foreign exchange regulations.1
The economic reforms adopted by the Vietnamese in 1986 were wide-
spread and of considerable historical significance. Doi moi represented a
sustained attack on the central planning model; thereafter, market-type
relations existed alongside the central planned economy throughout
Vietnam. The Sixth Party Congress thus represented an important retreat
by the Party as the latter was forced to admit that central planning had
been a failure. At the same time, the Congress insisted on retaining Party
rule even as it adopted the goal of economic reform along market lines. In
effect, Party members at the end of 1986 offered the Vietnamese people a
deal: we give you the opportunity to find new economic space and you
leave us in control of politics. No communist-ruled society had been suc-
cessful to that time with this approach. On the one hand, the Chinese
example appeared to offer the Vietnamese leadership some promise of
success in this endeavor. On the other, the experience of the Soviet Union
and its East European satellites suggested meaningful economic reform,
because it necessitated popular support, could only be successful once the
Party had been dislodged from power.
Initially, implementation of the doi moi reform package was sluggish
and incomplete, as economist Dang T. Tran later recognized; con-
sequently, the new reforms were inadequate to halt the progressive deteri-
oration in economic conditions.
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The implementation of the second reform was slow at first. Party
bureaucrats had been hesitant about Doi Moi (Renovation). Only
when twenty-one people died of starvation in Thanh Hoa Province
and famine threatened the central part of the country in March 1988
did the Vietnam leaders finally realize that they had to push hard for
reforms or millions would perish. The Politburo decided to return the
land confiscated from the peasants during 1975–1983. It downgraded
the role of agricultural cooperatives and allowed farmers to perform
individually most tasks in the rice-growing cycle.2
After achieving a fairly respectable level of economic growth in the first
half of the decade, the period 1986–8 witnessed a dramatic slowdown,
principally due to the near disastrous performance of agriculture. A series
of natural calamities compounded the negative impact of a long period of
neglect and forced collectivization. Consequently, agricultural production
stagnated throughout the period with an actual decline in output in 1987.
Although official statistics showed continued growth in industrial output,
many observers, including the author, believe government data for the
period was overstated and that industrial performance also deteriorated.
Industrial enterprises experienced increased difficulties in securing inter-
mediate inputs, especially from abroad, due to growing foreign exchange
shortages. Domestic demand for industrial goods slowed as the agricul-
tural situation worsened and agricultural incomes stagnated. The eco-
nomic crisis also assumed a regional dimension in that it provoked a new
outpouring of boat people. The number of Vietnamese illegal arrivals in
neighboring countries jumped to 45,000 in 1988 and 50,000 in the first half
of 1989. Most of them came from northern Vietnam where the food crisis
hit the hardest, but departures from the South also increased.3
Frustrated with the lack of progress, Vietnam in 1988 launched several
comprehensive and well coordinated new reform measures. Reversing
earlier monetary policies, Hanoi imposed tight credit ceilings by control-
ling the growth of reserve money, introducing cash reserve requirements
and increasing interest rates. Commercial bank access to state bank credit
was restricted, a policy supported by stricter control of the budget deficit
and government borrowing from the state bank. Expenditure restraint,
revenue mobilization, improved tax administration and new tax measures
helped reduce the budget deficit. In the area of exchange policy, the
government unified the exchange rate near the level of the parallel market
and devalued the ruble rate to the more realistic level of the cross-
exchange rate. Traditional foreign trade monopolies, jealously guarded by
state companies, were largely dismantled with new public enterprises, as
well as private traders, allowed to engage in foreign trade.4
The agricultural reforms introduced in Vietnam in 1988–9 recognized
both cooperatives and production teams as voluntary, self-governing eco-
nomic units. Tenure periods of 15–20 years or longer became common,
72 Reform accelerates
and contracts often included inheritance and transfer rights. Peasants
gained the right to sell agricultural produce freely, and at their discretion,
to engage in exchanges with the state. As a result, the initiative in northern
Vietnam, as well as in the South, clearly passed from collectives to house-
holds although the net effect of the process was far from uniform in each
area. In the South, where collective agriculture had never really taken
root, new reforms forestalled rather than overturned collectivization.5
The movement to strengthen property rights accelerated in 1988 with
the implementation of the land law approved earlier by the National
Assembly. The new land law maintained state ownership of land; however,
it also recognized private land use rights awarded by the state. Granted
without charge for a fixed term, these rights carried an obligation to
observe a variety of regulations and controls and to pay taxes on the land.
But land use rights still could not be transferred, and the lack of transfer-
ability meant they could not be pledged as loan collateral.6
By 1992, six million out of seven million hectares of cropland in
Vietnam were farmed under direct household land use rights with the land
either leased directly from state farms or allocated by collectives or former
state farms. Many state farms had been dissolved and the land distributed
to employees and local farmers. Most of the remaining state farms were
expected to be dissolved or to lease out their land in the near future. Even
large portions of state forest operations had been given over to smallhold-
ers. The 1988 land law did not permit the transfer or inheritance of land
use rights; however, a number of de facto land sales took place as the
economy surged.7
Party reform in Vietnam
The Party elected Nguyen Van Linh, a long-time southern activist and
organizer and twice chairman of the Ho Chi Minh Party Committee,
General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party at the Sixth
National Party Congress in December 1986. Under his leadership, Party
reform accelerated as the political consequences of economic trans-
formation encouraged Party leaders to shape a parallel reform movement
within the Party. Establishing himself as a forceful and forward-looking
leader, Linh committed to a measure of economic change and Party trans-
formation that was far more ambitious than the reformist goals of his pre-
decessors. Among other measures, the new reforms empowered local
Party organizations to assume responsibilities parallel to the growing eco-
nomic autonomy gradually being granted to state enterprises.8
Linh also worked to improve the training of Party managers and advoc-
ated a more flexible style of management that relied increasingly on
modern organization skills and management techniques. He sought to
confine the Party to a more limited role as the conscience of the revolution
responsible for fashioning social and political direction while allowing
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accountability for daily governance to pass to a body of elected and
appointed officials. Emphasizing the need for the Party to share power
with the Vietnamese polity, Linh strongly urged that Party building should
properly include non-Party entities. At the same time, he took pains to
stress the extent to which the Party would remain central to the political
process and continue to exert a strategic influence.9
At the outset, General Secretary Linh successfully nurtured the ability
to compromise, change political habits and alter institutional rules. He also
achieved limited, early success in turning the Party into a more flexible,
responsive body able to undertake organizational change. Nonetheless,
the Party after three years was still incapable of coping with a noncommu-
nist movement or anti-Party activism. Rules stating that the Party was the
preeminent political voice in Vietnam were still on the books, slightly bent
but hardly supplanted.10
Nguyen Van Linh eventually proved unsuccessful in pushing beyond
the conservative majority, as well as his own faith and political beliefs, to
achieve extensive, permanent change in the Vietnamese political system.
On the contrary, the Party responded to the change in Eastern Europe
and the improved domestic economic climate at the end of the decade
with a retreat from the modest gains recognized by Linh. As Vietnam
entered the decade of the 1990s, the Vietnam Communist Party had yet to
redefine its concept of socialism or alter its modus operandi to an extent
that foreshadowed a multi-party system or significant pluralism. The con-
tradictions inherent in this dual commitment to economic reform and
political dogma constituted a major imponderable in any assessment of the
future direction of economic reform in Vietnam.11
Structural reform and foreign investment
In support of the package of economic reforms introduced in 1988–9,
Vietnam expanded and strengthened its structural policies. Hanoi
extended price reforms through the liberalization of virtually all commod-
ity prices. As a result, only a handful of prices remained subject to admin-
istrative controls. The government also modified agricultural contracts to
link output and input prices more closely to market developments. The
remunerative package of public sector employees was restructured with
most subsidies in kind removed. Enterprise autonomy, with a few notable
exceptions like petroleum and electricity, was strengthened by reducing
the number of compulsory plan targets. Finally, the government intro-
duced an improved system to monitor the performance of public enter-
prises.12 The revised reform package in place by the end of the decade
represented the most radical, comprehensive set of reforms adopted by
any socialist country to that time.
The Vietnamese National Assembly first approved a foreign investment
law in late 1987. Although it resembled a 1979 Chinese law, the 1987
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Vietnamese version was, in some areas, more comprehensive and liberal.
For example, the Vietnamese statute stipulated maximum terms for joint
ventures, specified tax rates and set criteria for priority tax treatment.
Elsewhere, the Vietnamese law was identical to its Chinese counterpart in
that it allowed joint ventures, business cooperation contracts and 100
percent wholly owned foreign enterprises. Even though it still entailed
bureaucratic problems and delays, the investment approval process in
Vietnam was designed to avoid many of the problems encountered earlier
in China. Vietnam established one control body responsible for all foreign
investment projects, the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment
(SCCI). This body reviewed and approved all foreign investment applica-
tions, playing the same role as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation in China. In theory, the SCCI was designed as a
one-stop shop, and all relevant ministries were represented on it. SCCI
approval specified tax rates, tax holidays, import duties and other matters
related to financing. In practice, there was also a second approval level,
the local people’s committee at the site of the proposed investment. In a
few cases, project approval also involved a third level as the Politburo
could become involved in major projects.13
The 1987 foreign investment law aimed to create attractive conditions
for overseas investors, especially those from Western and noncommunist
countries. In the process, Vietnam hoped to lay the basis for expanded
foreign economic relations and increased integration within the world
economy. Desperate to develop alternate sources of foreign exchange,
Hanoi was prevented from doing so, not by the progressive introduction of
market-oriented reforms, but by the constraints of the U.S.-led embargo.
When introduced, the terms of the 1987 law on foreign investment were
considered to be among the most liberal in Asia. Overseas response to the
law was very positive; and by the end of 1989, Vietnam had granted
investment licenses for projects totaling $832 million with half of them in
operation.14
A December 1992 revision to the 1987 foreign investment law set the
maximum limit of foreign investment at 50 years with a possible extension
to 70 years. The government then issued a decree in April 1993 which
detailed new regulations for contractual business cooperation, joint ven-
tures and enterprises with 100 percent foreign capital. In addition, it
included sections on export processing contracts and zones, technology
transfer, labor relations, financial matters and foreign exchange controls.
Finally, the 1993 decree established a base tax rate of 25 percent with
lower rates available for special projects or projects located in designated
areas of Vietnam.15
The initial impact of the economic reforms implemented in Vietnam in
1989 was positive, especially in the area of disinflation. The rate of infla-
tion dropped sharply from the spring of 1988 to the summer of 1989. There
were other notable successes as well. Hard currency exports doubled as a
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result of the trade liberalization policy and the exchange rate devaluation.
These earnings enabled Vietnam to replace lost Soviet assistance with pur-
chases of necessary imports from the convertible area. National savings
also increased dramatically, more than offsetting the loss in foreign
savings. As one result, both the growth rate and the investment rate in
1989 increased over the previous year. On the other hand, money creation
continued at an unacceptably high level preventing the government from
consolidating the gains of the disinflation program. Inflation soon
reemerged at a disturbingly high level and real interest rates were once
again negative. In addition, reduced Soviet assistance, combined with the
failure of new sources of finance to materialize, contributed to a sharp
decline in public investment as well as a return to excessive financing of
the national budget through credit creation. National calamities through-
out the first half of 1991 added to the growing list of economic problems.
However, the relatively high, excessively volatile rate of inflation con-
tinued to be the major obstacle to successful growth in Vietnam.16
Vietnam joined Comecon in 1978; and during the 1980s, the Soviet
Union was Vietnam’s largest single trading partner as well as its largest
creditor and aid donor. But as the Soviet Union began to crumble, its eco-
nomic relationship with Vietnam deteriorated; and its economic support
faded. Vietnam was increasingly preoccupied with extracting itself from
Cambodia, ending its international isolation and participating in the eco-
nomic prosperity of its neighbors. For Vietnam, the changes that took
place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe meant the loss of political
allies, economic aid and its largest market. In addition, the already large
ranks of the unemployed swelled further with the return of thousands of
contract workers from the Soviet bloc. Visits to Moscow in May 1991 con-
vinced senior Vietnamese leaders they could no longer count on political
or economic support from the Soviet Union. The leadership in Hanoi thus
concluded that the rigorous pursuit of economic reform was the best sur-
vival course for the Communist Party of Vietnam.17
Economic reforms continue in Vietnam
It was against this background that the Party held its much delayed
Seventh Party Congress in June 1991. At the congress, the reformer Vo
Van Kiet, previously Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, was
elevated to the post of Prime Minister replacing the more conservative Do
Muoi who became General Secretary of the Communist Party. Phan Van
Khai, another leading reformer, replaced Kiet as Deputy Prime Minister
in addition to serving as Chairman of the State Planning Commission. The
elevation of recognized reformers to key government positions increased
their respective influence over the central organs of the state. Otherwise,
the Congress did not witness significant change in regional or local inter-
ests and influence as reflected in provincial and lower bodies. More to the
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point, it refused to extend market economy reforms by any measure that
might diminish Party control. In his closing speech, Do Muoi argued, on
the one hand, that economic reform was the keystone of Party policy, and
on the other, that the Party remained unshakable in its determination to
follow the path of socialism.18
Where the Seventh Party Congress had leaned toward order, constitu-
tional amendments drafted at the ninth session of the National Assembly,
which opened at the end of July 1991, dropped most references to social-
ism and emphasized the building of a multi-sector commodity economy
according to a state-guided and regulated market mechanism. In turn, the
Party Central Committee, meeting at the end of the year, called for a
strengthening of the economic reforms undertaken in the last five years
and proposed new measures to resolve the current economic crisis. It also
reaffirmed Vietnamese adherence to socialism, together with the leading
role of the Party in both government and society.19
Recognizing the need for additional change, Hanoi continued its meas-
ured pace toward economic reform. Government spokesmen repeatedly
emphasized the need to boost economic growth with special emphasis on
controlling inflation, expanding foreign trade and promoting foreign
investment. The National Assembly adopted a new constitution in April
1992 which institutionalized the market-oriented policies adopted by
Vietnam over the preceding five years. In Article 15, the 1992 charter
described the economic system as “a multi-component commodity
economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the
management of the State and following a socialist orientation.” Among
other things, the new constitution encouraged foreign investment, specifi-
cally mentioning investment by Vietnamese living abroad.20
In providing for private ownership and enhancing the protection
offered by the state for such ownership, the 1992 constitution formally
established three types of ownership: people (state ownership), collective
and private, all three of which received legal protection from the state.
Nationalization of the private property rights of individuals and organi-
zations was expressly prohibited while any necessary seizure of property
had to be compensated. The rights of inheritance and transfer were also
protected. The revised charter stipulated that land remained the property
of the state but could be allotted for long-term use and transferred by the
user. And it guaranteed that neither foreign-owned nor Vietnamese-
owned property could be nationalized. The new code also recognized the
right of citizens to own means of production, to start their own businesses
and to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies. Other reforms
included changes to the foreign exchange and banking codes. A modified
foreign investment law permitted private businesses to enter foreign joint
ventures and gave tax and operating concessions to overseas investors.
The government also took tentative steps toward the privatization of state-
owned companies.21
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In 1990, some 12,000 registered state companies operated in Vietnam,
ranging from large industrial concerns to small retail stores. With total
assets estimated at $12 billion and total employment around 2.3 million,
state enterprises were relatively small compared to the former Soviet
Union and its East European satellites; however, they played a significant
role in the national economy. The existence of a large number of state-
owned firms at provincial, district and local levels distinguished Vietnam
from Cambodia and Laos as well as other socialist countries like China.
Size was another notable feature of state enterprises in Vietnam; an over-
whelming majority of them were very small in terms of assets. The major-
ity of small and medium enterprises belonged to provincial and local
authorities and the Party apparatus. The smaller enterprises were the least
efficient with an estimated 40 percent losing money and another 30
percent barely breaking even.22
The Vietnamese government after 1991 made a real effort to reform
state enterprises by granting more autonomy to management and requir-
ing more financial discipline. Such efforts produced minimal results,
largely because the attempted reforms faced strong resistance from Party
cadre managing the enterprises. Vietnam, according to a report based on
1992–3 data, estimated that at least one-third of its 12,000 state enterprises
were bankrupt. To address this situation, the World Bank called on
Vietnam to take three related steps. First, it encouraged Hanoi to adopt a
clear policy as to the sectors of the economy in which the government
would continue to invest. Second, it suggested the government strengthen
the procedures in place for closing bankrupt enterprises and for auctioning
assets, especially land use rights. Finally, the Bank called on Hanoi to
implement a pilot program to privatize profitable enterprises in non-
strategic sectors. In effect, these policy recommendations constituted a de
facto privatization policy in that thousands of state firms would cease
operation with many of their assets and employees shifting to the private
sector. The World Bank report concluded that additional reforms, in
particular procedures for transferring the land use rights of failed enter-
prises, were needed to make the government’s implicit strategy for state
enterprises more formal.23
A major revision to the 1988 land law was drafted in 1992–3 and
approved by the National Assembly in July 1993. The new law created a
role for the state in land management similar to that of governments in
market economies. The continued ownership by the state of all land was
viewed as essentially a legal basis for regulating and taxing land use in
ways not dissimilar to that in many capitalist countries. For example, the
State was to determine prices applicable to each category of land for pur-
poses of tax calculation, revenue collection, valuation of property and
compensation for damages when land was recovered.24
The 1993 land law provided that land use certificates would be issued
for agricultural land and urban residential land. The certificates could be
78 Reform accelerates
exchanged, transferred, rented, inherited and mortgaged during the period
for which the land was allocated. These changes further strengthened the
incentives in place for agricultural production; however, they left the
length of tenure for commercial and urban industrial land use rights to
implementing regulations. The length of tenure for agricultural land, set at
20 years for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops, was renewable.
Residential land was allocated on a permanent basis, recoverable only
upon fairly narrow, specified conditions. In the 1993 land law, the people’s
committees at all levels were given authority, on behalf of the state, to
administer land within their respective local areas and within the scope of
their respective authority.25
A fundamental reform of the Vietnamese banking system began in July
1987 when basic banking functions were carefully delineated between the
State Bank and the commercial banks. Under the new system, the State
Bank undertook to regulate the supply of money and credit and hence
safeguard the value of the national currency. Commercial banking func-
tions were assumed by two newly established commercial banks, the
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture (VBA) and the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of Vietnam (ICBV). Regrettably, these early reforms were not
implemented to the fullest extent. Consequently, the government in 1990
introduced additional reforms that separated the State Bank from a com-
mercial role, giving it instead responsibility for conducting monetary
policy and regulating a more complex financial system.26
In the post-1990 banking structure, the state-owned and operated
Investment and Development Bank of Vietnam (IDBV) assumed respons-
ibility for the transfer of budgetary appropriations earmarked annually for
basic infrastructure and various government investment projects. Funded
by the government for both equity and working capital, the IDBV func-
tioned as the development bank for the central government. Three state-
owned and operated institutions, the Bank for Foreign Trade, the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam and the Vietnam Bank for
Agriculture, handled banking operations on a commercial basis. Joint-
stock banks were the third category of credit institution established. In
addition, an extensive network of credit cooperatives had operated in
northern Vietnam since the early years of national independence. Modest
in scope, these cooperatives catered to the limited banking needs of local
communities. Credit cooperatives also emerged in southern Vietnam after
independence.27
Positive impact of Vietnamese reforms
By mid-1993, the package of economic reforms initiated in 1986 and
expanded after 1989 was having an increasingly positive impact on the
Vietnamese economy. The level of economic growth in 1992, generally
estimated at around 8 percent, was a marked improvement from less than
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5 percent in 1991. At the same time, the rate of inflation dropped from
almost 700 percent in 1986 to around 18 percent in 1992. As the currency
stabilized and reserves grew, the trade deficit virtually disappeared. Public
sector subsidies were reduced or eliminated although the privatization of
Vietnamese state enterprises proceeded at a much slower pace than
expected. The private sector was now responsible for almost 75 percent of
the value of national goods and services. All in all, it was a credible
performance for an economy that had recently suffered the sudden disap-
pearance of $1 billion in annual Soviet non-military aid together with a
continuation of both the prohibition on multilateral funding and the U.S.
embargo.28
In July 1993, the U.S. government finally ended its prolonged opposi-
tion to loans to Vietnam from international lending institutions. This
cleared the way for implementation of a French proposal to refinance
Vietnam’s $140 million debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a
move which enabled Hanoi to clear its arrears, restructure its debt and
attract new international funding. Clearance of IMF arrears set the stage
for the World Bank and ADB to inject substantial amounts of project aid
to rebuild Vietnam. Meeting in Paris in November 1993, the world finan-
cial community responded enthusiastically to the above developments.
Praising Vietnamese progress in moving toward a market economy,
participants pledged $1.8 billion in aid. Japan emerged as the single largest
donor to Vietnam with a pledge of $560 million for 1994 alone.
Lao PDR adopts Second Five-Year Plan
Nouhak Phoumsavanh, a member of the Central Committee of the Lao
People’s Revolutionary Party, presented the Second Five-Year Plan
(1986–90) to the Fourth Party Congress in 1986. In most respects, the new
plan did not depart from the previous one, largely following guidelines
outlined in 1981. The goal in the agricultural sector was to meet the basic
food requirements of the population as well as to expand production for
export and for the development of agricultural processing industries. To
meet these objectives, planned expenditure for agriculture was set at 20
percent of the total investment budget with much of this expenditure tar-
geted for the development of small irrigation projects to support double
cropping. To stimulate growth in forestry, the plan allocated an additional
10 percent of expenditure to forestry-related projects. Collectively, the
agricultural and forestry sectors were allocated almost one-third of total
budgeted investment, an indication of the high priority the government
placed on them.29
In the period of the First Five-Year Plan, the performance of the indus-
trial sector, despite heavy government investment, was the worst of any
sector of the economy. Where targeted growth was 17 percent annually,
actual output was negative, dropping more than 10 percent in 1980–4. The
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poor performance in industry was due in large part to a decline in manu-
facturing as most Lao factories operated below capacity. The new plan
revised growth targets downward and shifted emphasis from capital inten-
sive industries to light industry to better meet consumer demand for goods
and handicrafts. With the sale of electricity and minerals a major source of
foreign exchange earnings, the Second Five-Year Plan provided for con-
tinued expansion in these areas.30
The lack of physical infrastructure in Laos has long been identified as a
major impediment to economic and social development. With this in mind,
it was not surprising that the new plan allocated some 20 percent of total
government investment to the improvement of transportation and commu-
nications. It targeted the construction or rehabilitation of 1,500 kilometers
of road network with priority placed on routes 8, 9 and 10 as well as sec-
tions of route 14. Improvements in air and river transport, together with
the postal and telecommunications systems, were also priorities in the
plan.31
In the trade sector, the Second Five-Year Plan focused on the develop-
ment of internal trade to increase the volume of goods in circulation. It
also called for increased external trade with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, especially Cambodia and Vietnam. In the social devel-
opment sector, education and health remained priority areas as they had
been in the First Five-Year Plan. While Laos had made impressive gains in
expanding to the village level both education and primary health care, the
quality of services remained poor.32
Observers in and out of the Lao PDR generally agreed the develop-
ment priorities articulated in the Second Five-Year Plan were realistic and
appropriate for a poor country like Laos. At the same time, many worried
the targets set were too ambitious given the nation’s mediocre perform-
ance in the First Five-Year Plan and its ongoing shortage of material and
manpower resources. A land-locked position, immature economic struc-
tures and a poor communications system were correctly cited as serious
obstacles to rapid economic development.
New economic mechanism in Laos
Openly acknowledging its poor performance, the LPRP leadership
launched a new round of economic reforms in conjunction with the
presentation of the Second Five-Year Plan. Decrying an excess of central-
ization in a thinly populated country with virtually no infrastructure,
LPRP officials admitted there was little scope for building socialism in a
subsistence economy. Therefore, the Party decided that administration
must be decentralized, with economic management developed from the
grass roots up, while the economy underwent a capitalist phase before it
moved beyond subsistence activities. Focused on improvements in eco-
nomic management, the new reforms were entitled the New Economic
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Management Mechanism or simply the New Economic Mechanism
(NEM). According to General Secretary Kaysone, the new management
system was designed to correct the serious shortcomings of the old
approach.
At present, our mechanism of economic management is fraught with
bureaucratic centralism and based on state subsidies. The essence of
this mechanism is that the State must provide the capital, equipment
and all materials needed for running business and the enterprise must
hand in its products to the State. The enterprise’s economic account-
ing is merely perfunctory, as a result the enterprise’s profit is inaccu-
rately determined. As a matter of fact, the enterprise is not fully
responsible for its operation.33
To end “economic operations which are based on wishful thinking and
administrative orders from top levels,” the LPRP replaced the former
management system with what Kaysone termed “socialist economic
accounting.” In the new system, state enterprises would be responsible for
their operations based on factors such as capital availability, production
capacity, labor productivity and profitability.34
The New Economic Mechanism implied a substantial decentralization
of administrative controls on pricing, production targets and wages. Under
the new system, policy decisions in these areas were delegated either to
local economic units or the management of state enterprises. To the unini-
tiated, the new approach appeared to be a bold departure from past prac-
tice. In reality, it was a classic example of Lao pragmatism. Elements of
the new system had been quietly implemented on a trial basis by larger
state enterprises after 1983. When the experiment achieved positive
results, the Party elected in 1986 to extend the system to all enterprises
and to grant additional autonomy. Support for the new strategy came from
a wide variety of sources, including Hanoi and Moscow who were also
experimenting with new methods. Western aid donors, like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also welcomed the change.35
The most far-reaching policy adopted in the New Economic Mechanism
was the one market, one price principle, eliminating the dual price system.
Unification of multiple exchange rates began in 1986 when the govern-
ment devalued the commercial exchange rate of the kip. Introduction of a
market exchange rate, together with the unification of official exchange
rates, supported development of an export-oriented cash economy. Moves
to stimulate domestic and foreign competition through private sector
promotion and import substitution complemented price and exchange lib-
eralization measures.36
The introduction of a market exchange rate, together with the unifica-
tion of official exchange rates, were major policy adjustments in support of
the development of an export-oriented cash economy. The Lao PDR by
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mid-1987 had moved to a pricing system reflective of the new economic
structures coming into place. It abolished virtually all administered prices
as well as the multi-tiered foreign exchange rate, lifted barriers to internal
trade and granted state enterprises direct access to international markets.
The reform process was further consolidated in March 1988 when the fifth
session of the Council of Ministers passed several important decrees
related to the economy. These new measures included revised policies on
taxation, finance and banking, state pricing, goods circulation and the
private sector.37
To implement the one-price concept, the Lao PDR took three major
policy decisions in March 1988. First, it set official retail prices, with very
few exceptions, at a level equal to the parallel market price. Prices at the
wholesale level, on the other hand, were to be freely determined by buyers
and sellers. Second, the government permitted state enterprises to fix their
own output prices. Finally, it increased the price of the 22 basic goods
available in state shops with coupons to the same level as the parallel
market price. This last decision, in line with the policy to eliminate con-
sumption subsidies to state workers, was scheduled for implementation
over a period of two to three years due to the size of the adjustments
involved.38
Other important policy changes introduced in late 1987 included the
removal of restrictions on the internal trade of agricultural products as
well as an end to the state setting producer procurement prices for a wide
range of crops. In the future, prices were to be set by mutual agreement.
For example, the procurement price of rice in 1988, which had been
around 30 percent of the parallel market price in 1987, was increased to
market level. In addition, the procurement price of rice paddy was now
determined on a contract basis between farmers and cooperatives.
Through these policy adjustments, the government hoped to boost the
incomes of farmers trading with the state and thus encourage increased
food production. At the same time, consumption subsidies to state
employees fell 25–35 percent in 1988. Unfortunately, the inadequate road
system in Laos continued to be a major barrier to the internal movement
of goods and services, limiting the trade in rice between provinces. Large
price differentials between regions compounded the problem.39
A distinctive feature of the early Lao approach to reform was the speed
and intensity with which the new economic measures were implemented.
The ability of the government to execute quickly a profound reorientation
of its economy was due in no small part to its underdeveloped nature.
Given the resistance to socialist reforms in the first decade of the revolu-
tion, the challenge to the government was not so much dismantling an
entrenched socialist system as it was reorienting a largely subsistence
system to market demands.
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State enterprise reform in Laos
The Lao government in 1986 switched four state enterprises to the new
business accounting system and granted them business autonomy. The
four enterprises were the Lao Electricity Company, Beer and Soft Drink
Company, Lao Tobacco Company and Lao Plywood Company. In this
initial stage of state enterprise reform, these four companies registered
increased profits, adding considerable revenue to the state budget.40
Mandatory production targets were abolished in 1988 with each state
enterprise free to decide which commodities to produce and how to
produce them as long as it met its targeted tax payments. A March 1988
decree implemented the principle of “self-financing” in which all indirect
and direct costs of production were to be financed by state enterprises
without state subsidies. Under this policy, only newly created enterprises
(or new activities within an existing firm) were entitled to receive invest-
ment funds from the government. Once enterprises were operating nor-
mally, both investment and working capital were to be financed from
after-tax profits or credit extended by the banking system. Any new bank
loans extended would be based on normal commercial criteria.41
The policy of empowering additional state enterprises to decide upon
prices, investments and wages was not successful. Autonomy did not
improve their performance, and financial results continued to fall short of
official expectations. In some cases, autonomy resulted both in greater
managerial discretion and increases in current savings at the expense of
investment and thus in a decapitalization of the enterprise.42
When efforts to reform state enterprises fell short of expectations, Laos
launched in 1989 a program of privatization covering some 260 state firms.
Initially, the privatization process proceeded rapidly with some 30 enter-
prises transferred to the private sector through mid-1990. The process then
slowed due to the absence of a competent authority to handle privatiza-
tion. Dissatisfaction also arose over the valuation of enterprises and the
tendering procedures adopted by the government. The absence of key ele-
ments of a privatization infrastructure, like a legal contract system,
accountants, a functioning capital market and merchant bankers, also
slowed the process. Finally, resistance to privatization increased among
civil servants hoping to retain the more profitable state enterprises in the
public sector.43
In 1990, the Lao PDR expected the 141 enterprises under central
government control to contribute 19.3 billion kip to the state budget.
However, during the first five months of the year, state firms paid only 643
million kip or 3 percent of the annual target. Most of the factories were
old and lacked spare parts, and many were confused as to how to imple-
ment the liberalization measures. The government responded to their pro-
duction problems by trying to sell them to private interests. In April 1990,
for example, Laos offered 70 of its state enterprises for joint venture
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agreement, lease or sale. This total included 20 factories and six hotels.
When the number of such enterprises had decreased only slightly by year
end, the government issued a decree in March 1991 that accelerated its
disengagement from state firms. Some 37 state enterprises were privatized
in 1991–2 alone with more than half considered medium to large in terms
of number of employees. Privatization in agriculture was also relatively
rapid with 22 state enterprises under the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry privatized in the same period.44
Reform tempo increases in Laos
The year 1988 marked a watershed in the tempo of reform in the Lao
PDR. Faced with ominous signs that the economy was in serious financial
difficulty, the government mid-way through the Second Five-Year Plan
introduced bold new policy initiatives, expanding reforms initiated in 1986.
This new stage of reform promised to change fundamentally the structure
of the Lao economy both in terms of an enhanced private sector and wider
commercial relations with capitalist countries. In the process, the commu-
nist leadership, casting off whatever remained of Stalinist economic doc-
trines, broke dramatically with the past. Stressing the importance of
international trade and private foreign investment to the transformation of
domestic economic structures, the government revised the exchange rate
structure linked earlier to the one market, one price principle. It also
adopted a relatively liberal foreign investment law which allowed for
wholly owned enterprises, equity joint ventures and contractual business
arrangements.45
The Lao PDR also continued to encourage private holdings in agricul-
ture with a mid-1988 announcement that no preferential treatment, credit
or subsidies would be provided to cooperatives. In addition, the Party
added a new economic sector, termed “the economy of small goods,” to
the existing five sectors of the Lao economy (individual subsistence,
private capitalist, collective, joint state-private and state socialist). Instead
of moving directly from subsistence to collective farming, the government
now encouraged peasant families to enter the small goods economy by
trading surplus production for commodities. To promote the newly recog-
nized small goods economy, Resolution 6, adopted in June 1988, gave
farmers long-term tenure rights and allowed them to pass land to their
children or to sell it, charging for improvements made. These changes fol-
lowed other reforms in late 1987, including the removal of restrictions on
the internal trade of agricultural products. The state also stopped setting
low producer procurement prices for a wide range of crops.46
In March 1988, the Lao PDR initiated a radical reform of the state-
controlled banking system as part of its promotion of the new manage-
ment system. The responsibilities of the state bank, heretofore the sole
financial intermediary in Laos, were now confined to the monetary
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functions generally expected of a central bank. Management of foreign
exchange, as well as commercial and development banking functions, were
reassigned to other autonomous banking institutions.47
Commercial banks in Laos no longer received government subsidies
and were fully responsible for their operations, including remittance of 60
percent of profits to the government. At the same time, foreign banks
were offered facilities in the country. The government later streamlined
the functions of the State Bank in a mid-1990 law which established the
State Bank of the Lao PDR. Finally, in January 1992, the Lao PDR
enacted new regulations governing commercial banks as well as other
financial institutions.48
In consequence, private ownership in Laos had become, by the early
1990s, the dominant form of property rights in the rapidly expanding
service sector as well as in the agricultural sector. However, it remained a
minor property rights form in the industrial sector. On the other hand, the
scope of private activities in the industrial sector expanded throughout the
second half of the decade as the result of the privatization of state enter-
prises and the emergence of new private firms, most especially in construc-
tion. Taken as a whole, this meant that private property rights, although
occasionally defined imperfectly, could be said to predominate in Laos.49
Unfortunately, the rules and regulations necessary to support market
institutions and private property rights trailed the implementation of
market-oriented reforms. Contract, inheritance and property laws, for
example, were not passed until mid-1990. On the other hand, the 1991
constitution did guarantee the security of private property and foreign
investment. And new insurance and accounting systems, adopted in 1990,
were followed in 1991 by laws covering the settlement of commercial dis-
putes, bankruptcy and liquidation. The government also expanded the
banking reforms initiated in early 1988, announcing plans to privatize
state-owned commercial banks.50
Until 1988, all investment in Laos was funded by the state which relied
in turn largely on foreign assistance to fund public sector investment. At
that point, the private domestic savings rate was negative and foreign
investment was negligible. With the release of a new foreign investment
code in July 1988, the government initiated a drive to attract external
investment. The code was comparatively liberal and excited much interest,
especially in Thailand, a target of the new policy. The objectives of the
code were to expand economic and technological cooperation with foreign
investors and to boost ailing state enterprises. It allowed for 100 percent
wholly owned enterprises, equity joint ventures with a 30 percent
minimum foreign share, and cooperative or contractual business ventures.
The new code also provided guarantees against seizure and nationaliza-
tion, allowed the remittance of profits and salaries, and extended tax con-
cessions or exemptions in specific circumstances. Tax rates on profits
varied with a minimum of 20 percent set for areas where the government
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was eager to attract capital and a rate of 35 percent or more for trading or
hotel businesses. Unfortunately, long-standing impediments to investment,
including an underdeveloped legal framework, poor infrastructure and
remoteness from world markets, combined to limit the positive effects of
the new investment regulations.51
Lao external relations
Lao relations with neighboring Thailand were not good at any time after
1975 and were especially tense in 1984–6 following a border confrontation
involving three small villages in the province of Sayaboury. The conflict
erupted over differing interpretations of a 1907 treaty between France and
Thailand delimiting the border between Laos and Thailand. Tensions
eased in 1986 when the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Laos and Thailand,
meeting in Hanoi, publicly endorsed a statement by Kaysone Phomvihane,
indicating the Lao government was ready to do its utmost to normalize
relations with Thailand. The foreign ministers of Laos and Thailand met
later in the year to discuss improving diplomatic and commercial ties.
After another short, but intense, border war in the winter of 1987–8, Thai-
land announced its intent to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a mar-
ketplace. Trade between Laos and Thailand burgeoned in 1988 with
Thailand reducing from 273 to 30 the list of strategic goods that Thai com-
panies were forbidden to trade in Laos. Relations continued to improve
over the next two years. In March 1989, Laos and Thailand established the
Lao–Thai Commission for Economic, Cultural, Scientific, and Technical
Cooperation, an event which led to frequent exchanges on both sides of
the Mekong. In November 1989, Thailand lifted its ban on the export of
strategic goods to Laos, a list that once included 363 items. Finally, Thai
Princess Maha Chakkri Sirinthon made an eight-day visit to Laos in March
1990.52
The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Laos in 1987 gave the Lao
PDR additional latitude to develop both diplomatic and commercial ties
with its neighbors. Relations with Vietnam remained close throughout the
period, extending from political work at the party, administrative and mili-
tary levels to the twinning of provinces, districts and communes. Although
the dramatic improvement in Lao–Thai relations was a significant devel-
opment, it did not presage a shift in the “special relationship” between
Laos and Vietnam. As William Worner noted in a perceptive article on
the Lao PDR, “the art of foreign policy-making in Laos has been to recog-
nize the practical limits imposed by the ‘special relationship.’ ”53
While it went largely unpublicized at the time, there was a much freer
movement of goods and people across the Lao–Chinese border after 1985.
Toward the end of 1987, the governments of China and Laos elevated
their diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level, opened borders
closed since 1979, and in 1988, reestablished commercial relations. The
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exchange of ambassadors between China and Laos took place against the
background of Vietnamese troop withdrawals from the Lao–China border
and assurances from Beijing that it was terminating support for anti-
government guerrillas in Laos.54
The Lao PDR also continued its close relationship with the Soviet
Union. Soviet aid accounted for approximately half the total economic
assistance received by Laos in 1988. At the same time, Moscow continued
to criticize the Lao government for what it felt was an often inefficient and
wasteful use of Soviet assistance. In part, Moscow’s attitude reflected its
position as the dominant donor to a country under severe constraints in its
ability to absorb aid. For this reason, the Soviet Union welcomed an
increase in Western influence in Laos as a means to reduce Soviet financial
investment at minimal political cost.55
Diplomatic relations with the United States in the second half of the
1980s focused on the issues of American MIAs (servicemen missing-in-
action since the Vietnam war), drug trafficking and political prisoners.
Responding to Lao cooperation in the search for MIA remains, the U.S.
Congress in December 1985 removed the ten-year-old ban on direct aid to
Laos. This action led to exploratory talks on possible areas of cooperation
but not to an immediate resumption of significant quantities of financial
aid. The State Department in May 1988 issued a report that implicated
Laos in the international narcotics trade. These charges were vehemently
denied by the Lao government, but direct proof of Lao involvement later
surfaced when several people were convicted of running an illegal heroin
factory in Oudomxay province in northern Laos. After temporarily decer-
tifying Laos in 1989 for failure to curb the production and distribution of
illicit opium, Washington in 1990 provided assistance to initiate crop sub-
stitution programs intended to replace opium production. The question of
political prisoners was largely defused before the end of the decade when
the government closed political reeducation camps as part of an effort to
attract expatriates to return to Laos.56
Laos also enjoyed a wide range of bilateral relations with other foreign
countries and support from international financial institutions, like the
World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Foreign Minister Phoune Sipaseuth in March
1988 made the first official visit of a Lao foreign minister to Japan since
the founding of the Lao PDR. The visit highlighted Lao interest in obtain-
ing development assistance from Japan as well as Tokyo’s reluctance to
increase the level of aid before a Cambodian settlement was reached.
Eighteen months later, Kaysone visited Japan and France, his first visits to
countries outside the socialist bloc. These excursions to the West were
meant to signal to the capitalist world that Laos was committed to
strengthening its economic and political ties with the nonsocialist world.
Laos also continued to maintain close ties with Australia and Sweden,
countries that had long provided generous amounts of aid.57
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Political developments in Laos
The Lao approach to reform could best be characterized as perestroika
without glasnost or economic change without political reform. Even as the
LPRP cast off Stalinist economic doctrines and broke dramatically with
the socialist past, it refused to share political power. In this context, the
April 1988 decision of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) to hold
elections, the first to be held in Laos since the regime took power in 1975,
was a major political development which complemented efforts to liberal-
ize the economy. Nationwide elections were scheduled in three stages with
the first, local council elections in June, followed by provincial assembly
and SPA ballots at the end of the year.58
The mechanics of the election law were clearly designed to broaden
participation in the selection of representative institutions without chal-
lenging the Party’s authority. A 15-member national election committee,
under the direction of the Supreme People’s Council Standing Committee,
was established to oversee the election process, and all candidates stand-
ing for election were nominated by the LPRP as opposed to representing
competing party platforms. Candidates were required to “be faithful to the
country and socialism” as well as to “be obliged to implement the party’s
line and policies.” Determined to retain its preeminent position in Laos,
there was clearly no intent on the part of the LPRP to permit political plu-
rality in the form of competing political parties.59
At the same time, despite the control exercised by the state and Party,
the 1988 elections were more than simply a matter of confirming govern-
ment candidates. With 4,462 candidates vying in the first round for 2,410
seats in 17 provinces, most voters had a choice. Only 360 single candidates
were elected unopposed. Delayed for a month, the provincial assembly
elections were held on November 20 and resulted in the formation of 16
provincial assemblies as well as a municipal assembly for Vientiane city.60
Turnout for the SPA election, which was delayed until March 1989,
reached a level of more than 98 percent, according to official sources, and
the Party acknowledged “weak points and shortcomings” in the adminis-
tration of the balloting. A total of 121 candidates campaigned for 79 seats
in the SPA so Lao voters again were granted a limited choice. The newly
elected representatives included 65 LPRP members, 66 lowland Lao
Loum, and five women, a number consistent with the low level of females
in Party and government positions.61
The first major undertaking of the Supreme People’s Assembly, which
convened in May 1989, was the preparation of a draft constitution. The
absence of a constitution was not a major issue in the early years of the
revolution; however, it had surfaced frequently in the 1980s in conjunction
with the trend toward liberalization. Without the protection of a legal
umbrella, prospective business entrepreneurs and individuals felt exposed
to the whims of powerful Party and government officials with broad
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interpretive powers. On 14 August 1991, the SPA unanimously endorsed
the first constitution promulgated since the formation of the Lao PDR in
1975. Logically constructed and legally correct, it detailed the structures
and duties of branches of government and defined certain basic citizen
rights. On the other hand, the new constitution was rather quiet as to the
limits of government authority.62
The 1991 Lao constitution stood in marked contrast to those of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea,
both published ten years earlier, in that it was much less ideological in
tone and content. In the cultural, economic and social spheres, both Cam-
bodia and Vietnam were obviously more committed to socialism at that
point than Laos was a decade later. There were also similarities in the
three documents, notably in their structure and in the political institutions
endorsed. The Lao constitution owed much to its Indochina neighbors and
the Soviet Union, but it was “a unique document reflecting specifically Lao
needs and conditions which apply, in the words of the Preamble, ‘at this
new period’ in the history of the state.”63
A major reshuffle of government ministries, evidence of the govern-
ment’s determination to consolidate the position of its supporters,
occurred without public announcement in 1988. The State Planning Com-
mittee and the Ministry of Finance merged into a new State Committee
for Economic Planning and Finance. Politburo member Sali Vongkahm-
sao was named chairman of this powerful new committee with Khamsai
Souphanouvong, son of the ailing Lao PDR president, as first deputy
chairman. In addition, a new State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade under Phao Bounnaphon, former Minister of Trans-
port, Communications, and Posts, assumed responsibility for the foreign
component of economic development strategy. Finally, the appointment of
Thongsavat Khaikamphithoun, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, to
the post of first deputy foreign minister, reflected the shift in Lao foreign
policy vis-à-vis the socialist bloc. Knowledgeable observers agreed that
these changes in key government structures and personnel signaled the
determination of the Lao government to press ahead with its new develop-
ment strategy.64
The Lao government also registered a shift in its attitude toward Bud-
dhism in a March 1989 national meeting of the Sangha in Vientiane. The
structural rules for the Sangha adopted at this meeting made it clear that
the government intended to “take the religion forward along the road of
socialism under the leadership of the party.” Young men were accorded
the right to enter wats as long as they received permission from local
authorities; and “before leaving the Sangha they must have a good reason
and carry it out according to the customs of Buddhism.” While not
restricting the beliefs of the Lao people, the Lao United Buddhist Associ-
ation reserved “the right to decide on all problems relating to the world of
the Sangha.” The document also reiterated the government’s opposition to
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superstitious beliefs in spirits and thevadas, together with any form of
intoxication or gambling. Subsequently, Lao monks were permitted to
travel to Thailand for study and to organize, on a temple-to-temple basis,
Thai assistance with Buddhist teaching texts. This latter concession
marked a radical departure from the recent past when the Lao govern-
ment had actively discouraged any contact with Thai Buddhists.65 The
1991 constitution later upgraded the status of Buddhism from one religion
among many to the one specific religion named in the document.66
Cambodia’s First Five-Year Plan
At the end of 1985, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea had survived for
seven years, longer than either the Khmer Republic or Democratic Kam-
puchea. Supported by massive economic and military aid from the Soviet
Union and Vietnam, the PRK made notable progress in rebuilding its
economy and reestablishing at least some of the attributes of a functional
nation state. At the same time, numerous obstacles remained to the sus-
tained, peaceful reconstruction of the economy, in particular the absence
of an international settlement to the diplomatic and military conundrum
plaguing Cambodia after 1978. It would take another six years of shifting
power relations and diplomatic maneuvering before an agreement was
reached which brought independence and peace to Cambodia.
President Heng Samrin, in his political report to the Fifth Party Con-
gress, introduced the PRK’s First Five-Year Plan (1986–90) in October
1985. Described as a program of socioeconomic restoration and develop-
ment, the plan emphasized agriculture, establishing aggressive production
targets for four economic spearheads – food supplies, rubber, aquatic pro-
duction and timber. Targets for the industrial sector, given its underdevel-
oped nature, were more modest. The plan called for the selective
restoration of existing industrial production capacity and the gradual con-
struction of small and medium industrial bases appropriate to Cambodian
requirements.67 The First Five-Year Plan also called for an expansion of
the socialist trade network under the motto:
For the peasantry, selling rice and agricultural products to the state is
patriotism; for the state, selling goods and delivering them directly to
the people is being responsible towards the people.68
Decisions taken at the Fifth Party Congress also resulted in important
changes in the political leadership of Cambodia. The balance of power in
the PRK continued in 1986 to shift from Khmer Viet Minh, former
members of the Communist Party of Indochina who had remained in exile
in Vietnam for long periods, toward former members of the Khmer Rouge.
Khang Sarin, Minister of Interior, and Chan Pin, Minister of Finance and
Trade, both Khmer Viet Minh, were replaced by deputy ministers who
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were not Hanoi exiles. Other ministerial changes and appointments to
Party posts also reflected a consolidation of power by former Khmer Rouge
cadre. The evolving complexion of the PRK leadership had significant
albeit uncertain implications for the future direction of Cambodian reform
efforts. At the very least, the changes clearly suggested a move toward a
more Cambodian-oriented, less Vietnamese-inclined leadership.69
It should also be recognized that these important leadership changes
had little or no impact on the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of most
Cambodians, the majority of whom were unsophisticated, rural peasants.
Throughout the decade, revolutionary changes in institutions, policy and
process, with the exception of the question of land ownership, were imple-
mented with little public notice, interest or debate. For example, elections
to the National Assembly, scheduled for mid-1986, were postponed in
February 1986 until 1991 under a constitutional proviso which allowed the
National Assembly to prolong its term of office “in the case of war or
under other exceptional circumstances.”70
The tenuous security situation throughout much of Cambodia con-
tinued to undermine efforts to rebuild the political economy. Three separ-
ate resistance groups, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
(former Khmer Rouge), the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
(former Prime Minister Son Sann), and the Nationalist Sihanoukist Army
(Prince Sihanouk group), operated on the Thai–Cambodian border. With
the Soviet Union and Vietnam supporting the PRK government, Chinese
support of the Khmer Rouge, coupled with American and ASEAN
support of their respective clients, sucked the major world powers into the
Cambodian vortex, vastly complicating any potential settlement.71
As journalist Steven Erlanger noted at the time, power politics in Cam-
bodia in the 1980s were largely a reflection of regional rivalries before and
during the Second Indochina War:
For China, rivalry with the Soviet Union and long enmity with
Vietnam made the humiliation of its ally, the Khmer Rouge unaccept-
able – whatever its crimes. While the Soviets supported Vietnam, the
Chinese revived the Khmer Rouge as the best way to harass Hanoi
and Moscow. Thailand, always fearful of Vietnam’s expansionist
ambitions, facilitated Chinese aid to the Khmer Rouge, happy to take
a cut and to have a buffer of Khmer Rouge soldiers and Cambodian
civilians between itself and Vietnam. The United States, traumatized
by its military defeat in Indochina and preferring improved relations
with China over those with Vietnam, sided with the Chinese and thus,
ironically, with the Khmer Rouge.72
To complicate matters, the three Cambodian resistance groups, loosely
tied after 1982 as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK), were often at odds with each other.
92 Reform accelerates
Despite difficult economic and political obstacles, Cambodia’s economy
improved over the next three years. Self-sufficiency remained elusive, but
annual rice production increased after 1984, with the exception of a setback
in 1988. Industry on the other hand was slow to recover in part due to a
lack of raw materials and power. And the composition of manufacturing
output continued to be heavily state-controlled. The trade balance con-
tinued in deficit with any increase in exports offset by an increase in
imports. Most foreign trade continued to be conducted in the Comecon
zone, but cross-border trade with Thailand also grew. In 1988, Cambodia
concluded a trade protocol with Vietnam in which the signatories agreed to
expand by 20 percent the volume of goods exchanged. The PRK also nego-
tiated agreements with the Soviet Union to provide construction, voca-
tional training and geological mapping to facilitate mineral exploration.73
Economic liberalization in Cambodia
Beginning in the spring of 1988, Cambodia initiated a series of economic
liberalization measures to strengthen the role of the private sector. In the
area of private property, the growing dominance of family farming con-
tinued a trend visible for much of the decade with the government eventu-
ally abandoning its policy of agricultural collectivization.74 With the
possession of land, albeit not ownership, already guaranteed in Article 15
of the 1981 Constitution, a February 1989 constitutional amendment
granted limited land ownership, although it did not alter Article 14 which
stipulated that all land was state property. Article 15, as amended in early
1989, gave citizens the right to manage and use land as well as the right to
bequeath and inherit land granted by the state for the purpose of living on
or exploiting it.75 The new rules, as Viviane Frings noted, accorded Cam-
bodian peasants secure tenure rights:
Contrary to what was said by most analysts at the time, the constitu-
tional amendment did not provide for a privatisation of land owner-
ship, but rather for some kinds of usufruct rights for the people who
cultivate the land, with all the land theoretically remaining the prop-
erty of the State.
Nevertheless, what was important was that the peasants were
thenceforth given secure tenure rights on the land they cultivated and
that land could not be redistributed.76
Traveling in Cambodia in mid-1989, journalist H. D. S. Greenway cited
anecdotal evidence to exemplify the importance of secure tenure rights to
Cambodian peasants.
François Grunewald, a French agronomist who does a lot of travelling
in the Cambodian countryside, told me that for the first time in ten
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years peasants are planting sugar-palm trees. Because it takes from
ten to twelve years for a sugar palm to mature, Grunewald sees the
planting as a sign that the peasants have enough confidence in the
government and in their own tenure on the land to plan for the
future.77
While rice production increased steadily in the second half of the 1980s,
the primary aim of the government’s land reform program was to increase
domestic political support as opposed to boosting agricultural output.
Land reform was a significant political gesture in a period of intense peace
negotiations with the CGDK resistance groups. The reforms helped rally
popular support for the PRK as it prepared to face the challenge of an
emboldened resistance following Vietnamese troop withdrawals. Eco-
nomic liberalization measures also helped compensate for unpopular pol-
icies like increased conscription. In reality, the PRK land reforms simply
legalized the existing situation since the land in most cases had been dis-
tributed several years earlier.78
Cambodia in mid-1989 promulgated a liberal, if somewhat deficient,
foreign investment code. It also established a national committee to
review foreign investment decisions. Early attempts to open the cross-
border trade with Thailand were encouraging, if problematical, as they
threatened a loss of state control over valuable resources. The rubber
sector appeared firmly in state hands; however, the prospects for the
timber and precious stones industries were far less certain. Over the next
three years, Cambodia received more than 200 project applications from
some 100 foreign firms. In addition, the lifting in January 1992 of the U.S.
economic embargo later eased the flow of foreign direct investment into
the country.79
Cambodia in late 1989 launched a program of financial autonomy for
state enterprises that envisaged them operating within a system of indica-
tive planning but without state interference. State enterprises over time
were expected to become financially self-sufficient and to behave as if they
were commercial ventures in a market economy. Unfortunately, meaning-
ful autonomy for state enterprises proved difficult to achieve. Faced with
worsening budgetary problems, mounting inflation and elections in 1993,
the government delayed addressing the short-term social, financial and
political problems entailed in a full transition to financial autonomy. Priva-
tization of state enterprises, in the form of partial sales, divestitures and
leases, also commenced in 1989. In Cambodia, privatization was seen as an
attractive alternative to the protracted restructuring of state enterprises.
As early as mid-1992, almost 40 percent of the state enterprises owned by
major national authorities, like the Ministry of Agriculture, had been pri-
vatized and others were awaiting official approval.80
The economic crisis in Cambodia intensified at the end of the 1980s
against a backdrop of Vietnamese troop withdrawals and growing turmoil
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in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Despite some improvement in
overall economic conditions, per capita GDP declined by 50 percent from
1968 to 1988. The fate of Cambodia was intimately tied to that of its prin-
cipal benefactor, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After Vietnamese
armed forces withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, the PRK doubled its mili-
tary expenditure to some 30 percent of the national budget. Due to infla-
tion and jittery confidence, the value of the riel plummeted from 150 to
800 to the dollar. The implosion of the Soviet Bloc threatened the sudden
disappearance of a development aid flow estimated at around $100 million
annually for most of the 1980s at a time when external assistance remained
a crucial component of the Cambodian economy.81
The year 1990 marked the end of the First Five-Year Plan. The plan
had recognized the role of the emerging private sector in creating employ-
ment and goods for domestic consumption and export. Economic activities
were progressively liberalized after 1988; however, the positive effects of
reform were largely offset by ongoing fighting, international isolation and
a reduction in economic assistance from the Soviet Union and its allies.
Corruption, smuggling and speculation in goods and property contributed
to runaway inflation rates. While the First Five-Year Plan set aggressive
agricultural production targets, rice yields in 1990 were among the lowest
in the world; and timber production was only a little better than half the
plan target. Moreover, timber cutting far outstripped replanting which
heralded future environmental problems for Cambodia. Rubber produc-
tion in 1990 approached plan targets, but a lack of capital, trained man-
power and research facilities threatened future production increases.
Output in freshwater and maritime fish production also approached 1990
targets; and in this sector, the government was successful in negotiating
contracts for the export of seafood. Revenues from state-run enterprises,
excise, property and other taxes, had also improved. But foreign invest-
ment levels remained low, reflecting the prevailing climate of instability as
well as the absence of the rules and regulations necessary to support
foreign investments.82
Successful peace talks in Cambodia
The Vietnamese government announced in August 1985 that it would
withdraw unilaterally from Cambodia no later than 1990. From 1985 to
1989, a series of peace talks occurred in an effort to resolve the decade-
long Cambodian civil war. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM I and JIM
II) in July 1988 and February 1989 eventually set the stage for a final set-
tlement. The Jakarta talks provided the four warring Cambodian factions,
two interested Indochinese states (Laos, Vietnam), and the six ASEAN
member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land) a benign atmosphere to share ideas and build consensus.83 Neither
JIM I nor JIM II produced a formal agreement; however, a consensus had
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developed by JIM II on the central issues to be addressed in a final settle-
ment:
1) achievement through peaceful measures of an independent, non-
aligned, politically and territorially sovereign Cambodia; 2) with-
drawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia by September 1989 and
the cessation of all foreign interference in Cambodian affairs; 3) an
internationally supervised ceasefire; 4) the establishment of a quadri-
partite coalition for the convening of a general election; and 5) an
international conference to guarantee the resolutions.84
JIM I and JIM II also highlighted a reluctance on the part of the Cam-
bodian factions to preempt the major powers and take independent
decisions without their sanction. The parties again came together at the
Paris International Conference on Cambodia in July–August 1989 but
once more failed to reach an agreement. Where only regional players
participated in the two Jakarta Informal Meetings, the First Paris Confer-
ence included all major international players, including the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council, Australia, Japan, India, Canada and
Zimbabwe (in its role as chairman of the Non-aligned Movement). Hanoi
had announced in January 1989 that it would withdraw all its troops from
Cambodia by September 1989. When it claimed to have met that objective
on September 26, Hanoi and Phnom Penh asked for UN verification, but
their requests were denied.85
Diplomacy in early 1990 flowed down multiple tracks. First, the
permanent members of the UN Security Council, having formed in 1985 a
body known as the “Perm Five” to pursue a settlement in Afghanistan,
placed Cambodia on their agenda in December 1989. A second track
involved efforts by the Indonesian government to revive the Jakarta Infor-
mal Meetings in a different format to preserve a regional initiative. A third
track consisted of informal talks between the four Cambodian factions. In
September 1990, the four factions agreed to pursue the “Framework for a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict” which the
Perm Five had adopted in August 1990. The proposal called for the elec-
tion of a bipartite Supreme National Council, composed of six CGDK del-
egates and six from what was now known as the State of Cambodia, to
represent Cambodia at the United Nations and to grant the UN a mandate
to administer the country. Representatives on the Supreme National
Council later proved unable to agree among themselves; consequently,
Cambodia’s UN seat remained vacant for an additional year. In the
interim, prolonged and difficult negotiations, in which the major powers
pressed their Cambodian clients to reach a settlement, finally led to the
conclusion of a series of agreements in Paris in October 1991.86
In the course of the negotiations, the PRK government headed by
Prime Minister Hun Sen sought to replace ideological rigidity with a more
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pragmatic approach. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea was renamed
the State of Cambodia in April 1989, abandoning the communist-
associated moniker of a “people’s republic” with its connotation of one-
party rule. In mid-October 1991, just before the Paris agreements, a
special congress of the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party transformed
itself into the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Several constitutional
amendments were also enacted both to move closer to the policies advoc-
ated by Prince Sihanouk and to promote Khmer nationalism. Other con-
stitutional amendments abolished the death penalty and made a first step
toward installing a separation of powers. Finally, Buddhism regained its
pre-1975 status as the state religion, and many of the restrictions long in
place, such as an age limit for ordination, were lifted.87
The Paris peace accords, concluded in late October 1991, consisted of
four separate but related agreements. The “Final Act of the Paris Confer-
ence on Cambodia” referenced the Perm Five “Framework” and outlined
the terms of the settlement. The “Agreement on a Comprehensive Polit-
ical Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict” called for the creation of the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia as an interim force to
run key government ministries, verify the disarmament of competing fac-
tions, and organize and conduct elections for a constituent assembly. The
“Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial
Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia”
detailed the conditions necessary for Cambodia to achieve the status con-
tained in the agreement’s title. Finally, the Paris agreement included a
“Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia”
which called for coordinated international assistance for Cambodia’s eco-
nomic reconstruction.88
Donor nations meeting in Tokyo in June 1992 pledged $880 million
toward the rehabilitation of Cambodia. Japan led with a target contribu-
tion of $150–$200 million. The conference also agreed to form an Inter-
national Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) to
provide assistance in planning and managing reconstruction programs.
Intended from the outset to become operational only after the new Cam-
bodian government was formed, the first ICORC meeting did not take
place until September 1993.89
From UNTAC to royal government
By early 1993, the forces of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), in accordance with the terms of the 1991 peace
accords, were in place and operating throughout the country. UNTAC
forces achieved notable success in several areas of their multifaceted
mandate, in particular the resettlement of refugees and the organization of
nationwide elections. They were less successful in maintaining a cease-fire
and demobilizing and disarming competing military forces, primarily
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because the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate. They also experienced
problems in containing violence and promoting human rights. The run-up
to the election witnessed considerable ethnic tension and attacks against
Vietnamese living in Cambodia as well as threats to UNTAC personnel.90
Even though electoral preparations took place in an atmosphere of
threat and intimidation, the actual conduct of elections was a huge success,
surprisingly free of violence. An estimated 46 percent of registered voters
cast ballots on the first day with voters flocking to polling stations long
before they opened, despite driving monsoon rains. Over the planned six-
day polling period (23–28 May 1993), more than 89 percent of registered
voters, an estimated 97 percent of Cambodians eligible to vote, cast a
ballot. When the results were announced, the National United Front for
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCIN-
PEC) had obtained 45.47 percent and 58 of 120 Constituent Assembly
seats, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 38.23 percent and 51 seats, the
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) 3.81 percent and 10 seats and
the small Moulinaka Party 1.37 percent and one seat. The remaining 16
political parties garnered only a handful of votes and no Assembly seats.
Exactly what most Cambodians voted for remains a subject of debate.
However, William Shawcross probably best captured the prevailing atmo-
sphere at the time. “Over most of the country, people had voted for peace,
for reconciliation, for Sihanouk, and, perhaps above all, for change. It was
a lot to hope for.”91
FUNCINPEC emerged from the elections as the largest and most suc-
cessful political party but one short of a majority in the Constituent
Assembly. CPP came second but retained the largest armed force and the
most effective administrative structures in Cambodia. With neither party
in a position to command the two-thirds majority necessary to secure
passage of a new constitution, cooperation between FUNCINPEC and
CPP was essential. Following a period of difficult negotiations, the two
parties in late June 1993 reached agreement on a power-sharing arrange-
ment in which CPP and FUNCINPEC joined to form the Provisional
National Government of Cambodia (PNGC). Creation of the PNGC
helped stabilize the immediate post-election period and led to the adop-
tion by the Constituent Assembly in September 1993 of a new constitu-
tion, restoring the monarchy with Prince Sihanouk as King. The
constitution transformed the Constituent Assembly into the National
Assembly and cleared the way for the formation of a new Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia (RGC), inaugurated on 29 October 1993.92
The new government faced a multitude of pressing problems. A famil-
iar pattern of violence continued to plague the country. Corruption was
omnipresent with illicit revenue extraction common at all levels of society.
Millions of landmines covered large areas of the countryside. The govern-
ment struggled to maintain cohesion within its own ranks even as it faced
the threat of a weakened but intact Khmer Rouge organization. King
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Sihanouk’s state of health remained uncertain, often forcing him to be
abroad for medical treatment. Economically, Cambodia faced widespread
poverty, resource and capital shortages, environmental degradation and
economic management shortages. Dependent on external assistance for
reconstruction and rehabilitation, only some $10 million or a little more
than one percent of the $880 million in financial aid pledged at the 1992
Tokyo Conference had been distributed by January 1993.93
When the U.S. government in July 1993 ended its prolonged opposition
to loans to Vietnam from international lending institutions, it cleared the
way, as noted earlier, for the implementation of a French proposal to refi-
nance Vietnam’s $140 million IMF debt. France and Japan subsequently
cleared Vietnam’s arrears, together with Cambodian arrears of $51
million, at the September 1993 IMF/World Bank meeting. In the Cambo-
dian case, the full amount was raised through cash grants from donor
countries with Japan paying more than half the total. The world financial
community responded enthusiastically to developments in Cambodia; and
at a second ICORC meeting in Tokyo in March 1994, Cambodia received
emergency aid pledges totaling $773 million, a figure inflated by the
repledging of funds previously committed but not disbursed. Representa-
tives from the 30 nations and 12 multinational bodies attending the second
ICORC meeting lauded Cambodia for its progress in curbing inflation,
boosting tax revenues and stabilizing the currency.94
The conclusion of the UNTAC mandate, followed by the creation of
the Royal Government of Cambodia, provided fresh challenges and new
opportunities for Cambodian diplomacy. Having regained its status as a
full member of the international community, Cambodia immediately
pursued contacts with a wide range of states, inside and outside Asia, often
with the objective of maximizing foreign assistance. China affirmed its
support for the process of reconciliation and moved to improve its rela-
tions with the RGC. Cambodian contacts with the ASEAN states also
expanded as did its involvement in a variety of regional and international
organizations. While it had few problems with neighboring Laos, relations
with Thailand and Vietnam were more problematic. Relations with
Vietnam were clouded by the volatile issue of ethnic Vietnamese living in
Cambodia together with outstanding border questions. The legacy of long
years of conflict, and Thai support for Cambodian resistance forces, trou-
bled relations with Bangkok.95
Concluding observations
The theme of a conference held at the Australian National University in
1992 was “the law in Vietnam,” but the title of the proceedings, drawn
from one of the contributions, became Vietnam and the Rule of Law. As
David Koh pointed out in an extensive review of the book, this subtle
change from the title of the conference to the title of the proceedings
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masked a fundamental difference in power, scope and emphasis.96 Any
legislative body can enact laws; however, the simple existence of a law
does not guarantee adherence. This is particularly true in countries like
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam which have no real tradition of central
authority, separation of powers or rule of law. When the ruling powers in
these states refer to state rule by law, they generally mean scrutinizing
laws, edicts and decrees, codifying them and passing the results through
the national assembly. This process incorporates the Confucian principle
that the good of society outweighs the individual good. The Confucian
system granted a benign ruler final powers of arbitration, but the reality of
the situation was more accurately reflected in the Vietnamese adage, “the
emperor’s writ stops at the bamboo hedge of the Vietnamese village.”
In contrast, the concept of rule of law involves not only the passage of
law but also enforcement and compliance. It necessitates a clear separa-
tion of power between the executive, legislative and judicial branches,
together with a consistent body of law and transparent rules and regula-
tions. This separation proved impossible to achieve in the communist-
controlled states of Indochina because it was the Party, not the legislature,
that made the law; and the Party was above the law. Consequently, the
governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, in the two decades after
1975, faced tremendous obstacles in affecting the rule of law because its
implementation involved a basic contradiction between respect for author-
ity and tradition and the legal framework thought by many economists and
other scholars to be necessary for a successful market economy.
Responding to serious economic problems, Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam implemented significant reform measures in the second half of
the 1980s. Vietnam led the way with Cambodia and Laos, in the early
days, often aping the general Vietnamese approach, if not specific meas-
ures. Individual approaches to the collectivization of agriculture high-
lighted the different conditions existing in each state as well as the
different paths to agricultural reform pursued. As the years passed, each
country increasingly followed its own path to modernization. This was a
natural and expected result as the economic problems faced by the three
were often very different, necessitating independent solutions.
The end of the Cambodian conflict, as ratified in the 1991 Paris agree-
ments, marked the end of the final phase of the decolonization of
Indochina, a process initiated at the end of World War II. The Communist
Party of Vietnam in 1945 challenged the resumption of French colonial
rule, and the ensuing struggle transformed the entire subregion into a
battleground of the Cold War. As the struggle progressed, the Vietnamese
leadership viewed Indochina as a single theater which demanded Viet-
namese hegemony in the interest of national security. China disliked this
strategic perspective but accepted it as long as it viewed the United States
as a serious threat.
As the strategic environment changed with the increased threat of the
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Soviet Union and a rapprochement with the United States, Chinese
opposition to Vietnamese hegemony hardened, leading to a direct military
confrontation over Cambodia. This conflict began with the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and lasted for more than a decade.
Throughout this period, the Lao PDR maintained its special relationship
with Vietnam, in part by preference and in part in recognition of the prac-
tical limits imposed by its dependent affiliation. The competing factions in
Cambodia naturally had their own agendas, but all of them were also
clients of foreign powers. In the early 1990s, geopolitical shifts divorced
Cambodia from the global picture; and the subsequent Sino-Vietnamese
rapprochement reduced its regional importance. Collectively, these polit-
ical developments both set the stage for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to
act independently of each other in the ensuing decade and enhanced their
ability to participate in nascent regional organizations.
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I think we will have to accelerate our development. Slow development
means hunger, don’t you think? But at the same time I want to see effi-
ciency and stability. If reform is too fast we will make mistakes. If you run
too fast and there is something in the road you may fall down.
General Secretary Do Muoi, Vietnamese Communist Party, June 1996
It is noteworthy that the imperialists have concentrated on carrying out a
strategy of effecting change through peaceful means with the hope of doing
away with our party’s leadership and moving our country into their orbit.
They carry out sabotage and subversive schemes through armed activities
while creating problems regarding the implementation of the democratic
and multiparty system as well as human rights in our country.
LPRP Politburo Resolution, October 1992
Le Cambodge s’aide lui-même (Cambodia will help itself).
Royal Government of Cambodia, 1993
In the final decade of the twentieth century, socioeconomic and political
reform in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam continued to move in divergent
directions. On the one hand, reform policy in all three countries contained
the core ingredients found in most states in transition. Competing, often
conflicting, forces for continuity and change also challenged all three
states, albeit in separate ways. On the other hand, the Asian financial crisis
in 1997–8 impacted each country differently, highlighting the structural
diversity of their respective economies. Finally, the inability of riparian
states to reach consensus on the use of the Mekong suggested practical
limits to regionalism.
Vietnam rejoins the world economy
The Vietnamese government achieved notable results in the decade
following the introduction of the package of economic reforms known col-
lectively as doi moi. The performance of the economy was especially
impressive given the collapse of Soviet aid and the loss of Comecon
trading partners. As the reform process increased in scope and intensity,
Hanoi emphasized external aid and foreign investment but postponed dif-
ficult institutional changes, like the privatization of state firms. In addition,
it often timed and sequenced economic reforms to fulfill political object-
ives related to the maintenance of the Party’s monopoly of power. Hanoi
enjoyed considerable initial success in the execution of economic reforms,
but there was growing doubt as to the viability of the current model for the
next stage of economic and political reform.
The November 1992 decision of the Japanese government to resume
broad economic ties, including the offer of a major loan package, height-
ened prospects for accelerated change. Unlike the United States, Japan
did not break diplomatic relations with Hanoi in the postwar period; but in
1979, after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, it did halt virtually all
economic assistance to Hanoi. Japan’s decision to resume economic ties
increased the pressure on Washington to sanction multilateral economic
assistance and to lift the trade embargo on Vietnam.1
The Clinton administration responded in mid-1993, ending its opposi-
tion to loans to Vietnam from international lending agencies. Further
progress toward a normalization of bilateral relations was thwarted by
U.S. insistence on first resolving so-called “discrepancy cases,” instances
where Americans listed as MIAs were known to be alive when they
entered Vietnamese captivity. The next major step in U.S.-Vietnamese
relations, lifting the trade embargo, occurred in February 1994. The White
House delayed taking the final step, normalization of diplomatic relations,
fearing the domestic political costs. The end to the U.S. trade embargo
was welcomed in Hanoi; however, it also put new pressure on the Viet-
namese economy, challenging reforms in place or coming into place.2
Vietnamese success in dealing with the new economic climate was due
in large part to lessons learned over the last two decades. Real GDP
growth in Vietnam in 1991–5 averaged over 8 percent annually compared
to an average rate of some 5 percent in the previous five-year period.
Flushed with success and full of optimism, the Communist Party, at its
Eighth Party Congress in 1996, set an aggressive GDP growth target of
9–10 percent compounded annually over the next five years.3 In marked
contrast to other transitional economies, Vietnam also succeeded in bring-
ing inflation under control. The annual rate of inflation, which approached
700 percent in 1986, decelerated to 17 percent in 1995 with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund reporting a rate of only 3.2 percent for 1997, the
lowest rate since the initiation of economic reforms.4
At the outset, economic recovery in Vietnam stemmed from a strong
performance in the agricultural sector; however, industrial output, follow-
ing a period of difficult adjustment, also strengthened, especially petro-
leum and light manufacturing.5 The Vietnamese economy thus emerged
from its transition period without pervasive subsidies or controls on prices
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and output but with a reasonably balanced fiscal situation and moderate
inflation. For the most part, the economy’s response to government struc-
tural and stabilization measures was impressive.6
At the same time, a variety of concerns highlighted the need for
ongoing economic reform. With external debt growing at an alarming rate,
the government clearly needed to introduce a system to manage foreign
borrowings if it was to avoid the debt problems faced by other transitional
economies. In turn, distorted investment incentives underlay widening
trade and current account balances that were simply not sustainable. The
General Statistical Office put the 1996 trade deficit at $4.15 billion, an
increase of 70 percent over the previous year. The trade deficit dropped to
$2.35 billion in 1997, but it still remained around 17 percent of GDP. Over
the same period, the volume of rice exports increased 20 percent; but the
export value of rice actually dropped. Moreover, Vietnam faced tough
choices if it hoped to strike an effective balance between economic growth
and macroeconomic stability. Without more effective stabilization policies,
financial reform could not be successful and might even aggravate macro-
economic imbalances.7
New Vietnamese leadership policies
Politics in 1995 were dominated by the approach of the Eighth Party Con-
gress, scheduled for the summer of 1996, and the Tenth National Assem-
bly, scheduled for 1997. Officially billed as a turning point in Vietnam’s
shift to heightened industrialization and modernization, the low-key
preparations for the Eighth Congress did not presage major changes.
Political scientist Brantly Womack accurately termed the period before
the congress as “the calm before the quiet” although he recognized that
simmering political issues could erupt at any moment.8
While some observers predicted a delay, the Eighth Party Congress met
on schedule in June 1996. The social composition of both delegates to the
Congress and its new Central Committee exemplified new trends in party
building. First, the importance of Party cadre from Party organizations,
the state sector and the Army increased. Second, there was a renewed
emphasis on the centralization of power. Finally, younger delegates and
Central Committee members signaled a desire to rejuvenate the Party.9 Of
the three trends, it was the renewed emphasis on control – control of the
Party, control of the state apparatus and control over society – at the
expense of continued economic reform that was most evident.10
The results of the Tenth National Assembly elections, held in mid-1997,
did not challenge the go-slow approach of the Party. Of 450 elected
candidates, 27 percent were incumbents and only 15 percent were non-
Party candidates. Of 11 independent candidates, only three were elected.
Tran Duc Luong, a little-known technocrat, was elected President, replac-
ing General Le Duc Anh. Nguyen Thi Binh continued as Vice President
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and Nong Duc Manh remained Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National Assembly.11
At the end of 1997, the Party faced an important policy crossroads
when it was forced once again to choose between a fast and a slow track to
reform. In selecting a new Communist Party General Secretary to replace
the aging Do Muoi, the Party elected Le Kha Phieu, an obscure but hard-
line ideologue who had served as the army’s political commissar. A
representative of the traditional wing of the Party, Phieu was quoted in
early 1996 as saying that capitalism would definitely be replaced as it was
backward in satisfying the needs of the people. In selecting Phieu, the
Party resolved a protracted leadership crisis; but it also dashed hopes for
decisive steps to stall economic decline. At the time, little was known of
Phieu outside Party circles, but his rise to prominence marked a victory for
Party stalwarts eager to cement closer ties between the Party and the
People’s Army as a means to ensure the Party’s survival. Following the
election of Phieu, Hanoi reshuffled the top tier of the ruling Politburo,
finalizing the new leadership.12
At the time, Party regulars were unnerved by peasant revolts in Thai
Binh province, sparked by declining rice prices, mounting corruption and
the widening gap between urban rich and rural poor. Consequently, they
opted for increased control instead of the accelerated economic reforms
necessary to promote continued growth and long-term legitimacy. Para-
doxically, the unrest in Thai Binh and elsewhere, intended to provoke
change, instead revived the political fortunes of the military which capital-
ized on the perceived threat to internal stability. In a show of firmness, the
government in early January 1998 executed two local businessmen and a
government official convicted in the largest corporate corruption scandal
in Vietnamese history.13
Crunch time in Vietnam
The election of Le Kha Phieu came at a time when Hanoi faced its most
serious economic downturn since it first embraced tentative economic
reforms in 1979. The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) called for $13
billion in foreign investment, $14 billion from local sources and $7.5 billion
from overseas aid. However, Hanoi was far from meeting any of these
targets, and the situation appeared unlikely to improve until substantial
new economic reforms were announced. Foreign investment pledges in
1997 were down 50 percent from the previous year, the first such decline
since the launch of doi moi. At the same time, exports were poised to take
a battering due to regional currency devaluations; and the banking sector
remained in tatters.14
In a show of bravado, the Vietnamese government, at the outset of
1998, reaffirmed an estimated annual growth rate of 9 percent. Challeng-
ing Hanoi’s forecast, informed observers cited the slowdown in GDP
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expansion over the previous three years and the competitive regional
climate for scarce offshore investment following the economic meltdown
in Asia.15 Even as it defended its ambitious target, the Party admitted a rift
over the direction of reform, a rare confession casting further doubt on
Hanoi’s ability to weather the crisis. The official Vietnam News, quoting
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, acknowledged people were divided into
two camps with some calling for increased reforms and others arguing a
domestic slowdown was healthy after years of rapid growth. In a country
where any public sign of disagreement within the Party was extremely
rare, the Asian financial crisis appeared to widen fissures that had long
existed in private, exposing weakness in the communist model.16
The limited recognition in official circles of the need for continuing eco-
nomic reform was evident in policy statements. Prime Minister Khai was
quoted in March 1998 as saying capitalism was not an option for Vietnam
and additional economic reforms would be implemented at a gradual
pace.17 His comments were taken as an official response to repeated calls
by the World Bank and others for lower trade barriers, finance sector
reform, currency devaluation and state enterprise privatization. At the
same time, the limited impact of current economic policies on principal
economic targets, including high growth, low inflation, low unemployment
and a positive balance of payments, aptly demonstrated the need to accel-
erate reforms.18
Over the previous three years, GDP expansion in Vietnam had slowed
from 9.5 percent in 1995 to 9.3 percent in 1996 to 8.2 percent in 1997. A
rapid growth in consumption, together with contracting accumulation and
savings rates, combined to stunt the overall growth rate. Revenue collec-
tion also fell short of budget targets, and the absence of effective policies
to encourage investment choked capital mobilization. In addition,
Vietnam continued to face a highly competitive regional climate for
limited investment funds. Nevertheless, Hanoi clung doggedly to its 9
percent target throughout the spring of 1998. It was only in July, after the
IMF slashed its forecast to 5 percent, that Vietnam reduced the official
growth target to 6–7 percent. By that time, many observers felt that even a
5 percent target might be unachievable. Vietnam ended the year at 3.5
percent.19
In the area of agricultural reform, the 1993 land law represented a com-
promise. It recognized partial land ownership in the form of legal rights to
use or usufruct land as well as to transfer, lease and inherit such rights.
However, the government retained much of the socialist regime of real
property rights, in particular the indivisibility of state ownership. A
veteran Vietnam observer, Douglas Pike, termed the law “politically
correct socialism in title, but market economy in use.” To sanction the
beginnings of a land market, the 1993 land law circumvented legal and
ideological constraints to allow land use rights for extended periods of
time. It also diminished the authority of the commune and cooperative
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due to their poor performance as administrative units. Additional regula-
tions issued in early 1995 later called into question the powers granted to
property users through land use permits, including the right of transfer.20
Outdated, inefficient and uncompetitive state enterprises remained a
core problem in Vietnam.21 Earlier reforms to the public sector were posit-
ive, but additional reforms at a faster pace were required. In 1992–8 only
21 companies, capitalized at less than $20 million, were equitized as the
privatization process was termed in Vietnam. Yet, according to the
Finance Ministry, more than half the country’s state-owned firms were
unprofitable. In a study of state enterprise reform, Phan Van Tiem and
Nguyen Van Thanh highlighted the major problems Vietnam faced in the
second half of the decade.
The legal framework governing the direction of SOE [state-owned
enterprise] restructuring, issues of state ownership and transferring
ownership of SOEs, and turning SOEs into joint-stock companies or
other forms of mixed ownership, is not adequate at present, and stems
only from the pilot equitizations attempted to date. Also, Vietnam’s
capital market remains underdeveloped, and there has been no active
preparation for the experimental operation of a stock exchange.
In addition, a master plan for the development of the state sector in
the coming five, ten, and fifteen years – spanning all branches and
sectors of the economy and all locations – has not been promulgated.
Also, the limited ability to mobilize financial resources for the national
budget means that it is currently difficult to meet the demand for
expenditure. . . . Finally, the psychology and training of both managers
and employees in the state sector are not conducive to their voluntary
participation in the restructuring of SOEs, and so they do not always
respond positively to the measures implemented under SOE reform.22
Under increasing pressure from international financial bodies, Hanoi
announced in early 1998 plans to speed its privatization program. With up
to half the country’s 6,000 state industries as potential candidates, Vietnam
soon fell behind its revised objectives with shares in only 11 state-run firms
offered in the first half of the year. This dismal performance contrasted
with plans announced at the end of 1997 to privatize 150 public enterprises
in 1998 alone.23
The rate of inflation also remained a major concern with inflation
targets put to a severe test in 1998. After falling to 3.2 percent in 1997, the
lowest level since the outset of doi moi, inflation increased every month in
the following year. Analysts warned the consumer price index, the primary
inflation meter, could jump to double figures unless stringent measures
were implemented to curb price increases. Economists argued that stabi-
lizing the price of rice was one of the most effective ways to control the
consumer price index. Unfortunately, record rice exports in the first half of
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1998, coupled with a failure to read global markets accurately, spotlighted
inefficiencies in the state-run rice export system. The breakdown in the
system raised doubts as to the government’s ability to manage the delicate
balance between increased rice exports, benefiting farmers and the
balance of trade, and the lower rice prices needed to meet inflation goals
and avoid social unrest.24
The related challenges of job creation and retraining continued to be
major obstacles to the speedy reform of the public sector. Unemployment
in Hanoi alone was estimated in mid-1998 to be almost 9 percent. And this
figure did not include the underemployed or the thousands of rural vil-
lagers drifting into the city in search of work. According to official reports,
the rate of unemployment in state enterprises approached 10 percent
while an estimated 8 percent of the labor force employed in the private
sector had experienced redundancies.25
Trade and investment in Vietnam
Prospects for trade diversification improved in 1995 when Vietnam joined
ASEAN. Vietnam’s accession to full-member status, together with the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, were signific-
ant moves in the direction of economic and political integration. That said,
its entry into ASEAN was not smooth as Vietnam was at a different stage
of development compared to older members.
Whilst gaining full membership of ASEAN is deemed by most to be a
positive step for Vietnam, with the prospect of greater trade flows and
foreign capital inflows from the region arising from this development,
the fruits of acceptance are likely to be evident only in the long
term. . . . Prior to that, however, lie a series of challenges that Vietnam
must surmount if it is to realize and harness its new-found status in
ASEAN. . . .26
In the second half of the decade, the level of foreign exchange reserves
dropped to worrying levels. Compounding the problem, international
donors, to encourage economic reform, began in November 1997 with-
holding over $500 million in balance of payments support. With a variety
of factors impacting negatively on balance of payments in general and
exports in particular, the situation was exacerbated by what could best be
termed “export gridlock.” At a time when its trade patterns had shifted to
Asia, neighboring countries were attempting to export their way to growth
and recovery and thus had little interest in importing more Vietnamese
goods. Vietnam’s exports increased in 1998 but no where near the annual
average of 27.5 percent in 1992–7. Textile and garment exports to the
European Union were a bright spot as they increased rapidly, a trend
expected to continue under a three-year agreement, running until 2001.27
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Hanoi in mid-February 1998 devalued the dong by a little over 5
percent after bankers had complained for months that it was overvalued
by as much as 40 percent. In so doing, Vietnam embarked on what its
political leadership perceived to be a precarious balancing act between
easing market pressure on the overvalued dong and maintaining social
stability. With the government reluctant to weaken the currency further
due to fears it would lead to rising inflation and difficulties in repaying
dollar loans, outside experts soon considered the dong again overvalued.
Vietnam later devalued the dong by an additional 7 percent in August
1998 for a combined total devaluation of 16.2 percent between October
1997 and August 1998. In a related event, Decree 63/ND-CP in September
1998 established the dong as the sole legal tender in Vietnam, reducing the
country’s dependence on the U.S. dollar.28
Foreign investment declined in 1997 for the first time in a decade,
reflecting the slump in East Asian economies, sluggish domestic demand
and inadequate reforms which hampered investment disbursements. And
the mid-term outlook was even worse. Hanoi later revised its investment
regulations in an effort to address long-term complaints of foreign
investors in areas like bureaucracy and corruption. But it was a case of too
little, too late. Domestic and regional markets proved smaller than
expected while many investors remained skeptical about Hanoi’s ability to
implement new investment policies.29
While the Asian financial crisis impacted negatively on investment, the
downward trend actually preceded regional turmoil by several months.
Internal reforms had not kept pace with the initial phase of foreign invest-
ment; therefore, projects licensed years earlier were still fighting tough
trade barriers, an opaque bureaucracy and ever-shifting tax and foreign
exchange regulations. Faced with a grim business climate, a growing
number of investors pulled out of Vietnam. Foreign representative office
openings in Ho Chi Minh City in the first half of 1998, for example, were
roughly half the figures for 1995–6 and down 20 percent from the previous
year.30
In early February 1998, news emerged that three respected Communist
Party members had recently warned the Party that it must adopt radical
political reforms or face collapse. In a 13-page letter to Party leaders, Tran
Do, a former army general and ideology chief, made a sweeping appeal for
press freedom, freer elections and reduced Party influence over Viet-
namese society. He warned that economic reforms, if not accompanied by
vigorous political reforms, would soon reach a dead end. General Do fol-
lowed his December 1997 letter with a second letter in April 1998 in which
he complained of a concerted press campaign attacking his ideas as well as
surveillance and intimidation of family members. After Do wrote two
more letters calling for greater democracy in Vietnam, the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party in July 1998 voted to condemn him for
writing letters calling on the Party to loosen its grip on power.31
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Sentiments similar to those expressed by General Do were contained in
letters published separately by mathematician Phan Dinh Dieu and former
Party Central Committee member Hoang Huu Nhan. In a more dramatic
move, Nguyen Van Kinh in mid-April 1998 set himself on fire in broad
daylight in Ba Dinh Square, the heart of the Vietnamese state. The inci-
dent was reminiscent of the 1960s when Buddhist monks sacrificed them-
selves to protest the Diem regime in South Vietnam. Kinh’s motives were
unclear, but the method and site of his self-immolation suggested it was
politically motivated. Even if it was not, many in Vietnam viewed the
event as a metaphor for political and social decay.32
External relations
In May 1996, President Clinton named Peter Peterson, a former Congress-
man and ex-POW, as the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam; however, the U.S.
Senate did not approve the nomination until the following year. Vietnam
remained a relatively unimportant trading partner with the United States.
And U.S. investment in Vietnam lagged in 1997–8, due to the absence of
clear, enforceable legal standards for commercial transactions as well as
the Asian financial crisis. In the summer of 1998, Congress waived the
Jackson-Vanik amendment. This meant the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Export-Import Bank could finally
provide financial and insurance services to U.S. companies operating in
Vietnam.33
Congressional discussion of trade issues provided an opportunity for
concerned U.S. constituencies to focus debate on other questions, like
human rights, religious freedom and labor rights. In turn, Vietnamese offi-
cials continued to raise two sensitive questions, Vietnam’s own wartime
missing and postwar health problems related to the wartime use of defo-
liants like Agent Orange. An intense, internal policy debate also con-
tinued in Vietnam as to U.S. interests in Vietnam and the most
appropriate policy for the United States.34
Following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Beijing’s
decision to drop support for the Khmer Rouge, ties between Vietnam and
China quickly expanded.
The similar situations confronting China and Vietnam [after 1990] and
their common interests have brought several outcomes for Sino-
Vietnamese relations. First, they have enforced contacts between the
two countries. . . . These regular contacts resulted in several joint com-
muniqués, which repeated the will of the two countries to pursue eco-
nomic cooperation, and not to use force to settle border problems.35
China remained the key actor in Vietnamese foreign policy with the most
persistent issues being a trio of territorial disputes: the land border in
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northern Vietnam, territorial waters in the Gulf of Tonkin and ownership
of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos in the East Sea. China began
minesweeping operations on the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1993 even as
a joint working group struggled to resolve outstanding land boundary
questions. In July 1997, the two parties agreed on the year 2000 as the offi-
cial target for a comprehensive settlement of all open issues related to
their disputed land boundary. China and Vietnam also worked to increase
cross-border trade which flourished in the second half of the decade.
Prime Minister Khai visited Beijing in October 1998. The visit resulted in
progress on border dispute questions as well as bilateral trade and invest-
ment issues. Sensitive to China’s regional interests, Hanoi was careful to
keep Beijing well informed throughout the decade as to Hanoi’s security
discussions with Washington.36
A most welcome regional development was the progressive improve-
ment in Vietnamese relations with Thailand. The Thai defense minister
visited Vietnam in January 1996, followed three months later by the Thai
foreign minister. Vietnam opened a consulate general in Khon Kaen
province the same month. Over the next two years, visitations and consul-
tations increased in frequency and broadened in scope. Tran Duc Luong’s
visit to Thailand in October 1998, the first visit by a Vietnamese head of
state, marked an important benchmark. Vietnam and Thailand also con-
cluded the second phase of a program for development cooperation in
which Thailand agreed to provide technical support to Vietnam in
1998–2000. And Thailand agreed to send anti-narcotics experts to Vietnam
in a joint effort to combat the narcotics trade, one of Vietnam’s most
serious social problems. Finally, a Thai–Vietnamese memorandum of
understanding led to joint naval patrols in overlapping maritime areas.37
Border questions and the future of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia
remained sources of friction between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Cambodia
charged in January 1996 that Vietnamese farmers, supported by Viet-
namese army units, had encroached on Cambodian territory in the border
provinces of Kompong Cham, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng. In response,
Vietnam agreed to convene a border expert working group to determine
the January 1995 status quo and to return the boundary to its original posi-
tion. Violence against ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia again
occurred during the July 1998 Cambodian elections, and the Vietnamese
friendship monument in Phnom Penh was vandalized during a political
demonstration. In both instances, Hanoi demonstrated restraint, limiting
its reaction to formal protests. Smuggling and border crimes were addi-
tional concerns, coloring an already troubled relationship. Political
stability in Cambodia remained a policy priority for Vietnam, but Hanoi
wisely eschewed unilateral initiatives. Instead, it steered a multilateral
course, lobbying on Cambodia’s behalf for early ASEAN admission.
Hanoi believed regional membership would temper Cambodian foreign
policy as well as Chinese influence in Cambodia.38
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Vietnam continued to pursue its “special relationship” with Laos both
on Party and state levels. At the Party level, regular exchanges focused on
ideological and cultural issues. At the state level, the two neighbors con-
cluded or expanded a number of cooperation agreements. For example,
they signed an agreement on cross-border goods transport in February
1996 and a plan for cooperation in the areas of culture and information
later in the year. They also held joint talks on the construction of a port in
central Vietnam, important for landlocked Laos, as well as cooperation in
improving road links between themselves and other states in the region.
Border negotiations also continued although their intensity remained
notably lower than Vietnam’s corresponding talks with Cambodia and
China.39
In conjunction with its ASEAN membership, Vietnam established an
ASEAN Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with a
National Committee for the Coordination of ASEAN affairs. It also initi-
ated an import tax reduction program as part of its responsibilities as an
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) member and concluded a protocol for
dispute settlement in economic relations. In late December 1998, Hanoi
hosted the Sixth ASEAN Summit, the first time a meeting of ASEAN
leaders had been held in Vietnam.40
Lao economic policy and planning
In March 1991, the Fifth Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party approved a medium-term economic strategy for the period 1991–5.
In contrast to the Fourth Party Congress, which endorsed the New Eco-
nomic Mechanism, the Fifth Congress did not initiate radical changes in
economic policy. Instead, it reinforced the direction of reforms in
progress. The medium-term economic strategy included familiar goals like
self-sufficiency, infrastructure development, sustainable forestry, develop-
ment of small and medium industry, increased production of consumer
goods and basic commodities, and improved education and health.41
At the same time, Laos completed a working draft of a Third Five-Year
Plan (1991–5). Unlike earlier years, the government later elected not to
publish a formal five-year plan, relying instead on an annual planning
exercise tied to a rolling five-year public investment program. The
continuing uncertainty associated with economic reforms and the poor
performance of earlier five-year plans, prompted the Lao PDR to adopt
this more flexible approach to planning. The rolling five-year plan, incor-
porated within the policy framework of the indicative Third Five-Year
Plan, was approved in November 1991.42
A longer term Socioeconomic Plan (1993–2000), approved by the Sixth
Plenum of the Fifth LPRP Central Committee in February 1993, was con-
sistent with both the indicative Third Five-Year Plan and the rolling five-
year public investment program. Providing government budget figures for
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the first time, the long-term plan exemplified Lao PDR efforts to increase
transparency and provide greater access to public information. In terms of
total state investment, the Socioeconomic Plan (1993–2000) gave priority
to communications, transportation, postal services and construction (47
percent); industry and handicrafts (19 percent); agriculture and forestry
(15 percent); rural development (9 percent); education (7 percent); public
health (2 percent); and information and culture (1 percent). Long-term
priorities were later set out in two documents, Outline Public Investment
Program, 1994–2000 and Socio-Economic Development Strategies, pre-
sented in June 1994 to a round table meeting of aid donors in Geneva.43
In support of these policies, the Lao PDR introduced a new land tax
in March 1993, replacing an agricultural tax which had proved a serious
disincentive to production. A registration tax on housing and property
was also introduced.44 In May 1994, the government repealed the 1988
foreign investment law, replacing it with a new code. Promulgated one
month after the official opening of the new Mitaphap (Friendship)
Bridge across the Mekong River, the 1994 foreign investment law joined
the new bridge in symbolizing the economic opening of landlocked Laos.
The law removed key restrictions on joint ventures, reduced corporate
tax rates, opened new areas to foreign investment and offered a one-stop
service through the Foreign Investment Management Committee. The
new regulations also provided for a two-track licensing procedure in
which investments below a certain threshold enjoyed a “fast track”
approval process.45
In conjunction with the new investment regulations, the Lao PDR con-
tinued efforts to privatize state enterprises. To accelerate this process, it
turned to a decentralized approach in which the central government
focused on the privatization of larger enterprises while provincial and
municipal authorities took responsibility for the divestiture of medium to
smaller ones. The program gained momentum, after limited progress in
the early years; and by mid-1995, most medium to small-sized firms,
together with a large percentage of larger ones, had been privatized. With
some 65 state enterprises remaining in the central government portfolio
and approximately 40 remaining at or below the provincial level, the
government indicated in 1995 its intention to retain 32 companies in the
public sector with the remainder targeted for privatization by 1997.46
New Economic Mechanism, ten years on
In the decade after implementation of the New Economic Mechanism, the
Lao PDR made remarkable progress in moving from a centrally planned
to a market-oriented economy, especially when compared to other reform-
ing socialist economies. A number of factors contributed to its success,
including an agricultural sector that was never more than superficially
socialized, a very short period of central planning, and the proximity of
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Laos to Thailand which ensured a degree of openness to market influ-
ences, regardless of official policy.47
Despite large differences between economic sectors, annual GDP
growth rates in 1990–6 averaged better than 6 percent, an impressive
performance, albeit lower than fast-growing neighbors like Thailand and
Vietnam. The industrial sector experienced the most rapid growth fol-
lowed by services and agriculture. Within industry, manufacturing and
construction achieved the best results. The performance of the service
sector was mixed with growth varying between the various subsectors.48
A subject of concern for some time, agriculture exhibited a highly
volatile, relatively weak performance. Several factors combined to explain
the poor results obtained, beginning with deteriorating terms of trade for
agricultural products after 1990. Another was the subsistence nature of
agriculture which was generally isolated from the rest of the economy and
characterized by stagnant productivity. High transaction costs, a lack of
modern inputs, poor rural infrastructure and weak support services also
contributed.49
The weak performance of agriculture reinforced the dual nature of the
Lao economy and society. Income and wealth distributions became
increasingly uneven with standards of living improving in urban regions
but stagnating in rural areas. High rates of population growth combined
with low rates of agricultural growth to result in a decline in per capita
income in some rural provinces.50
A strict, non-accommodating monetary policy was a central component
of the macroeconomic reforms incorporated in the New Economic
Mechanism. As public expenditure declined due to a reduction in the
number of civil servants, the Lao PDR tightened fiscal and monetary policy
to consolidate reforms. Tax reforms were implemented to increase rev-
enues, and institutional reforms were introduced to improve public finance
management and to provide the tools necessary for macroeconomic stabi-
lization. In response, the budgetary situation improved steadily in the early
1990s after which public revenues leveled off and expenditures began to
increase. By 1995, multinational bodies, especially the IMF, were pressur-
ing the Lao PDR to revise its five-year public investment program to make
it more compatible with anticipated revenues and foreign assistance.51
The stabilization policy pursued by the Lao PDR in the early 1990s
helped reduce the rate of inflation. But the government later relaxed mon-
etary discipline, resulting in an upsurge in inflation in 1995 which reached
double-digit rates for the first time since 1992. At the same time, the
exchange rate jumped from around 700 kip to almost 1,000 kip to the U.S.
dollar. Monetary policy was tightened in 1995–6, stabilizing the rate of
exchange and bringing inflation under control. Integration of the Lao
economy into the regional economy also proceeded. Imports plus exports
increased from 34 percent of GDP in 1990 to 62 percent in 1995 with the
ratio of exports to imports improving from 40 percent to 60 percent.52
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The Lao PDR’s long-anticipated membership in ASEAN was expected
to have a positive, if unclear, impact on its economic development. Under
the terms of entry, it had until 2008 to meet AFTA requirements to reduce
tariffs on most goods to below 5 percent. To meet this goal, Laos would
have to encourage trade and investment and introduce fiscal reforms to
compensate for the 20 percent of total revenues currently received from
tariffs. Regional trade liberalization would be trade-creating and favor
export of the products for which Laos had a comparative advantage;
however, its overall impact would be limited because the Lao economy
was largely complementary to the economies of the ASEAN states. Typ-
ically, economic integration among complementary economies has relat-
ively small trade-creating effects. With its ASEAN neighbors viewing
overland trade routes as essential to increased trade between Thailand and
Vietnam, as well as between Thailand and southern China, road and
bridge construction were already priorities. Hydropower dam construction
was also expected to continue. In addition to the controversial Nam Theun
II dam in central Laos, designed to provide electricity for eastern Thai-
land, smaller dams were also under construction in northern and southern
Laos.53
The Lao PDR implemented structural reforms and practiced generally
sound economic management under the New Economic Mechanism.
These policies fostered a relatively steady movement toward macroeco-
nomic stability, production growth, a small private sector and increased
trade and foreign investment. Annual GDP growth in 1992–7 averaged 7
percent, providing some hope Laos would achieve its goal of graduating
from the ranks of the Least Developed Nations by the year 2020. Unfor-
tunately, the financial crisis that hit Thailand in mid-1997 triggered a
related crisis in Laos in 1997–8. Thailand was the main trading partner
and principal source of investment in Laos, and the macroeconomic insta-
bility it experienced triggered a sharp depreciation of the kip, together
with a widespread loss of confidence in the Lao economy. A weakening
domestic reform effort and lax macroeconomic management com-
pounded the impact of the financial crisis. Foreign investment and some
key exports, both tied to the sagging Thai economy, took a severe hit.
The negative effects of the financial crisis were aggravated by a lengthy
consensus-building process. Divergent thinking toward economic reform,
which first surfaced in the 1970s, made it impossible for the Lao elite to
react quickly and effectively to rapidly changing economic realities. As a
result, the reform process slowed and the macroeconomic environment
worsened.54
The Asian financial crisis thus exposed a major weakness of the Lao
political system. The political stability inherent in a one-party state facilit-
ated reform policy at the beginning of the transition process, but as econo-
mist Yves Bourdet astutely observed, it turned out to be a hindrance when
more balanced economic development was required.
End of the beginning 115
One main lesson from transition in Laos is thus that the existence of
the one-party state has facilitated the formulation, adoption and
implementation of a comprehensive and relatively rapid transition
programme. This has resulted in significantly improved macroeco-
nomic performance in the short and medium-term. But the absence of
democracy and transparency in interaction with the specific economic
and historical conditions of Laos has contributed to the emergence of
a bargaining economy in Laos with a stop-and-go macroeconomic
stance and long-term macroeconomic instability.55
The Lao PDR initiated a few half-hearted measures to mitigate the
crisis, mopping up excess liquidity and raising interest rates, but these ten-
tative steps were not enough to overcome a rapidly deteriorating situation.
The most immediate challenge was to institute strong stabilization meas-
ures and renew reform efforts to contain both exchange rate volatility and
inflation in order to restore the economy’s competitiveness. But ideo-
logical in-fighting paralyzed the country’s leadership at a time when swift,
decisive action was required. As late as July 1998, for example, the gover-
nor of the Lao central bank, in a front page article in the English-language
Vientiane Times, blamed the collapse of the kip on “speculative attempts
by opportunists,” totally ignoring the fact that the kip was among the
least-traded currencies in the world. In an adjacent article in the same
newspaper, the director of the National Economic Research Institute, a
government think-tank, more accurately described the kip’s fall as “home-
grown” and the product of the Lao PDR’s “persistent balance-of-
payments deficit.”56
By the end of 1998, annual GDP growth, shielded in part by the
country’s large subsistence agricultural base, was still positive but down to
4 percent. The exchange rate had also dropped to an alarming level with
the kip less than 30 percent of its July 1997 level, and inflation accelerated
to more than 150 percent on an annualized basis, reducing real incomes
and purchasing power. Economic targets set by the state for the year 2000
included an annual growth rate of 8–8.5 percent and a per capita income of
$500, completely unrealistic goals in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis.57
Lao domestic politics
The death of President and LPRP Chairman Kaysone Phomvihane on 21
November 1992 was the most significant political event of the early 1990s.
Born in the southern province of Savanakhet, he was the son of a Lao
peasant mother and a Vietnamese father who was an official in the French
colonial administration. Both a brilliant political theoretician and a crafty
military chief, he was a leading figure in the Lao revolutionary movement
beginning in the 1940s and the most powerful political figure in Laos after
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the mid-1950s when he became General Secretary of the Lao People’s
Revolutionary Party. Promoted to the new post of LPRP Chairman in
1991, Kaysone was named President under the new constitution. He was
the principal architect of the country’s economic reform program. When
asked to explain the radical shift in ideology, he acknowledged Laos was
simply too underdeveloped to begin socialism.58
Throughout Kaysone’s career as a Party and state leader, the LPRP
leadership assiduously projected a collective profile; but with his death, the
state developed a cult of personality around Kaysone in an effort to
promote the legitimacy of the regime. A seven-day period of national
“deep mourning” was followed by a “state-sponsored sequence of nation-
alist and religious rites.” Throughout the 1990s, the cult of Kaysone was a
central part of the Lao PDR’s ongoing efforts to invent or reinvent
national legitimizing myths. The cult was promoted through the establish-
ment of memorial museums, the erection of statues and busts, and through
journalism and speeches.59
The Supreme People’s Assembly, renamed the National Assembly
under the 1991 constitution, elected Nouhak Phoumsavanh President in an
extraordinary session on 25 November 1992. Khamtay Siphandone, Prime
Minister since August 1991, was elected General Secretary of the LPRP
Central Committee. Khamtay was defense minister from 1975 to 1991, and
his elevation to the senior Party job exemplified the growing influence of
the Lao military in government and Party affairs. Both Nouhak and
Khamtay had been close to the center of power for decades, and both
were committed to the process of economic reform. Nevertheless, the
uncertainty over leadership succession caused by Kaysone’s illness caused
delays in government actions and decisions in the months surrounding his
death. As one observer noted, “inertia and avoidance of difficult personnel
decisions are powerful forces in Lao political life.”60
A reorganization of public administration, expected since the adoption
of the new constitution in 1991, was finally approved by the National
Assembly in February 1993. One significant change was the division of the
Ministry of Economy, Planning and Finance into a separate Ministry of
Finance and a Committee for Planning and Cooperation. The reorganiza-
tion also involved new appointments and a reshuffling of portfolios,
strengthening the government’s capacity for both economic planning and
the implementation of economic reforms.61
The National Assembly, elected in December 1992 in only the second
nationwide elections since the communists took power in 1975, held its
first session in February 1993. As was the case with the Supreme People’s
Assembly, the candidates for the National Assembly were all screened by
the LPRP; and in most instances, the 158 candidates for 85 seats were
nominated by Party or government bodies. While the LPRP continued to
exercise total control over both the election process and the functioning of
the Assembly, the new members, with an average age of around 50, were
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younger in age and outlook than the senior Party leadership. This offered
the potential for fresh, if circumscribed, thinking in the Party and govern-
ment.62
Even as the Party dealt with questions of succession and attempted to
restructure, it continued to wrestle with a level of corruption that reached
every sector of the economy. In March 1993, Prime Minister Khamtay
established an Anti-Corruption Committee to address the issue country-
wide. The work of the committee was made more difficult by the
omnipresence of corruption due to low salaries paid to civil servants, low
levels of respect for the police and legal system, and the growing
opportunities for graft as the economy opened to foreign investment. Most
observers agreed corruption was especially rampant in the forestry indus-
try and in the provision of services. Party officials subsequently stressed in
speeches and articles the interrelationship of law and corruption, Party
legitimacy and security. If the Party failed to uphold the rule of law, in a
time when legal statutes were being published for all to read, it feared
popular resentment might undermine Party legitimacy and threaten its
hold on power.63
During commemoration ceremonies in November 1995, marking the
twentieth anniversary of LPRP rule, Party leaders reaffirmed their intent
to continue external policies of gradual engagement while promoting
stability on the domestic front. Much like the Communist Party of
Vietnam, the LPRP offered the Lao people increased economic openness
and prosperity in exchange for continued communist domination of the
political system. As Yves Bourdet, a long-time observer of Laos, noted:
There is a clear dichotomy in Laos between the comprehensiveness of
the economic reforms and the inertia of the political system. The New
Economic Mechanism has not been accompanied by political reforms,
and the regime perpetuates itself despite the demise of most of the
founding members of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP),
the Pathet Lao.64
Sixth Party Congress
The Sixth Party Congress was held in Vientiane on 18–20 March 1996, five
years after the Fifth Party Congress. The 381 delegates in attendance
represented 78,000 Party members (less than 2 percent of the total popu-
lation). In terms of reform policy, the Sixth Party Congress was highly
significant in that it reinforced the power of Party members advocating a
slower reform path with more control over the various effects of reform
policy. In effect, it was a victory of “reformers by necessity” over “reformers
by conviction.” The role of the military in the new top leadership illustrated
the change in the balance of power. At the Fifth Party Congress in 1991, the
army gained three positions out of nine on the Politburo; but at the Sixth
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Party Congress, the number jumped to seven out of nine, six generals and a
colonel. Prime Minister Khamtay Siphandone remained number one in the
Party hierarchy with General Saman Vignaket, a well-known opponent of
comprehensive reforms, occupying the number two position. The appoint-
ment of General Sisavath Keobounphanh to the newly created post of Vice
President eroded the position of aging President Nouhak Phoumsavanh, for-
tifying the militarization of the political elite of Laos.65
The Sixth Party Congress also reaffirmed the leading role of the LPRP.
Party leaders argued economic reform should not be accompanied by
political liberalization because a departure from one-party rule could lead
to the political instability characteristic of other countries under transition.
Another notable result of the congress was the increased political
representation of ethnic minorities. Three of the four new members of the
Politburo belonged to ethnic minorities. This was particularly significant in
Laos both because of the multi-ethnic character of the country and
because the NEM had altered income distribution in favor of urban areas.
While the increased representation of ethnic minorities could help to
correct the insufficient attention given to rural areas in recent years, it was
also noted that two of the three new ethnic members were also generals.
Consequently, they could prove more inclined to represent the interests of
the provincial military-political elite as opposed to the aspirations of rural
peasants. Finally, while the changes in the balance of power at the Sixth
Party Congress clearly favored advocates of slower economic change, the
Party did reaffirm its commitment to reform policy.66
As the decade progressed, the Party and general public became increas-
ingly concerned with the problems resulting from an open-door policy,
especially its impact on the material and social fabric of Laos. Where less
than 15,000 tourists had visited Laos in 1990, the number had swelled to
over 400,000 by 1996. Some 50,000 tourists – approximately one per inhab-
itant – visited Luang Prabang alone in 1996. The pressure on basic infra-
structures was tremendous, and the Lao rightly worried that social ills, like
prostitution and HIV/AIDS, would follow. The number of American and
European visitors increased, but the bulk of tourists remained Thai. With
mounting Thai influence a threat to national identity, the government
responded with a heightened emphasis on Lao culture and history. It
restored historical monuments, erected new monuments to past kings, and
conducted seminars on minority culture and the protection of the national
heritage. The re-Buddhification of Lao society also continued with Party
officials often interweaving Buddhist ideas about seeking truth with the
communist idea that there is a single truth which only the Party knows.
The Party also emphasized the revolutionary roots of contemporary Lao
society. A six-meter-high bronze statue of Kaysone Phomvihone was
erected in Vientiane, and the first of an anticipated three statues commem-
orating Vietnamese killed in Laos during the Second Indochina War was
erected on the Plain of Jars.67
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In January 1998, the National Assembly announced its new member-
ship, following elections held in December 1997. Some 160 candidates,
almost all of them LPRP members, had contested 99 seats, an increase of
14 seats from the previous session. Out of the 99 members of the new
assembly, 68 were from local authorities and 31 from the central govern-
ment. One delegate was independent and 21 were women. The retirement
of President Nouhak Phoumsavanh precipitated a leadership reshuffle in
the spring of 1998. Prime Minister and General Secretary Khamtay
Siphandone was elected president; and Sisavath Keobounphanh, a close
associate of Khamtay with expertise in foreign affairs, became prime
minister. Khamtay’s elevation to the presidency made him the most
powerful person in Laos since 1992 when Kaysone Phomvihane also held
both the top state and Party posts. The leadership changes reaffirmed the
Lao PDR’s commitment to economic reform; otherwise, they reflected a
determination to opt for stability and continuity over change.68
International relations
In July 1992, Laos signed the Bali Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia, thus becoming an ASEAN observer; and in July 1993, it
established diplomatic relations with Brunei, completing the network of
associations necessary for inclusion in ASEAN. The Lao PDR applied for
ASEAN membership in March 1996 and joined Myanmar in becoming a
formal member in July 1997. While most Lao who were aware of ASEAN
welcomed their country’s membership, there was also concern over
whether Laos could meet its diplomatic and financial demands. Based on
the experience of bringing Vietnam into ASEAN without proper prepara-
tion, a number of seminars and meetings were held throughout the year to
better prepare Lao officials, journalists and others. ASEAN membership
had an immediate impact on Lao foreign relations. Throughout 1997, a
string of ASEAN presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers visited
Vientiane. A wide range of agreements on agriculture, health, narcotics
control and cultural exchange were concluded. Both Brunei and Singapore
opened embassies in Vientiane. At the annual ministerial meeting in
Manila in 1998, Laos opposed efforts by Thailand, supported by the
Philippines, to drop ASEAN’s long-standing policy of noninterference in
the internal affairs of member states and replace it with a policy of con-
structive intervention.69
The policies of the New Economic Mechanism increased Thai economic
and cultural influence in Laos. Thailand became the leading source of
private investment as well as its principal trading partner. Thai banks
dominated the rapidly expanding banking sector, and Thai television
exerted a strong cultural influence on the western parts of the country. As
a result, Lao relations with Thailand, marked by strong commercial ties on
the one hand and a degree of cultural reserve and suspicion on the other,
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continued the equivocal pattern of past decades. With relations with all its
neighbors in a state of flux, the Lao PDR remained determined not to
become an economic or cultural appendage of any state, most especially
Thailand. Substantive issues also clouded bilateral relations. These
included unresolved border questions and Thailand’s eagerness to close
down the refugee camp at Ban Na Pho, home to some 12,000 Hmong,
most of whom resisted repatriation to Laos. In addition to the economic
concerns raised by the Asian financial crisis, Lao–Thai relations focused
on the issues of border demarcation and the repatriation of Lao refugees.
When Thailand announced in February 1998 that it was suspending work
on the border, Laos successfully lobbied to reverse the decision with both
sides eventually agreeing to complete its demarcation by 2003.70
The Lao PDR’s contribution to peacemaking in Cambodia was recog-
nized in July 1993 by the visit to Laos of Cambodian leaders Hun Sen and
Prince Norodom Ranariddh. President Khamtay returned the favor later
in the year when he traveled to Phnom Penh in what was more than a
simple goodwill visit. Reflecting a mutual concern for the unbridled devel-
opment of the Mekong, the two neighbors issued a joint communiqué
during his visit, expressing their determination to cooperate more closely
on environmental protection within the framework of the Mekong River
Commission. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen returned to Vientiane
in April 1997 to conclude economic and cultural agreements with the Lao
PDR.71
Lao–Vietnamese relations, which remained “special” in the sense the
two communist parties continued to feel some degree of solidarity,
declined in overall importance. The security concerns that once bound the
two neighbors were no longer compelling, and their common search for
trade, investment and economic assistance caused both to look elsewhere.
Nevertheless, appearances were kept up with a regular exchange of official
state visits and delegations at all levels. In contrast to visits with Cambo-
dian or Thai officials, which were carefully defined (border issues, environ-
mental concerns, refugees), the purpose of the manifold meetings with
Vietnamese delegations was often vague and concerned with “ideological”
questions. The agenda often appeared to be dominated by difficult issues
of common concern, such as how to maintain one-party rule within a
market-oriented system governed by the rule of law. Agreements on cul-
tural and social development, as well as economic development, tied the
two states, but illegal Vietnamese immigration and logging in the border
areas constituted minor annoyances. Vietnam’s newly elected Party
General Secretary, Le Kha Phieu, made his first visit to Laos in March
1998, immediately after the reshuffle of senior Lao Party and state leader-
ship, signing three agreements covering economic cooperation, trade and
cultural, and scientific-technical exchange. Prime Minister Sisavath
returned the favor in July, concluding agreements on energy, transporta-
tion, legal assistance and narcotics control.72
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Diplomatic and commercial relations with the People’s Republic of
China expanded throughout the 1990s. China provided aid, arms and
trade; however, its most important role was to validate the path followed
by the LPRP. If the Chinese Communist Party could adopt market
reforms and private ownership while preserving one-party rule, could its
Lao comrades be wrong in doing the same? For China, Laos was attractive
both for its natural resources, rich hardwood forests and mineral deposits,
and for its strategic location as a land bridge and gateway to Southeast
Asia. In October 1997, China agreed to provide Laos with a long-term
loan of $12 million to build a cement plant, also agreeing to build addi-
tional roads in Laos.73
Vientiane and Washington finally exchanged ambassadors in 1992 after
a hiatus of 17 years. Thereafter, diplomatic intercourse centered on the
American fixation with servicemen still listed as missing-in-action (MIA)
from the Second Indochina War as well as on drugs and refugees. In May
1995, the United States removed Laos from the list of countries ineligible
for foreign assistance; however, lifting the ban proved more symbolic than
a precursor to vastly increased aid because of U.S. budget constraints.
Washington and Vientiane concluded a draft trade and investment pact in
August 1997; and in November 1997, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott visited Laos, marking the highest-ranking U.S. official visit since
1975. Only days after signing the bilateral agreement, Radio Free Asia, a
government-funded corporation mandated by the U.S. Congress, launched
a Lao-language service. The move was strongly criticized by the Lao PDR
which argued the new broadcasts would create misunderstanding.74
Finally, Laos maintained close diplomatic and economic relations with
a large number of far-distant foreign donors. The number of bilateral
donors increased in the 1990s with the principal ones being Australia,
France, Germany, Japan and Sweden. Japan was the main bilateral donor
with annual economic assistance approximating $50 million, followed by
the European states and Australia with contributions from each generally
in the range of $12–14 million. The Japanese presence in Laos was low-key
but widely considered to be influential.75
Cambodia’s revised strategy for development
In Cambodia, the pace of economic reform accelerated with the successful
conclusion of general elections in May 1993 and the subsequent creation
of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). Operating under the
slogan “Le Cambodge s’aide lui-même” (Cambodia will help itself), one of
the first undertakings of the RGC was the development of a complex,
ambitious program aimed at the economic rehabilitation of the Kingdom.
The success of the plan, composed of separate but interrelated initiatives,
depended on the RGC’s ability to orchestrate a total program in which
individual components complemented and reinforced each other.
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Envisioned from the outset as a prolonged effort stretching well into the
next century, the government rightly deemed progress during the first 18
months to be critical.76
A commitment to implement a market economy, together with the fun-
damental change in the role of the government which that commitment
implied, was at the core of Cambodia’s new strategy. The 1993 constitu-
tion formally adopted the market economy system and accorded citizens
the right to sell their products freely. The state was expressly prohibited
from imposing on citizens the sale of private products to the state or the
use of private products by the state unless authorized by law. In turn, the
state assumed responsibility for promoting economic development as well
as managing and protecting the environment.77
The RGC attached a high priority to integrating the Cambodian
economy into both regional and global economies. To achieve this result,
it aimed to develop external trade, pursue regional initiatives and attract
foreign investment. In so doing, it recognized the interrelationship and
mutually reinforcing character of its various goals. On the one hand,
export promotion, import substitution and foreign investment had an
important role to play in reconstruction. On the other, achievement of
desired levels of integration and investment were dependent on revival of
productive sectors, rebuilding of physical infrastructure, creation of a
modern financial system and maintenance of political and economic
stability.
In the external sector, the RGC removed a significant obstacle to free
trade with the elimination of import licenses in late 1993. It also com-
menced negotiations with the U.S. government for the enjoyment of Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status, talks complicated by the absence in Wash-
ington of a clear legal authority for restoring MFN. Executive Office
action had denied Cambodia MFN status in 1975, and the U.S. Congress
subsequently confirmed its trading posture in the 1988 Trade Act. The
Clinton administration could not simply reverse the 1975 executive order
because Cambodia’s non-MFN status was subsequently made law by the
1988 Trade Act. Observers estimated MFN status would lower import
duties imposed on most Cambodian products by up to 40 percent. Mem-
bership in ASEAN also promised to boost economic growth by increasing
Cambodian participation in regional economic affairs.
The RGC presented its development plan to the International Commit-
tee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) in late 1993. The
objectives of the National Programme included social justice, national
reconciliation and economic growth. In support of these goals, the plan
outlined five reinforcing strategies. First, the RGC aimed to promote eco-
nomic stabilization and growth by creating policies and processes for long-
term economic management. At the same time, it hoped to nurture
foreign investment and private entrepreneurship. Second, the government
planned to reform administrative and judicial institutions through a
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clarification of the roles and responsibilities of administrators, together
with the establishment of effective and fair legal institutions.78 Third, the
Royal Government sought to ensure structural adjustment and sectoral
reform through the creation of commercial and investment codes. Fourth,
it aimed to provide direct support for sustained development by address-
ing infrastructure needs, expanding access to social services and upgrading
human skills. Finally, it hoped to optimize the sustainable use of natural
resources through conservation management and effective protection of
the environment. The RGC recognized the plan was ambitious and stated
that success depended on the mobilization of the country’s resources. It
also stressed that considerable international financial support and tech-
nical assistance would be essential to success.
In the course of the ICORC meeting, Minister of Economics and
Finance Sam Rainsy discussed the national program with members of the
international donor community. Declaring the move from a centrally
planned to a market economy to be irreversible and irrevocable, Rainsy
highlighted the key reforms necessary to achieve this result. Among them,
he cited creation of a comprehensive legal framework, transformation of
the state apparatus to mirror development of the private sector, disen-
gagement of the state from most commercial activities and continuation of
the privatization program. To encourage investment, he promised a new
investment law. He also pledged to move Cambodia from a regulated and
controlled economy to one based on tariffs and incentives.79
Economic stabilization and growth in Cambodia
In support of RGC policies, the National Assembly in December 1993
unanimously adopted a national budget and new finance laws which col-
lectively set the stage for a sound economic policy. The new regulations
called for a single budget, prepared and executed annually, and the closure
of all bank accounts held by ministries or other government bodies. All
revenues were to be remitted to the National Treasury and all expendi-
tures disbursed by the same body. In effect, the new finance laws stripped
ministries, provincial authorities and powerful individuals of long-
exercised rights to collect taxes independent of the government. They also
separated responsibility for the authorization of public expenditures from
the subsequent disbursement of cash and provided greater transparency
for the management of state assets.80
At the same time, the Royal Government moved to rationalize the tax
collection system to increase revenue collected and to make the system
more equitable. The Customs Department began to collect both import
duties and the consumption tax where the Tax Department had earlier
collected the latter. The Ministry of Economics and Finance later unveiled
a new tax package intended to improve the balance between direct and
indirect taxation and to reduce an unhealthy dependence on customs
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revenues. Tax revenues at the time approximated only 6 percent of GDP
compared to 25–30 percent in a more normal situation, and customs duties
provided some 54 percent of total revenues in Cambodia while 15–20
percent would have been more representative. The new taxation measures
included a streamlined profits tax, extension of the real estate rentals tax
and a new turnover (sales) tax.81
The tax reform movement continued throughout 1994 in an effort to
increase tax revenues and broaden a revenue base heavily dependent on
customs duties. The introduction of new taxes, including increases in the
airport departure tax and duties on petroleum products, dramatically
increased revenues. Customs duties also increased due to a higher volume
of imports and the move to a Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) basis to
value imported goods. The tax base was again widened in early 1995 when
new laws clarified the profits tax and imposed a personal income tax.82
The National Programme, recognizing the important role confidence in
the banking system played in an effective monetary policy, also expanded
efforts to transform the banking system into a modern financial sector.
The People’s National Bank of Cambodia acted as both a central bank and
a commercial bank until 1992 when the government reorganized the bank
and implemented a commercial banking law. Aimed at transforming the
National Bank into a genuine central bank, the new law provided for the
establishment and regulation of commercial banks, in particular branches
of foreign banks operating in Cambodia.83
In March 1994, Rainsy remarked that the monetary policy of Cambodia
was devoted to fighting inflation, stabilizing the riel and improving the
National Bank’s regulatory capacities. He added that regained confidence
in financial institutions would facilitate the dedollarization of the
economy. He emphasized that the RGC had already implemented a
liberal foreign exchange regime and a unified foreign exchange market,
introduced a 5 percent reserve requirement on bank deposits and required
banks to show minimum paid-in capital. He concluded that the near term
goals of the government included enactment of a new Central Bank law
guaranteeing National Bank independence, a revised financial institutions
act and a more liberal foreign exchange law.84
In a June 1994 interview, Radsady Om, Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, emphasized the need to
streamline the existing investment law to make the process more attract-
ive. A new law adopted by the National Assembly in August 1994 com-
bined investment and incentive provisions. It also designated the Council
for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) a one-stop service organization
responsible for the rehabilitation, development and oversight of invest-
ment activity. The new law required CDC to provide a response to
investor applications within 45 days.85
The terms of Cambodia’s new investment law were more liberal than
similar statutes in place in Laos and Vietnam, and the response from
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investors was positive. In January 1995, the Cambodian Investment Board
(CIB) circulated a list of 57 private investment projects, totaling $2.2
billion, approved after passage of the new law. However, an estimated $1.3
billion of the total involved a single deal with Ariston, a Malaysian
company, to develop a resort complex in Sihanoukville. Critics of the
project understandably questioned the utility of a casino to nine million
Cambodians, some 80 percent of whom were poor farmers. The issue of
political stability also continued to plague Cambodia, and charges of cor-
ruption tainted the contract-approval process. An ADB delegation visiting
Cambodia in late 1995 rightly emphasized that more needed to be done to
make the rules of the game clear and predictable.86
The 1994 Foreign Investment Law became the principal legal basis for
privatization in Cambodia. Regrettably, the government, especially in the
early years of privatization, focused more on speedy execution than on the
transparency and equity of deals. In contrast to Vietnam, leasing in Cam-
bodia quickly became the preferred form of privatization, accounting for
more than half the deals concluded. The lease option was created to
enable local Cambodians with little capital to take over domestic enter-
prises; however, most investors were foreign. With restrictions in place
governing ownership of land, overseas investors regarded leases as less
risky in the uncertain economic and political milieu characterizing
Cambodia.87
Sustainable development in Cambodia
The Royal Government attached considerable significance in the National
Programme to managing the reconstruction of Cambodia in a sustainable
way, making environmental improvement a principal measure of the
success of the overall program. Short-term objectives included strengthen-
ing the technical capacities of the Secretariat of State for the Environment,
completing provincial land use studies, drafting a comprehensive environ-
mental law and strengthening enforcement capabilities at all levels. Sec-
toral targets centered on the development of strategies for drainage,
irrigation and sanitation; sustainable forestry and fisheries exploitation;
and landmine clearance.88
The timber sector became a test case for the entire reform process as it
focused global attention on the widespread political resistance generated
by government attempts to restructure financial regulations and institu-
tions. Economic reforms in Cambodia won loud praise from international
lending institutions and donor states, but the traditional power brokers of
Cambodia were not pleased to see their incomes and influence eroded.
The RGC eased temporarily the timber export ban put in place earlier by
the Supreme National Council. At the same time, it implemented new pro-
cedures designed to increase national revenues and reduce damage to the
environment. These revised procedures required any company intending
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to export timber to obtain an export permit from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs or an export license from the Ministry of Agriculture.
In large part due to the new control measures, timber exports in the
first three months of 1994 generated government revenues close to $23
million compared to total revenues of only $8 million for all of 1993. At
the same time, security problems prevented Cambodian customs officials
from inspecting a number of frontier crossing points on the Thai–
Cambodian border. The amount of timber stockpiled in or exported
through these border areas, as well as through Laos, was unknown but was
thought to be substantial. Thai customs statistics for 1993 indicated that
the amount of timber imported from Cambodia to Thailand alone was
more than the total amount of wood licensed for export by Cambodian
authorities.89
In late June 1994, the Cambodian government, in a decree issued by co-
premiers Ranariddh and Hun Sen, transferred oversight responsibility for
lucrative logging contracts from the Ministry of Economics and Finance to
the Ministry of National Defense. This decision generated intense
domestic and international criticism as it was in direct contravention of the
new Budget Law which stated that all state revenues must be remitted
directly to the National Treasury. The decree also contravened govern-
ment agreements with international lending bodies, like the IMF, which
called for the centralization of government spending. The June 1994
decree was reversed two months later, but the Ministry of National
Defense continued into October 1994 to issue licenses for the export of
timber.90
In late February 1995, Cambodia announced a ban on raw timber
exports effective the end of April. In theory, only processed timber could
be exported from that date. The RGC hoped this move would encourage
investment in the country’s timber processing industry, raising export
taxes and increasing local employment. It also reserved several million
hectares of timber land for concessions to domestic or foreign companies,
provided they met regulations for sustainable forestry management. The
Malaysian logging company, Samling, signed a memorandum of under-
standing covering 800,000 hectares; and the Indonesian Panin Group later
concluded a deal covering 1.5 million hectares. With both agreements
attacked by environmentalists, the timber sector highlighted the complex
problems faced by the RGC as it implemented development policies.91
As unlikely as it might seem, the precious stones industry proved even
more difficult than the timber sector to regulate. The richest gemstone
deposits were located in Battambang province around the town of Pailin,
an area long dominated by the Khmer Rouge. Government forces briefly
occupied Pailin in March 1994 but were unable to hold the town. Reports
in early 1995 suggested the number of Thai companies working with the
Khmer Rouge to mine gemstones had more than doubled since the latter
reoccupied the area. In addition to the loss of customs revenues, mining
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practices in the area threatened ecological damage to the region and the
rivers flowing through it.92
Aquaculture proved yet another serious threat to the environment as
seaside mangrove forests, among the richest and most diverse ecosystems
in the world, were increasingly destroyed for shrimp farms and charcoal.
With the mangrove forests in Koh Kong province among the finest
remaining in Southeast Asia, environmentalists called for prompt action to
curtail shrimp and charcoal production. In a related move, the RGC
formed a National Wetland Committee and agreed to sign the Ramsar
Convention, an international agreement addressing the preservation of
wetland areas.93
Cambodian political culture
The final strategy in the National Programme, reform of administrative
and judicial institutions, focused on strengthening government bodies
through a clarification of roles and responsibilities, reform in corporate
functions and improved coordination between central and provincial
administrations. The government’s strategy here aimed to overhaul the
civil service and to promote an effective workforce that accepted the merit
system and respected human rights. It also hoped to establish a fair and
efficient judicial system.94 Ironically, it was in this area of administrative
reform that domestic and international expectations for improvement
were highest while sustained progress proved most difficult.
The UNTAC-sponsored elections were a unique achievement, but they
proved insufficient to establish a solid foundation for democratic institu-
tions and practices in a still immature body politic. Instead of spawning
change in the political culture of Cambodia, the elections led to a reasser-
tion of the political practices of old. Power brokers continued to practice
politics as usual often evidencing the familism, cupidity, narrow horizons
and reluctance to tolerate opposing points of view prevalent in the
Sihanouk and Lon Nol periods. For Cambodia to prosper, most observers
agreed its political culture would have to change. Consequently, the pre-
vailing trend was a discouraging one, hampering progress, not only in judi-
cial and administrative reform, but in the overall development program.95
The case of Sam Rainsy, the architect of the nation’s economic reform
program, illustrated the difficulties involved in changing Cambodia’s polit-
ical culture. As Minister of Economics and Finance, his efforts to root out
official corruption and to centralize revenue collection were widely her-
alded abroad. In contrast, the same reforms prompted a storm of protest
at home from politicians, entrenched business interests and the armed
forces, sparking efforts at the highest levels of government to remove him
from office. Eventually, his critics won out, and Rainsy was sacked in a
cabinet reshuffle in October 1994. He was later ousted from the FUNCIN-
PEC party in May 1995 and from the National Assembly in June 1995.
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Both prime ministers supported the removal of Rainsy because both
viewed him as a serious political rival. At the center of the storm, Rainsy
was by no means the only critic targeted by the government. After Prince
Norodom Sirivuddh, half-brother of King Sihanouk, secretary-general of
the FUNCINPEC party and a deputy prime minister in the government,
resigned in solidarity with Rainsy, he was first imprisoned and then exiled
to France. At the same time, the RGC argued increasingly that curbs were
necessary to keep the press from acting irresponsibly and undermining the
people’s faith in their leaders.96
The ousting of Sam Rainsy and the mounting pressure on the press
were the product of heavy-handed government efforts to neutralize any
opposition. The National Assembly became little more than a rubber
stamp. Voices of even mild dissent often received death threats. The court
system, according to human rights lawyers and diplomats, was largely con-
trolled and directed by politicians. The widespread abuse of human rights,
accompanied as it was by extensive evidence of corruption, made a
mockery of the $2 billion UN peace plan that had led to elections and the
subsequent formation of a new government.97
Widespread violence also continued to plague Cambodian society. For
centuries, Cambodian history has been a chronicle of violence as evi-
denced by the bas-reliefs at Angkor, the cruelties of nineteenth-century
uprisings, the sordid political killings of Sihanouk, the Vietnamese mas-
sacres of Lon Nol and the murderous purges of Pol Pot. Never a country
at peace with itself, it was not surprising that studies of the Khmer Rouge
era found that Cambodians were not as shocked as outsiders with its viol-
ence because it differed only in scale and intensity from past experience.
This predilection to violence was much in evidence in the 1993 election
campaign and continued largely unabated after the installation of the new
government.98
At the March 1994 ICORC meeting in Tokyo, a session which high-
lighted Cambodia’s continuing struggle against banditry, landmines and
poverty, the 12 international bodies and 31 donor nations in attendance
pledged $777 million in aid to Cambodia, including funds pledged earlier
but not yet disbursed. Over the next year, political violence and human
rights abuses dampened the donor enthusiasm with many donors com-
plaining of “compassion fatigue.” At the March 1995 ICORC meeting in
Paris, a chorus of voices, including Amnesty International and Sam
Rainsy, condemned the government’s human rights record and the limited
progress made toward democratization, accusing it of corruption and
malfeasance. After the IMF and World Bank emphasized in early 1996
that corrupt practices would no longer be tolerated, major donors at the
July 1996 ICORC meeting in Tokyo seized on the new approach, insisting
for the first time that Cambodia implement a more transparent forestry
policy.99
The year 1996 appeared to bring improved prospects for peace, stability
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and democracy in Cambodia. The ruling coalition experienced periodical
crises but managed to stay intact. The two leading parties in the coalition,
FUNCINPEC and the CPP, remained at loggerheads with each other, but
events suggested that neither could eliminate the other by force, and each
appeared willing to contest the other in the national elections scheduled
for 1998. In November 1995, ex-minister Rainsy had formed an opposition
party known as the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) which claimed member-
ship in 1997 of more than 250,000 people. Most encouragingly, ongoing
defections and a loss of foreign support reduced Khmer Rouge capabilities
to the point they were largely a spent military and political force by
1997.100
As the political and security front improved, Cambodia again suffered
what professor Khatharya Um termed its “seemingly limitless capacity for
implosive self-destructiveness.”101 In July 1997, the CPP led by Hun Sen
launched a preemptive coup d’état against the FUNCINPEC party of
Prince Ranariddh. The coup itself was not surprising as many had foreseen
its making. With an eye on the May 1998 elections, both Ranariddh and
Hun Sen had been aggressively competing for the support of Khmer
Rouge defectors, and FUNCINPEC was also negotiating a compact with
the Khmer Nation Party. Hun Sen’s troops and Ranariddh’s bodyguards
clashed in the weeks prior to the coup, but most analysts agreed it was the
political alliance being constructed by Ranariddh that triggered the
coup.102
While the coup was not unexpected, the brutal manner of its execution
shocked most observers, especially the many human rights and pro-
democracy groups working in Cambodia. Hun Sen’s troops moved swiftly
against FUNCINPEC headquarters, military strongholds and the resi-
dences of Ranariddh and other FUNCINPEC leaders. Summary execu-
tions and custodial deaths were followed by a wave of mass arrests,
detentions and the intimidation of any individual or organized opposition.
Cambodia witnessed a return to state-sponsored violence and de facto
single-party autocracy in absolute defiance of the spirit of the U.N.-
brokered Paris Accords to which all parties were signatories.103
The offices of the FUNCINPEC and KNP parties were ransacked. The
military and political leaders of FUNCINPEC were pursued, and FUNC-
INPEC newspapers were shut down. In France, Prince Ranariddh was
unable to return to Cambodia. Civil rights activists later verified that
extra-judicial killings continued for weeks after the coup. Hun Sen sought
to justify the coup by charging Ranariddh with secret Khmer Rouge nego-
tiations, the infiltration of Khmer Rouge units into Phnom Penh, illegal
arms shipments and the initiation of a campaign of intimidation and viol-
ence. However, most observers saw it as a preemptive strike as the CPP
and its adversaries prepared for the 1998 elections. Attempting to legit-
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imize his actions, Hun Sen described the events of July 5 and after as a
legal act, not a coup, and promised that free and fair elections would be
held in May 1998.104
RGC economic performance
As the Royal Government pursued its economic goals in an environment
of considerable political uncertainty, both in terms of the Khmer Rouge
insurgency and the political infighting among the coalition leaders, its
overall economic performance in 1994 proved credible, if below forecast.
The government achieved some degree of macroeconomic stability, con-
taining expenditures and increasing revenues. GDP grew just short of 5
percent, a modest improvement over 1993 but well below the 8 percent
target outlined at the March 1994 ICORC meeting. The rate of inflation
was a little more than 26 percent which was down from 1993 but well short
of the 10 percent target. The exchange rate remained relatively stable
throughout the year, contributing to a stronger balance of payments posi-
tion. But the budget deficit was 6.2 percent of GDP in 1994 which was up
from 5.7 percent the preceding year. External economic assistance con-
tributed significantly to Cambodia’s fiscal achievements. And the new
foreign investment law stimulated business and investment through tax
concessions and other incentives to investors.105
With the ingredients for a strong and stable economy coming into place,
the Council for the Development of Cambodia launched a regional tour in
1995 to publicize the improved investment climate. Advertisements in the
United States began with the question, “Why would anyone want to invest
in Cambodia?” In addition to a relatively stable exchange rate, respectable
GDP growth and a low rate of inflation, CDC officials promoted the posit-
ive impact of ASEAN observer status, pending U.S. approval of MFN
status and growing confidence among foreign donors. They also touted the
potential for American investment in Vietnam to generate economic
spillover into Cambodia. The CDC sales pitch was well prepared albeit not
wholly convincing.106
The Cambodian economy, propped up by massive infusions of foreign
aid, continued to struggle over the next two years. GNP growth was 7.6
percent in 1995 and 6.4 percent in 1996, reasonable growth rates when
compared to minus 4 percent in 1991 albeit from a low base. Inflation was
effectively constrained, and the budget deficit narrowed. The exchange
rate remained relatively stable despite uncertainty in the fiscal and mone-
tary sectors. Export growth accelerated thanks to the achievement of
MFN status and some European states granting the Generalized System of
Preferences. Nevertheless, with total expenditures in 1996 estimated at
approximately $580 million, Cambodia still required foreign aid totaling
$262 million or more than 40 percent of its entire budget.107
Continuing to face serious obstacles to sustained economic growth, the
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negative fallout from the Asian financial crisis and the July 1997 coup
threatened to be devastating, undermining the international support Cam-
bodia so desperately needed. As political tensions increased in the first
half of 1997, Cambodia’s structural reforms lost steam, decelerating in the
second half of the year. Direct foreign investment commitments to Cam-
bodia fell by 35 percent in 1997 and actual flows declined by 45 percent.
The Cambodian riel lost value, but it fell less precipitously than other
Asian currencies, notably the Lao kip, due to the extensive dollarization of
the Cambodian economy. The negative effects of the regional financial
crisis and concurrent domestic political unrest were also tempered by the
strong increase in 1997 in Cambodian garment exports to Europe and the
United States.108
Evolving regional and international relations
At the outset of the 1990s, Thai–Cambodian relations were strained by
outstanding bilateral issues like border disputes and Thai support for the
Khmer Rouge; however, they gradually improved as the decade pro-
gressed. The first meeting of the newly established Thai–Cambodian
General Border Committee, held in Bangkok in November 1995, resulted
in three border checkpoints being reopened. Shortly thereafter, the two
Cambodian prime ministers, in separate deals struck in January and Feb-
ruary 1996, granted large timber concessions to 17 Thai logging com-
panies. These deals were followed by a visit to Phnom Penh by Thai Prime
Minister Banharn Silapa-Archa in late June 1996, the first such visit since
Chuan Leekpai went to Phnom Penh in January 1994 and only the second
visit by a Thai prime minister in 42 years. Issues discussed during
Banharn’s visit included border questions, Thai logging activities and bilat-
eral economic cooperation. The two parties also signed a memorandum of
understanding regarding the construction of a hydropower station in Koh
Kong province, concluded a trade, economic and technical cooperation
agreement and established a joint subcommittee on finance.109
Ancient enmities also strained Cambodian–Vietnamese relations.
Following the 1993 elections, the Khmer Rouge continued to attack ethnic
Vietnamese residents, prolonging the anti-Vietnamese violence of the
UNTAC period. In 1993–4, tens of thousand of ethnic Vietnamese fled
Cambodia; and more than 5,000 refugees were stranded on the border.
High-level Vietnamese delegations visited Cambodia in 1994–5, and King
Sihanouk visited Vietnam in December 1995. Tensions between Cam-
bodia and Vietnam increased in 1996 with Cambodia charging Vietnam
was moving boundary markers westward into the three border provinces
of Kompong Cham, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng. Domestic politics compli-
cated the issue as the co-premiers often advanced conflicting approaches,
with Prince Ranariddh usually taking the more aggressive position.
In January 1996, he termed alleged Vietnamese encroachments on
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Cambodian territory an “invasion,” calling them a “complete violation” of
existing agreements to preserve the border status quo. The rising tensions
between Cambodia and Vietnam were eventually defused; nevertheless,
the two neighbors were no closer to a permanent border settlement.
Heavy fighting during the 1997 coup again raised concerns among ethnic
Vietnamese living in Cambodia, but no evidence surfaced to suggest they
were the victims of targeted violence.110
Elsewhere, Cambodian policy toward China, Taiwan and Korea moved
in new directions. The Chinese government, which terminated its formal
ties with the Khmer Rouge in the early 1990s, took steps to strengthen its
ties with the RGC, pledging $1 million in non-lethal aid in April 1996.
Beijing also moved closer to the Cambodian People’s Party, a significant
step as it had considered Hun Sen an enemy during the Vietnamese occu-
pation of Cambodia. In the wake of Hun Sen’s July 1996 visit to Beijing,
Michael Hayes, editor of the Phnom Penh Post, highlighted the shift in
Chinese foreign policy:
The Chinese have made a cool calculation. They like the King, but
they have to think of their own interests. They waited to see what the
coalition would do for three years and now they have decided to back
Hun Sen.111
In November 1996, a Chinese trade delegation visited Cambodia,
signed a cooperation agreement and pledged $10 million in aid. China’s
major objective in Cambodia was “political stability, not respect for
human rights and adherence to democratic principles.” It desired, above
all, “a stable Cambodia which is not used by anyone to contain China.”
Taiwan opened a representative trade office in Phnom Penh in 1995, and
Cambodia opened a similar office in Taiwan in 1996. But these Taiwanese
initiatives were associated with FUNCINPEC, not the CPP, which facilit-
ated Beijing’s decision. The Chinese felt betrayed by FUNCINPEC, a
party they had supported for a decade when it operated with resistance
factions on the Thai border. To curry Chinese favor in the wake of the
July coup, Hun Sen closed Taiwan’s representative office. By the end of
1997, China had become very active, buttressing claims to regional leader-
ship with high-level political backing, military assistance and investment in
Cambodia. The RGC also established mission-level relations with South
Korea in 1996, upgrading them to full diplomatic relations in October
1997.112
Throughout this period, Japan remained Cambodia’s largest aid donor
with budgetary support taking up a significant amount of Japanese aid.
Like China, Japan did not, at least publicly, seek to tie its financial support
to either respect for human rights or adherence to democratic principles,
an approach much appreciated by the RGC. In the wake of the 1997 coup,
Japan refused to be drawn into the discussion over the legitimacy of the
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Hun Sen government, arguing it was more productive to ensure the May
1998 national elections proceeded on schedule. Following a brief interrup-
tion in economic aid, Japan quickly resumed its flow to Cambodia and
supported ASEAN efforts to find an acceptable solution.113
Cambodian relations with the United States also improved, overcoming
a number of stumbling blocks. In August 1995, Washington and Phnom
Penh concluded an agreement under which OPIC would provide loans,
loan guarantees and risk insurance to U.S. companies operating in Cambo-
dia. Angered by U.S. Senate attempts to tie approval of MFN trading
status to human rights and democracy improvements, Hun Sen four
months later launched a blunt criticism of the United States, protesting its
alleged interference in Cambodian affairs. When the U.S. Deputy Secret-
ary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Winston Lord, visited Cambodia
in January 1996, he declined to discuss the issue but suggested “opposition
expression and parties” were “important elements” in the domestic affairs
of any state. Cambodia finally achieved MFN status in October 1996, a
Phnom Penh objective since the beginning of the decade. The U.S. govern-
ment was the most persistent critic of the July 1997 coup. Condemning the
killing, Washington suspended aid, with the exception of humanitarian
assistance, until democracy was restored. The White House later looked to
the May 1998 elections to legitimize political authority in Cambodia,
arguing they must be conducted under international supervision.114
As the political situation in Cambodia deteriorated, the European
Union joined the United States in taking a tougher line. The European
Parliament in May 1996 urged the EU to add conditionality, including
support for democracy and human rights, to future aid agreements with
Phnom Penh. Elsewhere, a number of Western states, including Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom,
continued to provide generous amounts of financial assistance to Cam-
bodia. Much of this aid went through NGOs; however, France was an
exception as it stayed directly involved in the process of state-building.
French aid targeted improvement in areas like public health, the judiciary
and public administration. Like Japan, France avoided confrontation,
using quiet diplomacy to express its concern for human rights and demo-
cracy issues.115
Cambodia declared an interest in ASEAN membership as early as
1992; and following creation of the RGC, it took the necessary steps to
achieve this objective. However, following the July 1997 coup, the
ASEAN member states postponed Cambodia’s admission which had been
scheduled for later in the month. A number of factors contributed to this
decision, including the short time between the coup and Cambodia’s
scheduled membership, U.S.-led international criticism of the coup and
Hun Sen’s rejection of ASEAN mediation of the issues between his post-
coup government and Ranariddh’s government in exile. When ASEAN
attempted to mediate the dispute, Hun Sen successfully “embarked on a
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series of tactical maneuvers that deftly exploited ASEAN’s internal con-
tractions,” and rendered their efforts ineffective. An early ASEAN initi-
ative was frustrated when ASEAN found itself increasingly isolated in its
defense of Ranariddh as the legitimate head of government. Overruling
both Malaysia and Vietnam, ASEAN later decided to delay Cambodian
membership indefinitely and to consider human rights when reviewing its
decision even though Burma and Laos had stated publicly their support
for Cambodia’s immediate accession. In the end, it was Japan, not
ASEAN, that successfully brokered an agreement between Hun Sen and
Ranariddh, enabling the latter to return to Cambodia and participate in
the 1998 elections. In the interim, both the Lao PDR and Myanmar joined
ASEAN on 23 July 1997, a blow to the legitimacy of the Cambodian
government. Largely due to American veto power, the UN Credentials
Committee also left vacant Cambodia’s UN seat, dealing another blow to
the prestige of the CPP-dominated government in Phnom Penh.116
Greater Mekong subregion
With the conclusion of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, Cambodia joined
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam on the Interim Mekong Committee (IMC).
China and Myanmar refused to join but did agree to participate in the
Mekong Development Research Network, a Canadian initiative. As the
decade progressed, a thaw in Cold War tensions, growing economic liber-
alization and domestic political events combined to make broader subre-
gional cooperation possible. The emphasis on large dam construction and
hydropower development also continued, despite a growing number of
studies documenting the negative aspects of large dam performance. ADB
alone identified as high potential for economic development over 50
hydropower projects in the six riparian states. Laos remained at center
stage with its large dam at Nam Theun Hinboun among the more contro-
versial projects.117
The Interim Mekong Committee became the Mekong River Commis-
sion (MRC) in April 1995 when Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam
concluded the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Develop-
ment of the Mekong River Basin. The agreement established a new frame-
work for subregional cooperation, calling for the creation of a Mekong
Basin Development Plan. It also established guidelines for the use of
Mekong waters, together with a process to create rules governing water
utilization and inter-basin diversions. Thereafter, the MRC focused on an
inventory of environmental resources, small-scale irrigation and environ-
mental monitoring. As a result, the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos remained the
only significant MRC hydropower project to be completed. China and
Myanmar later became dialog partners in the MRC with the initial dialog
session held in July 1996.118
Upstream, China was busy damming the Mekong to generate
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hydropower in Yunnan province. The first dam was completed at Manwan
in 1993, and energy production began in mid-1994. Construction of a
second major dam, Dachaoshan, in a planned system of seven such dams,
began in 1996 with a third, Jinghong, and a fourth, Xiaowan, in the plan-
ning stages. The potential downstream impact of these Chinese dams was
a source of widespread concern as Milton Osborne later stressed:
Occasional placatory statements to the contrary, there seems little
reason to believe Chinese planners have much concern for the con-
sequences of this dam-building program on the downstream countries
through which the Mekong flows. Suggestions that the dams will
provide improved water flow during the dry season are a subject of
controversy. And talk by Chinese officials of the desirability of blast-
ing an all-season channel along the Mekong, where it runs through the
gorges of northern Laos, do nothing to ameliorate worries about the
dams’ impact.119
As the IMC evolved into the MRC, the Asian Development Bank in
1992 initiated a technical assistance program intended to promote eco-
nomic cooperation among the six riparian states. Emphasizing the import-
ance of coordinated, collective action, ADB President, Kimimasa
Tarumizu, stressed the benefits of promoting subregional development
and trade within the context of individual national priorities.
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and Yunnan
Province of the People’s Republic of China share borders and many
important natural resources, and as such form a logical grouping for
economic cooperation. Recent positive political and economic devel-
opments in this subregion provide an excellent opportunity for the
Bank to encourage coordinated activities which will enhance the effi-
ciency and competitiveness of the six economies. The most important
areas for coordination include trade, investment, transportation, com-
munications, energy, water resources and tourism.120
ADB representatives also highlighted the private sector benefits to be
derived from the harmonization of investment codes, commercial laws,
financial reporting systems, land use and property rights, banking regula-
tions and product standards.121
The report of the initial ministerial conference on subregional economic
cooperation, which met in Manila in October 1992, emphasized that future
projects could involve any number of countries in the subregion but not
necessarily all six. In pursuit of the outlined agenda, ADB saw its primary
role as being a catalyst for change by “encouraging dialogue, providing
forums for that dialogue, and assisting, if requested, in subregional cooper-
ation through project identification and development.” ADB officials were
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also candid from the outset in recognizing existing barriers to subregional
cooperation in the transportation, energy and telecommunications sectors
as well as in financial services, legal systems and pricing policies.122
The riparian states, especially Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam,
approached the challenges and opportunities of enhanced subregional
cooperation from widely different perspectives. Laos was an enthusiastic,
early supporter, seeing subregional cooperation as an avenue to overcome
its dual handicap of being small and landlocked. Emphasizing the role of
transportation projects as facilitators of trade, together with hydropower
projects as trade opportunities, Lao PDR officials voiced concern about
debt levels and economic viability. In turn, Vietnam was acutely aware of
the need to expand trade horizons following the collapse of its Comecon
markets. Hanoi in 1992 was in a difficult position as it attempted to imple-
ment structural reforms and develop new markets without assistance from
the non-convertible-currency states. Consequently, it viewed subregional
cooperation as part of a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at revitalizing
the Vietnamese economy through Western aid and foreign investment.123
At the outset, Cambodia was the least enthusiastic supporter of the
ADB initiative. It agreed that greater cooperation and trade would result
in more effective and efficient resource use. However, its ability to pursue
cooperative activities was limited by the current state of the Cambodian
economy. Phnom Penh rightly argued that any economic gains from sub-
regional cooperation would be marginal compared to what could be
achieved from simply stabilizing its domestic macroeconomic climate. On
a more positive note, Cambodia recognized the ADB initiative would
provide it with a forum to strengthen its domestic and international stand-
ing. Moreover, the initiative also provided a weakened state with the
opportunity to sit down with its neighbors on an equal footing to discuss a
variety of issues important in regularizing trade and reestablishing sover-
eign control. In the end, Cambodia approached “subregional initiatives
with caution, and with high regard for maintaining national sover-
eignty.”124
The second ministerial conference on subregional economic coopera-
tion was held in August 1993. In opening statements, delegates expressed
their commitment to subregional cooperation. Touting recent political
developments, the Cambodian delegate emphasized the successful elec-
tion, under UN auspices, of a constituent assembly followed by the forma-
tion of a national government. He also acknowledged the Cambodian
economy remained one of the poorest on earth. “Rehabilitation and
reconstruction has been undertaken but due to a lack of resources, the
economic activities of the country have not reached the levels achieved in
the late 1960s.” Again stressing macroeconomic stabilization as its first pri-
ority, Cambodia urged ADB to focus its regional plans on the develop-
ment of transportation, power, tourism and environmental protection.125
Highlighting the divergent thinking found at the second ministerial
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conference, China and Myanmar put road and railway development as
their first priorities while Thailand favored the energy sector together with
transportation. In turn, Laos considered the telecommunications and
energy sectors to be key elements in harmonizing economic cooperation in
the subregion. At the same time, it emphasized the need for cooperation
in the fields of tourism, trade and services.126
In the longest presentation, the Vice Prime Minister of Vietnam tabled
five priorities. In transportation, he supported projects to rehabilitate east-
west roads from Vietnam to Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Desiring to
upgrade existing transportation systems before considering new ones, he
also expressed interest in air, rail and water transport. On the environ-
ment, his comments centered on the Mekong, emphasizing the need to
develop and utilize “this water resource in line with the latest technology
and international laws.” In part, his comments here reflected the mounting
controversy over the impact of upstream dams on lower Mekong water
flows. Vietnamese priorities in the energy sector centered on hydropower
projects on the Se San, Ca and Black rivers. Finally, Vietnamese emphasis
on both human resource and tourism development echoed similar con-
cerns elsewhere, especially in Cambodia and Laos.127
The first two ministerial conferences were followed by a series of sub-
sequent meetings on roughly an annual basis. Over time, delegate presen-
tations tended to become longer, and in some cases, increasingly
self-congratulatory. However, core positions and country priorities
remained largely unchanged. As time passed, conference proceedings also
provided increasingly detailed information on sector development plans.
In addition, the scope of the environment as a priority sector expanded to
include both the environment and natural resource development.
Telecommunications was later added as a seventh priority sector. By the
end of 1995, the six governments had endorsed 77 projects, including 34 in
transportation, 12 in energy, 11 in environment, eight in trade and invest-
ment, seven in human resource development and five in tourism. Early
discussions focused on providing the necessary infrastructure for trade and
development. Steps aimed at liberalizing trade, such as reducing tariffs and
dropping trade barriers, were purposely left out of the deliberations.128
Other subregional initiatives
In addition to the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiative, an impres-
sive number of other efforts to promote subregional development were
underway in the early 1990s. These included the Forum for Comprehen-
sive Development of Indochina (FCDI), established by Japan in 1993 to
address opportunities for cooperation in infrastructure and tourism devel-
opment. FCDI participants included Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand
and Vietnam. After 1994, Japan, working with ASEAN Economic Minis-
ters and its Ministry of Trade and Industry (AEM-MITI), also promoted
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Asian growth in conjunction with strengthening linkages between ASEAN
and Indochina. The emphasis here was on market economy transition,
infrastructure, investment, trade and industrial policies.129 Thailand
launched the Golden Quadrangle initiative in 1992 to strengthen economic
cooperation in line with its concept of “turning battlefields into market-
places.” This program linked Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Yunnan
province in an effort “to formalize and develop existing cross-border
trade, tourism and transport links.” The Mekong Development Bank,
UNDP, UN/ESCAP, the Canadian IDRC and the private sector were also
active in the subregion.130
The ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (ASEAN-
MBDC) was established in 1995 to promote the well-being of the Mekong
subregion through ASEAN assistance to riparian states. This initiative
focused on transportation and communication links between ASEAN and
the GMS. Concerned that subregional plans reflect regional requirements,
officials of the original six ASEAN states spoke increasingly of the need to
create “one Southeast Asia” to integrate all ten Southeast Asian countries
into a “family of one.” In so doing, they developed ambitious – and expen-
sive – plans for regional integration. For example, the development of a
trans-Asian rail link from Singapore to Kunming in Yunnan province, a
priority project intended to kickstart the area’s development, was tenta-
tively estimated to cost at least $1.5 billion. Such grandiose plans, often
emphasizing private sector support, raised serious questions as to the
source and availability of funds, together with the additional reforms
needed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to attract funding. Varying rules,
regulations and procedures on matters pertaining to land ownership and
transfer, profit repatriation and visas, together with shortcomings in legal
frameworks and immigration laws, were barriers to would-be investors.131
This potpourri of well-meaning agencies, promoting joint and individual
initiatives, sometimes resulted in self-destructive competition between
participant states, sponsoring groups and funding organizations over the
priority, timing and location of projects. It also provoked occasional criti-
cism as individual governments, organizations and agencies searched des-
perately for at least a modicum of coordination and cooperation. Some
analysts warned of “initiative overload,” and an independent observer
noted that Mekong region schemes “have proliferated to the extent that
there may soon be the need for a scheme to manage the managers of the
river.”132
Sometimes described as an economic growth triangle, the GMS differed
from the Greater South China Growth Triangle or the Singapore-
Johor–Riau Growth Triangle in important respects. First, the government
role was of prime importance in the case of the GMS where market forces
were the primary drivers in dynamic Asian growth triangles. Second,
unlike the growth triangles developing elsewhere in Asia, which typically
involved only selected regions of participating states, the GMS
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encompassed the entire country in five out of the six states involved and
more often than not affected countrywide interests. In the transitional
economies found in the GMS, the riparian states were also directly
involved in the planning and execution of projects. Fourth, with the pos-
sible exception of Thailand and maybe Yunnan province, the financial
resources of the participating states were quite limited and thus hindered
their ability to invest in subregional infrastructure projects. Finally, differ-
ences in factor endowment and economic complementarity characterized
the national economies comprising the Greater Mekong Subregion.133
From this perspective, the Greater Mekong Subregion could best be
described as “a lower level form of subregional economic co-operation”
than either “the growth triangles or the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA)” because its programs did not aim at the “economic integration
of the participating countries.”134 Pragmatic and results oriented, the “key
characteristic of economic co-operation in the GMS” was that it was
“activity-driven, involving initiatives in limited transborder linkages.”135
The issue of whether the GMS was or could become an economic growth
triangle was more likely one of scope creep as opposed to goal incompati-
bility. The GMS initiative appeared to be evolving, at least in selected
areas, from one whose primary purpose was the development of infra-
structure and natural resources to a more ambitious project promising sub-
regional trade and development. That said, the debate over what
constituted a growth triangle and the place of the GMS in that debate
looked set to continue.136
Despite the plethora of ambitious plans, GMS initiatives faced numer-
ous obstacles. With a variety of governmental and nongovernmental
bodies involved, inadequate coordination between the various national
agendas and international agencies was commonplace. Funding constraints
also posed problems as the subregion was estimated to require around $40
billion over the next 25 years. The Asian financial crisis in 1997–8 damp-
ened enthusiasm for such ambitious, expensive development plans. Ten-
sions also surfaced among competing economic and social groups as to
optimum water use, and nongovernmental bodies proposed varied, some-
times contradictory agendas. Finally, serious concerns surfaced as to the
level of cooperation possible among the major players on the Mekong.
When China refused to sign the regional agreement in 1995, for example,
it stated that “whatever action it takes to exploit the Mekong’s potential is
purely an internal matter.” For these reasons, the Mekong was accurately
labeled “the realpolitik dimension of water conflict.”137
Conclusions
It was obvious as early as mid-1997 that the leadership of Laos and
Vietnam had reached the end of the beginning in terms of economic
reform. It was also clear that both states needed to consolidate and build
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upon the reforms in place to ensure long-term social stability and sustain-
able growth. Over the next year, the elite in both states appeared to
misread the economic tea leaves, moving backwards toward the future.
Adrift in a policy vacuum compromised by factional divisions, they
seemed to lose their way. Fixated on the appropriate mix of political and
economic reforms, they tended to overcompensate for the former, com-
promising the later. Struggling to get back on course, they were in danger
of dismantling and destroying the achievements of more than a decade.
Mistaken policy choices, compounded and aggravated by the Asian finan-
cial crisis, put the entire reform process at risk in both Laos and Vietnam.
Next door, the development objectives of the Royal Government of
Cambodia were ambitious from the outset, especially for a state wracked
in recent decades by extreme social, economic and political dislocation.
They were doubly difficult because the country was still in the process of
building, as opposed to rebuilding, crucial sectors of its economy. In this
challenging milieu, Cambodia made considerable progress in promoting
economic stabilization and growth as it developed the fundamentals of a
market economy. Unfortunately, economic reforms were repeatedly
undermined by the domestic political process as a disheartening and dis-
turbing pattern of corruption, incompetence and malfeasance emerged
that mirrored past practice and augured ill for future performance. Demo-
cratic procedures, respect for human rights and concern for social justice
were concepts bandied about but seldom implemented. Instead, the ruling
parties returned to the system of clans and clients prevalent in the
Sihanouk and Lon Nol eras. Access to power and wealth was sought and
achieved through place and position with connections most often deter-
mining the level of justice obtained.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997–8 did not bring about a fundamental
change in economic policy in Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam. However, it did
delay anything more than tentative steps in the direction of regional
integration, most especially in the case of Cambodia and Laos. Moreover,
the ongoing commitment of the Association of Southeast Asian States to
the “ASEAN way” of consultation and consensus building made the
development of effective, binding regional initiatives that much more diffi-
cult. Whether or not the expanded ASEAN-10 (ASEAN-6 plus Cambo-
dia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) could function with the same degree of
trust and cohesion as the original ASEAN-6 also remained unclear. Like
many regional organizations, ASEAN-10 promised much, but it had pro-
duced little as the decade closed.
One of the world’s most untouched rivers only two decades earlier, the
Mekong by the late 1990s looked to become one of the most dammed.
Upwards of 100 major dams, diversions and irrigation projects were
planned, and thousands of smaller schemes already impacted on local
residents as well as people downstream. Established to guide the sustain-
able development, utilization, conservation and management of the river,
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the Mekong River Commission was not basin-wide in that China and
Myanmar refused to join. MRC officials readily agreed more needed to be
done to protect the interests of member states but acknowledged little
could be accomplished without Chinese cooperation. The policy triangle
of hydropower development, environmental science and geopolitics high-
lighted the need for a regional process of cooperation and decision making
as well as the practical limits of regionalism in its absence.
Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai suggested in March 1998
that China was a suitable development model for Vietnam.138 Many
aspects of that comparison were subject to debate, but there was one clear,
undeniable difference. While Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam might face
choices similar to those faced by China, unlike China, they could not
escape the consequences of inaction. Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Vientiane
were not cushioned like Beijing by a large current account balance, high
foreign exchange reserves and a manageable foreign debt. On the con-
trary, they were plagued with a drop in foreign investment, limited and
declining foreign exchange reserves, mounting foreign debt and a deterio-
rating current account balance. As the millennium neared, the prevailing
economic and political climate in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam made the
right choices more difficult, but it also made them more pressing.
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6 Challenges and prospects
Arriving at Pochentong airport on a Sunday morning, my first sight was a
bumper to bumper traffic jam, heading out of town, the new middle class of
Phnom Penh on their way to the beach at Sihanoukville. The novelty of
this was sufficient, it seemed, to mitigate the journey which would take
most of the day there and back. Traffic, of course, transforms a city,
particularly in the case of Phnom Penh which has seen so little of it, and
while its wide boulevards can still handle the modern flow easily, there’s
the sense that the city’s new car owners simply enjoy cruising around.
Author Michael Freeman, Cambodia, 2004
At heart the Lao belong to the past, and it is only by the accident of being
located in the middle of Indochina that they have been forced to live
amidst the violence of the contemporary world. They have paid a very high
price for it.
Italian Journalist Tiziano Terzani, A Fortune-Teller Told Me, 1997
We are not going to undertake political reform in the same way that other
countries have because it could easily lead to the collapse of the political
and economic system in Vietnam, creating greater instability and disorder.
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, Hanoi, 1999
In one sense, revolutions are much like people. While they seldom
improve with age, they often become more like themselves. Three decades
on, the revolutions in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam remained a tug of war
between economic and political forces, a struggle whose outcome was
unclear. In the process, events served to underline the unique character
and specific challenges confronting reform efforts in each state. The para-
doxes inherent in each revolution, in turn, often masked more practical
limits to regional integration and development.
Vietnam faces economic challenges
Vietnam experienced a drop in foreign trade and a decline in foreign
investment as early as 1996. Over the next two years, a series of shocks
rocked the Vietnamese economy – declining growth rates, peasant unrest,
a crippling typhoon and the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Funda-
mental causes for the deteriorating economic climate included government
protection of some 6,000 inefficient, debt-ridden state enterprises and a
weak, corrupt financial system. In addition, a combination of internal
forces, including excessive red tape, Byzantine rules and regulations and
pervasive corruption, impacted negatively on the prevailing investment
climate.1
A sharp decline in economic growth sparked calls for accelerated
reform from international financial institutions and donor countries. The
World Bank in 1998 joined the International Monetary Fund in telling the
Vietnamese government that certain types of financial assistance would
now be contingent on its adoption of appropriate reforms. The global
donor community, meeting in Paris in December 1998, endorsed the
concept of aid conditionality, tying $500 million in potential Vietnamese
assistance to the adoption of an accelerated doi moi program.2 Vietnam
responded with a three-point plan of structural and sectoral reform cen-
tered on state enterprises, the banking system and trade reform. Hanoi
readily agreed to the reform program in late 1998, but it made no effort in
the following year to carry out its commitments. As a result, the 1999
donor meeting was largely a rehash of the previous session. Donors again
offered a package of conditional aid, totaling $700 million, tied to restruc-
turing state enterprise debt, refinancing the banking system and retraining
the unemployed.3
The Vietnamese leadership rejected out of hand financial inducements
to underwrite reform efforts, fearful the requisite policy initiatives would
threaten political stability. This concern and other factors led to what two
Vietnam experts, Brantly Womack and Carlyle Thayer, termed reform
immobilism, “a middle course of muddling through” with “policies that
are conflicting in their effects.” Womack concluded, “the structural weak-
ness of immobilism is that it is permanently behind the curve of societal
developments.”4
Economic reforms enjoyed widespread support in Vietnam and con-
tinued to be supported publicly by the government; nevertheless, official
support for reform continued to be tempered by the Party’s concern for
retention of political control. In this milieu, ideological conservatives
argued that aid conditionality comprised national sovereignty. Some
reforms were implemented, but the process as a whole was restrained by
“excessive caution and gradualism.” Like neighboring Laos, Vietnam
failed to develop a comprehensive, coherent strategy for overcoming the
economic downturn, electing instead to “tough out” the crisis.5
Given dire predictions from all sides, the Vietnamese economy sur-
prised most observers when it revived in the coming year. Real GDP
growth in 2000 was 6.8 percent, up from 4.8 percent in 1999, albeit still
below the pre-1997 average of 8.2 percent. Strong performances in both
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exports and industry were the main sources of growth. Exports grew by
21.3 percent, driven by fast-growing manufactured exports and a surge in
the value of oil shipments. The resurgence in industrial growth to 9.7
percent was spurred by rising internal and external demand with the
domestic nonstate sector outperforming the foreign and state sectors.
Agriculture also performed well despite floods in the central region and
drought in the north. Imports grew by 29 percent, compared with only 3.8
percent in 1999, reducing the current account surplus to 2 percent of GDP.
The slowdown in foreign direct investment also continued. Vietnam fol-
lowed accommodative fiscal and monetary policies in the year 2000, and
inflation continued to fall. Described by some as an under-performing
economy, Vietnam’s performance in 2000 was highly credible given the
shocks experienced in recent years.6
A number of high-profile events in 2000 helped restore a buoyant mood
to Vietnam. These included implementation of an Enterprise Law effect-
ive in January, conclusion of the U.S.–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agree-
ment and the opening of the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange in July and
the visit of President Bill Clinton in November.7 Given the recent decline
in foreign investment, the new Enterprise Law encouraged the private
sector by reducing bureaucratic obstacles thwarting domestic investment.
By year-end, 12,000 enterprises had registered under the new law, an
exponential increase over the 600 registered in 1995–8.8
The Bilateral Trade Agreement opened the way for Normal Trading
Relations with the United States which would give Vietnamese goods
access to the U.S. market under the same low tariffs accorded other
nations enjoying the same trading status. In so doing, it increased
Vietnam’s attractiveness to foreign as well as domestic investors.9 In creat-
ing a marketplace for investment capital, the stock exchange marked an
important step in the development of a market economy.10 The Bilateral
Trade Agreement and the creation of a bourse, together with President
Clinton’s visit, were of enormous political importance given the ideo-
logical discord prevalent within the Party, disagreement which had
delayed all three events for many years.
Long-term economic outlook
Longer term, the ten-year socioeconomic strategy adopted by the Ninth
Party Congress in April 2001 set ambitious targets for the 2001–10 period.
The goal of the long-term strategy was to lead Vietnam out of underdevel-
opment, laying the foundations for a modern, industrialized country by
2020. To accomplish this goal, GDP in 2010 was targeted to double that of
2000 while the share of agricultural employment was to drop from 66
percent to around 50 percent. Investment was set to increase to 30 percent
of GDP, and exports were targeted to grow at more than twice the rate of
GDP growth. As a first step, the goal for annual GDP growth over the
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coming five years (2001–5) was set at 7.5 percent, a target which proved
optimistic. The ten-year plan recognized that Vietnam would have to
restructure its economy to make it more competitive, focusing on modern-
ization and industrialization, together with the development of a multi-
sector economy. Related targets included improvements in education, the
maintenance of social and political stability and a strong national
defense.11
Despite the global recession which began in late 2000, Vietnam experi-
enced relatively strong GDP growth in 2001–3, averaging 6.4 percent. Vig-
orous growth of 7.1 percent in 2003, making Vietnam the fastest growing
economy in Asia after China, was supported by strong investment and
private consumption. Domestic demand grew by 9.4 percent and total
investment by 15.8 percent. Strong domestic demand pushed up imports,
widening the trade deficit from $1.3 billion in 2002 to $3.38 billion in 2003.
The strong growth in imports was the product of higher demand from
industry for capital and intermediate goods and of preparations for the
Southeast Asian Games held in Vietnam in December 2003. A liberaliza-
tion of import restrictions also spurred imports. The current account
deficit in 2003 was double the previous year but manageable due to inflows
from foreign direct investment, international aid and remittances from
overseas Vietnamese. The industrial sector grew a robust 9.6 percent with
the nonstate subsector growing 18.7 percent. The continuing strong devel-
opment of the private sector was largely the result of an improved business
environment. Initial outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and avian influenza (bird flu) were generally well managed by the
government although a fresh outbreak of avian influenza in early 2005
prompted Hanoi to appeal for international assistance in containing its
spread. Buoyed by improvements in the business sector and the recovery
of external demand, the overall outlook for the Vietnamese economy
remained positive.12
That said, Vietnam had clearly entered a new phase of economic devel-
opment. Successful implementation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement,
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), commitments to the
ASEAN Free Trade Area to 2005 and to China’s free trade arrangements
with ASEAN to 2010, collectively generated new challenges for the Viet-
namese economy. Hanoi’s pledges to this potpourri of regional groups,
donor agencies and international organizations, in effect, constituted a
road map for the ongoing liberalization of the country. To remain
competitive, Vietnam would have to maintain – or accelerate – reform
momentum in a variety of familiar areas, including state enterprise reform,
land use rights, access to capital markets, private sector development,
banking reform and business and trade liberalization. In so doing, the
Vietnamese leadership would have to adapt to an evolving policy-making
environment in which economic policy decisions, in particular, were driven
increasingly by external as well as internal dynamics.13
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Political reform fails to keep pace
As it approached the new millennium, the Vietnamese Communist Party
faced daunting challenges in reconciling competing political interests with
deepening economic reforms. A wholesale housecleaning appeared in
order in the wake of rural unrest caused by local cadre abuse, several
banking and smuggling scandals involving state and Party officials and a
front-page commentary by former Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, sug-
gesting the people had lost faith in the Party. At the end of the second
session of the sixth plenum in February 1999, Party General Secretary Le
Kha Phieu launched a three-year “criticism and self-criticism” campaign to
restore unity and rid the Party of “bad elements.” Calling on the 2.3
million members of the Communist Party to declare private assets, the
campaign also included injunctions against the use of official positions for
private gain, deviation from the Party line, and in some cases, participation
in private business. In addition to rooting out corruption, the campaign
aimed to return unity and discipline to a Party torn by dissension and
internecine struggle. As part of the campaign, the Party in November 1999
announced a number of leadership changes, including removal of several
senior Party officials for mismanagement or corruption.14
As the Ninth Party Congress, scheduled for early 2001, approached, the
stewardship of General Secretary Phieu was severely tested by ongoing
rural unrest, the aftershocks of the Asian financial crisis and the continu-
ing influence of old guard political leaders. In October 2000, Do Muoi, Le
Duc Anh and Vo Van Kiet sent a joint letter to the Central Committee,
criticizing Phieu for weak leadership, failure to revive the stagnant
economy and inability to root out corruption in the Party. He was also
charged with anti-democratic behavior on the grounds he aspired to be
both Party leader and state president and with nepotism due to his
appointment of cronies from his native Thanh Hoa province. Finally,
Phieu was accused of pursuing an overly pro-China foreign policy to the
extent of ordering concessions in talks to delineate the maritime boundary
in the Gulf of Tonkin.15
In February 2001, large-scale demonstrations involving thousands of
ethnic minorities broke out in the Central Highlands. The demonstrators
protested local government corruption, the appropriation of ancestral
lands by ethnic Vietnamese settlers, lack of religious freedoms and denial
of basic rights, including education in native languages. A few protestors
also called for independence for the Central Highlands region. The
demonstrations were expected to fuel growing discontent with Phieu’s
leadership; however, he skillfully used them to rally his supporters,
arguing now was not the time for a potentially destabilizing leadership
change. In response, the Politburo in early April 2001 voted 12 to six to
recommend his reappointment, but the Central Committee soon over-
turned their recommendation. By this time, Phieu was also facing charges
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he had misused the military intelligence services to conduct wiretaps on
fellow Politburo members. The Central Committee later reprimanded
both the minister of defense and the chief of the general staff for their
roles in the affair.16
The leadership issue was finally resolved during the Ninth Party Con-
gress which met in late April 2001. Nong Duc Manh, chairman of the
National Assembly and a member of the Tay ethnic minority, replaced
Phieu as Party head. The congress also reduced the size of the Central
Committee from 170 to 150 members with the Politburo reduced from 19
to 15 members. The new Central Committee was largely composed of
incumbent officials holding posts in the central government or provincial
administrations. Military representation on the Central Committee
increased slightly but dropped on the Politburo from three members to
one. While some observers viewed the changes as suggesting a decrease in
the influence of the military, the relative size of the military-security camp,
when military and police members were counted together, actually
increased given the reduction in size of the Central Committee and Polit-
buro. The Ninth Party Congress also abolished the Politburo Standing
Board, replacing it with a Secretariat. With the former body appointed by
the Politburo and the latter elected by the Central Committee, this change
represented a concession to supporters of internal Party democracy. Con-
gress also dropped the position of advisor to the Central Committee,
effectively eliminating the behind-the-scenes influence of retired senior
officials.17
Immediately after the Ninth Congress, newly appointed General
Secretary Manh instituted several leadership changes, including new
appointments to the Central Committee’s departments of ideology and
culture, organization and internal security. He also initiated a series of
new policies, emphasizing that policy implementation would be strength-
ened through a more proactive Politburo and the use of Party committees
within the state apparatus. Thereafter, Manh emphasized six areas: leader-
ship, economic development, state enterprise reform, party-building,
redress of ethnic grievances and constitutional reform. Continuing the
fight against corruption and the campaign for party-building, he pressed
for implementation of Politburo Directive 03-CT/TW, requiring all state
and Party officials to disclose their assets. Manh also pushed to give a legal
basis to the changes to economic development and political renovation
adopted by the Ninth Congress. The Central Committee responded in
early November 2001, approving alterations to the 1992 electoral law and
32 amendments to the 1992 constitution. Most of the constitutional
amendments subsequently adopted by the National Assembly simply
reflected the realities of what the Political Report of the Ninth Party Con-
gress had termed Vietnam’s “socialist oriented market economy.”18
Vietnamese authorities responded to the February 2001 demonstrations
in the Central Highlands by dispatching police and military units to restore
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order. Several alleged ringleaders were arrested and tried later in the year.
Initial reports blamed “hostile external forces” for the violence, but it was
soon clear to Party leaders that the real cause was encroachment on ances-
tral forest homelands by lowland settlers in collusion with corrupt local
officials. Restrictions on freedom of worship were also a volatile local
issue. General Secretary Manh personally addressed ethnic minority griev-
ances, visiting the three affected provinces in September 2001. He ordered
increased educational opportunities for ethnic minorities, together with
their increased recruitment into government service. While Manh’s per-
sonal approach appeared to mark a welcome change in official policy,
Vietnam’s minorities continued to suffer from a mixture of land, religious
and ethnic grievances. Government confiscation of land continued after
2001 as did persecution of highland Christians and suspected supporters of
the U.S.-based Montagnard Foundation, Inc., an indigenous rights organi-
zation. In April 2004, coordinated demonstrations again took place in the
Central Highlands to protest long-standing issues of land and religious
freedoms together with three years of restrictions on freedom of move-
ment, communication and religious practice.19
National Assembly elections were held in May 2002, the third round of
national elections since the 1992 election reforms. The revised candidate
selection process placed a premium on formal qualifications and ethical
probity, and prospective candidates for the first time were required to
declare their assets. While a record 762 candidates were certified as eli-
gible to run, this total translated into a low 1.5:1 candidate to seat ratio in
the 500 seat National Assembly. After three candidates were disqualified
on the eve of the election, the Standing Committee of the National
Assembly took the unprecedented step of reducing the number of
deputies to be elected from 500 to 498 in order to comply with a 1992 law
requiring all seats to be contested. Despite early enthusiasm for candidates
from ethnic minorities and the private sector, as well as non-Party affili-
ated individuals, the results of the election were disappointing in their
sameness. The number of non-Party deputies declined from 14.7 percent
to 10.2 percent, and only 14 seats were represented by the private sector.
Female delegates increased by a mere one percent taking the total to 27.3
percent. Of 161 self-nominated candidates, only two won seats. The
incoming delegates faced the daunting task of clearing a substantial
backlog from the outgoing legislature as well as bringing Vietnam’s laws
into compliance with the bilateral trade agreement concluded with the
United States.20
Reorganization, repression and reform in Vietnam
Following the National Assembly elections, the Vietnamese government
reorganized into 26 ministries and 13 agencies. The revised structure
included four new ministries and 15 new ministers, including five deputy
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ministers who were promoted. In an unusual step, the National Assembly
challenged the creation of the four new ministries, arguing they over-
lapped existing bodies at a time when the government should be reducing
and not expanding the size of the bureaucracy. While the restructure even-
tually proceeded, Prime Minister Khai was tasked with reporting back to
the assembly as to how the government would prevent overlap between
existing and new ministries.21
The now infamous Nam Cam scandal began with the arrest in mid-
December 2001 of crime boss Truong Van Cam, known as Nam Cam, on
ten charges, including drug-trafficking, extortion, fraud, gambling, prosti-
tution and murder. The ensuing police investigation revealed an organized
crime network stretching from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City and involving
more than 150 people, including senior Party and state officials. Nam
Cam’s political ties in Ho Chi Minh City alone were sufficiently strong that
outside police forces were brought in to arrest him. The octopus-like
extent of his criminal activities combined with his high-level political con-
nections to arouse intense public interest in the case. Widespread media
coverage soon drew a sharp rebuke from the Communist Party which
complained the popular press was not executing the principle of “follow-
ing the Party’s leadership.” The Party expelled 22 members from the Ho
Chi Minh City organization in August 2002, and a total of 155 persons
were subsequently indicted in November. Politburo and Central Commit-
tee members suffered collateral damage due to their alleged involvement
in widespread corruption; however, the Party leadership took steps to
ensure no member of the political elite was adversely affected. Nam Cam
and five accomplices were later sentenced to death in June 2003 with five
other defendants sentenced to life in prison and dozens of others receiving
shorter sentences.22
As the Party wrestled with the corruption issue, it continued to harass
its critics, most especially a new breed of political activist – the cyber dissi-
dent. At least six cyber dissidents were arrested in 2002 for posting
information on the Internet considered illegal by the regime. For example,
Nguyen Khac Toan was arrested in January for posting pro-democracy
material on the Internet and later sentenced to 12 years in jail followed by
three years house arrest. Tran Khue was detained in March 2002 and
placed under house arrest for posting on the Internet an open letter to
Chinese President Jiang Zemin in which Khue criticized the 1999
Sino–Vietnamese land border settlement. Police then raided the home of
Nguyen Vu Binh in July 2002, downloading his computer files and reading
personal documents after he took part in a BBC interview series on promi-
nent dissidents and provided written testimony to a U.S. Congressional
Human Rights caucus.23
Reflecting official concern with cyber dissidents, Prime Minister Khai
ordered a nationwide inspection of Internet access in mid-2002. The Min-
istry of Culture and Information later announced plans to tighten Internet
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controls, including reinforcement of firewalls to block material threatening
national security. In June 2004, Vietnam directed Internet-cafe operators
to monitor and record the websites visited by users. Vietnamese attempts
to control the Internet mirrored Chinese restrictions on the medium,
which were among the most invasive in the world, and contradicted the
goal of the sixth plenum to use information technology to spur economic
development. International bodies like Human Rights Watch also
reported a deterioration in the treatment of other Vietnamese dissidents
in 2003–4, including Buddhists, political dissidents and ethnic minority
Christians.24
Assuming office after a period of drift and discontent, General Secret-
ary Manh championed the fight against “negative phenomena” like red
tape, corruption and wastage at state agencies. At the seventh plenum of
the Party Central Committee, for example, Manh emphasized:
Exemplary acts shown by Party officials and members, government
employees and their families are of important significance toward the
fight against corruption and negative phenomena. It is also necessary
to show a strong resolve to effectively combat corruption and negative
phenomena, considering this a top criterion to examine the qualifica-
tions of each Party official and member as well as government
employee, especially the head of each office and organization.25
Nevertheless, the campaign against corruption was notably less successful
than the campaign against political dissent. Corruption was endemic and
touched the highest levels of the state. In June 2004, for example, the
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development was sacked over sus-
pected links to a massive embezzlement case; and in October 2004, the
chairman of the management board of the National Shipping Lines was
dismissed for illegal authorization of petroleum contracts. Although
government efforts to curb graft evidenced some success in 2005, most
observers agreed eliminating corruption among Vietnamese officials
would require far-reaching changes in the transparency of government
decision making and the accountability of public officials.
General Secretary Manh successfully advanced the socioeconomic strat-
egy outlined by the Fifth Party Congress, approaching most of the goals in
the Five-Year Plan (2001–5). He also improved the capacity of the Party
and state to establish and implement public policy under the rubric of
“party-building” and the creation of a “law governed state.” As part of
this effort, he worked to make Party officials more accountable. For
example, the Party in early 2003 introduced new regulations for its key
organizations in an effort to institutionalize what was morally acceptable
behavior for top Party members. The Central Committee and not the
Politburo made the rules, signaling a recognition that authority must come
from the larger Central Committee as opposed to the smaller Politburo.
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Another reform in governance involved the rotation of senior officials
within the bureaucracy to broaden their experience.26
At the same time, it must be recognized that Manh’s efforts to create a
“law governed state” were not necessarily steps in the direction of political
liberalization. Intent on maintaining the Party in power, not bringing
about its demise, Manh repeatedly stressed the close relationship between
political stability and economic development.
We should know clearly the relationship between stability and devel-
opment; socio-political stability serves as the precedent for socio-
economic development while socio-economic development is the
condition for stabilizing socio-political life. Up to now, our country
has maintained political stability, but in some places, the situation
sometimes became complicated with hidden factors possibly causing
instability, that cannot be ignored. At the same time, hostile forces
have time and again sought ways to distort, slander, incite and sow the
seeds of division among religious sects, the nation and the all-people
unity.27
The Vietnamese Communist Party in the new millennium executed a care-
fully paced program of political reform in which the Vietnamese people
increasingly enjoyed a limited array of personal freedoms; however, ques-
tioning Party rule or assembling to challenge authority were still prohib-
ited. The Party continued to rule the country through the traditional
structure of Party cells and Party committees with little real change in the
political system inherited from the past.28
Foreign relations
Sino-Vietnamese relations outstripped all others in this period in terms of
bilateral exchanges between Party, state and military officials. Vietnam
and China reached a comprehensive agreement on their land boundary in
late December 1999, delineating their 1,300km land frontier. The Bac Bo
Gulf treaty, completed one year later, delineated their maritime boundary
in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, rival claims over the Spratly and Paracel
islands remained unresolved. The Ninth Party Congress in April 2002
endorsed plans to build logistical bases and resettle people on the islands
as part of Vietnam’s economic and defense strategy. In a March 2002 visit
to Vietnam, Chinese President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin
stressed the “Chinese and Vietnamese people have the same ideology”
and called for increased bilateral economic ties. Consistent with this think-
ing, at least ten high-level exchanges at the Politburo and Central Commit-
tee levels took place in 2003 tying the two states in a web of relations,
ranging from border demarcation to trade and investment to ideological
cooperation. At the same time, Vietnam boosted its economic ties with
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Taiwan, the number one investor in Vietnam in 2003, whereas China
ranked seventeenth. In April 2004, a boatload of 100 Vietnamese tourists
sailed on an inaugural voyage to the disputed Spratly Islands despite
strong Chinese protests. To promote responsible management of water
resources in the Greater Mekong Basin, Vietnam later proposed a so-
called “friendly” amendment at the November 2004 World Conservation
Congress which suggested construction of hydropower dams on the
Mekong mainstream require the prior agreement of all countries in the
region. The wording of the amendment upset China which denied its
upstream dams had depleted water levels in the river.29
Following years of confidence-building, Vietnamese relations with
Thailand began to improve with officials from both states regularly
exchanging visits. Thai authorities were especially interested in Viet-
namese progress towards construction of the East–West Corridor project,
a network of roads linking central Vietnam with Laos and Thailand. Thai
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra visited Vietnam in April 2001 and
returned in February 2004 to participate in the first joint-cabinet meeting
between the two governments. A variety of issues were discussed, includ-
ing cooperation on narcotics, exchanges among military academies and
extradition matters. Thai investors expressed interest in Vietnamese
mining, and the Thai government invited Vietnamese enterprises to invest
in its energy sector. During the meeting, representatives of Thailand and
Vietnam signed two agreements, a Joint Statement on Thailand–Vietnam
Cooperation in the First Decade of the 21st Century and a Framework
Agreement on Economic Cooperation. The first document outlined the
general direction of future relations and established a joint consultation
mechanism, co-chaired by their respective foreign ministers, to review
implementation of cooperative programs. The second pact identified six
areas of economic cooperation comprising trade, investment, finance,
infrastructure development, energy and human resource development.
Thailand in mid-2004 ranked ninth among foreign investors in Vietnam,
and it was the second-leading ASEAN investor after Singapore.30
Following ethnic demonstrations in the Central Highlands of Vietnam,
relations with Cambodia were turbulent in 2001. The arrest of 24 asylum
seekers in Mondolkiri province drew attention to the anti-Hanoi FULRO
(United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races) movement whose
members were active in the dense forests along the Cambodia–Vietnam
border. Cambodia initially agreed to treat the asylum seekers as refugees
and to repatriate them to Vietnam. Under pressure from human rights
groups and the United States, it later reversed this decision, to the chagrin
of Hanoi, and permitted them to leave for the United States where they
were granted refugee status by the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR). Notwithstanding this prolonged controversy, overall
relations with Cambodia remained generally good.31
Vietnam maintained traditionally strong ties with fellow travelers in
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Laos. Aspects of its close relationship with the Lao PDR resembled
China’s relationship with Vietnam in that Hanoi provided much needed
ideological succor and legitimization to the communists in Vientiane. For
example, Vietnam sent specialists to Laos in 2002 to exchange experiences
on finance and banking issues, like inflation control and exchange rate bal-
ancing; and in 2003, senior Vietnamese officials called for creation of a
trade development zone on the Lao border.32
Despite close ties with China, Vietnam looked to Russia as its principal
source of military hardware and training. In July 1999, the two allies con-
cluded a military agreement providing for comprehensive military-technical
cooperation, Vietnamese training in Russian military schools, arms supplies
and a service and repair facility in Vietnam for Russian-sourced equipment.
Prime Minister Khai later visited Russia, concluding an agreement in Sep-
tember 2000 which resolved the vexing debt issue between the two states.
Vietnam agreed to pay Russia $1.7 billion over 23 years with 10 percent in
cash and the remainder in business concessions and the provision of goods
and services. During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam,
the two sides in March 2001 concluded a strategic partnership which
involved long-term economic cooperation and arms sales. The agreement
was later devalued when Russia announced in October that it planned to
withdraw the last of its military forces from Cam Ranh Bay in early 2002.
General Secretary Manh visited Russia in October 2002, and Vietnam con-
tinued to purchase Russian weaponry, ordering two air defense batteries in
September 2003 at a cost of $300 million.33
Japan remained a major donor to Vietnam as well as its largest overall
investor. The cumulative disbursed value of Japanese investment in
Vietnam in 1988–2003 approximated $4 billion. In November 2003, the
two countries concluded a landmark pact which guaranteed Most Favored
Nation treatment to investors in both states. The agreement was highly
significant because Japanese investment in Vietnam, which was very
strong in 1992–7, dropped off sharply in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis when regional competition to attract Japanese investment intensi-
fied. Representatives of Japan and Vietnam also signed a Joint Initiative in
December 2003, an agreement designed to facilitate investment in
Vietnam. In the initiative, Hanoi pledged to take a number of steps to
improve its investment climate, such as developing a strategic plan,
improving local infrastructure and easing investment rules and
regulations.34
Bilateral relations with the United States reached a new level in March
2000 when William Cohen became the first U.S. secretary of defense to
visit Vietnam since the end of the Second Indochina War. The conclusion
of the Bilateral Trade Agreement in July set the stage for a November
2000 visit by President Bill Clinton, the first visit to Vietnam by a U.S.
president since 1969. Unfortunately, Clinton’s meeting with General
Secretary Phieu proved a stilted affair in which Phieu lectured his guest,
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condemning imperialism. Clinton responded with an extended rebuttal of
Phieu’s description of U.S. aims during the Second Indochina War. Phieu’s
comments played well with Party conservatives, but reformers viewed his
remarks as backward and ill-advised. Responding to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Vietnam offered sym-
pathy and condemned terrorism but warned against a counterproductive
U.S. reaction. Vietnam and the United States in October 2003 agreed to
resume direct air service; and a U.S. warship visited Ho Chi Minh City in
November 2003. Following a trip to Washington by Vietnamese Defense
Minister Pham Van Tra, a visit which marked a new stage in U.S.–
Vietnamese security relations, Admiral Thomas Fargo, head of the U.S.
Pacific Command, visited Danang in February 2004. In mid-November
2004, the first commercial U.S. airliner to fly to Vietnam since the end of
the Second Indochina War landed in Ho Chi Minh City.35
Ratification of the Bilateral Trade Agreement set the stage for Vietnam
to be accorded Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status with U.S. tariffs
dropping from around 40 percent to 5 percent. In 2002, the first full year of
implementation, Vietnamese exports to the United States more than
doubled to $2.4 billion, almost doubling again in 2003. Nonetheless, bilat-
eral trade relations were not without their problems. Vietnamese fish
farmers were furious when the U.S. Department of Commerce in June
2003 ruled catfish imports from Vietnam would be subject to anti-dumping
duties of 45–64 percent. In the wake of the catfish ruling, the Southern
Shrimp Alliance, a coalition of U.S. shrimp producers, lodged a similar
anti-dumping petition against six shrimp producing countries, including
Vietnam. Washington responded in early July 2004, announcing it would
impose preliminary tariffs in the range of 12–20 percent on Vietnamese
shrimp imports, applying much lower, company-specific tariffs in Novem-
ber. A garment and textile pact between the United States and Vietnam in
April 2003 also set quotas on Vietnamese imports, and Vietnamese manu-
facturers faced additional quotas following charges Chinese-made gar-
ments were being trans-shipped through Vietnam to the United States.
The end of the Multifiber Agreement among World Trade Organization
members in 2005 left Vietnam, not yet a WTO member, shackled by
export quotas under its bilateral trade agreement with the United States.
On a more positive note, the U.S. government in June 2004 designated
Vietnam a “focus nation” in the global fight against HIV/AIDS, making it
eligible for special funding to combat the scourge. Ongoing talks on trade
and investment issues, together with preparations for a U.S.–Vietnam
summit, also provided ample opportunities for U.S. constituencies to
engage Vietnam on other issues of concern like human rights, religious
freedom and labor rights.36
Vietnam assumed in July 2000 the rotating chairmanship of the
ASEAN Standing Committee which contributed to Hanoi’s image as an
active ASEAN member even though the organization’s flexible agenda
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made few demands on Vietnamese diplomacy. In the role of chairman,
Vietnam hosted the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting, Thirty-Fourth
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Eighth ASEAN Regional Forum,
Fourth ASEAN Plus Three Meeting and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial
Conference. Hosting these meetings enhanced Vietnam’s position in the
international arena and increased ASEAN’s confidence in Vietnam’s
future. Vietnam also took advantage of its temporary chairmanship to
shunt aside the constructive engagement approach advocated by Thailand,
and it stood firm on the principle of noninterference, steadfastly defending
the policy against international pressure. Vietnam hosted a regional con-
ference on immigration in September 2003, calling on ASEAN to establish
the framework necessary to achieve visa-free travel within the ASEAN
states by 2005. In a four-nation mini-summit on the eve of the November
2004 ASEAN meeting in Vientiane, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
later agreed to explore the idea of issuing single-entry visas valid for travel
within their four states.37
Severe crisis in Laos
The aftershocks of the Asian financial crisis hit Laos like a tsunami. With
the Lao economy heavily oriented toward Thailand, the sharp drop in the
value of the Thai baht produced an even sharper drop in the value of the
Lao kip, causing hyperinflation and skyrocketing prices for imported
goods. Inflation exceeded 90 percent in 1998 and approached 130 percent
in 1999. The quasi-insolvent condition of state-owned domestic banks,
where nonperforming loans from state enterprises and others constituted
around 60 percent of total loans, contributed to the sharp deterioration in
the kip. Lao exports also fell off sharply and foreign investment evapo-
rated, contributing to mounting balance of payment and debt repayment
problems.38
Faced with a severe crisis, the gerontocratic leadership of the Lao
People’s Revolutionary Party proved incapable of a decisive response.
With seven of the nine members of the Politburo sharing military back-
grounds and little formal education, their policy priorities remained
preservation of both the Party’s political power monopoly and the influ-
ence of the army. When Western governments and international lending
agencies called on Laos to accelerate economic reforms and improve
macroeconomic management, Lao authorities turned to Vietnam and
China for counsel and guidance. At least four high-level Party exchanges
with Vietnam and two with China took place in 1999. It was only toward
the end of the year that the Lao PDR began to introduce remedial meas-
ures to strengthen the economy.39
Macroeconomic conditions improved in 2000 when Laos regained some
control over fiscal policy and instituted a tighter monetary policy. Real
GDP rose by 5.5 percent as both imports and exports expanded. Increased
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tax revenues and reduced public expenditures were central components of
improved fiscal policy, but expenditure reductions came largely from the
social sectors which threatened longer term growth. The central bank
improved its control of the money supply, restricting the credit policy of
state-owned commercial banks and increasing the sale of treasury bills to
absorb excess liquidity. The improved macroeconomic stance contributed
to a significant decrease in the budget deficit which reduced both mone-
tary financing of the deficit and the inflation rate. Inflation declined
steadily after late 1999, dropping to around 23 percent in 2000. Neverthe-
less, the rate of inflation rate remained much higher than that of the Lao
PDR’s major trading partners which meant the kip would again have to be
depreciated.40
Measured recovery, worrying trends
The Lao economy continued its recovery in 2001–4. In a September 2003
address to the National Assembly, Prime Minister Bounnyang Vorachit
described the overall macroeconomic situation as stable and on track for
development. On the negative side, President Saman Vignaket highlighted
weaknesses in government administration, low production rates, corrup-
tion, illegal trade, drug trafficking and an inefficient use of overseas loans,
grants and investment. GDP growth in 2003 was 5.9 percent, similar to
growth rates in the previous two years. The overall budget deficit, financed
mostly by grants and external concessional loans, was 7.8 percent of GDP
in fiscal year 2003, an improvement over the previous year but still over
target. Revenue mobilization remained a major and worsening problem,
but expenditure control improved. The rate of inflation, averaging 15.5
percent in 2003, was one of the highest in the region. The merchandise
trade deficit narrowed to approximately $135 million, continuing a trend
evident for several years. While foreign direct investment increased only
slightly, approvals increased sharply, raising hopes FDI might return to the
higher levels last seen five years ago.41
On the other hand, the future of Laos’s most ambitious development
project, the controversial 1,070 megawatt (MW) Nam Theun 2 hydroelec-
tric power station, continued in doubt. After the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) agreed to buy its electricity, a dispute
arose over the terms of the purchase agreement, delaying finance for the
project. Nam Theun 2 was challenged on several grounds, including Thai-
land’s future power needs and the threatened environmental con-
sequences of the project. It was only in November 2003 that EGAT finally
agreed to buy 995 MW over 25 years beginning in 2009, and Electricité du
Laos agreed to take the remaining 75 MW. Even with the purchase agree-
ment concluded, the project remained contingent on a partial risk guaran-
tee from the World Bank which would open the door to financing from the
Asian Development Bank and other international sources.42
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At the same time, many aspects of the Lao economy, together with the
government’s management of the economy, evidenced worrying trends. A
report published in January 2002 by Focus on the Global South, a
Bangkok-based policy research group, highlighted the negative impact
centralized decision making had on public policy communication and
implementation.
The current political culture in the Lao PDR is not conducive to
formal public debate about macro level policies. Members of the
general public and even government officials at mid and lower levels
are often unfamiliar with macro development concepts and therefore
unconfident in their abilities to engage meaningfully in national plan-
ning processes. When policies are put in the public realm, there is little
space for dissent, and even fewer channels by which the views and
concerns of local civil society can be fed back into the policy develop-
ment process. So much for World Bank speak about the poor becom-
ing “active participants.”43
Moreover, the Lao PDR had yet to carry out comprehensive structural
reforms. The state banking system clearly required additional reforms to
put it on a commercially sound basis. And the government continued to
subsidize state enterprises when they needed to be restructured to reduce
nonperforming loans, a move which would complement banking reforms.
Interventionist policies prevented free market forces from reaching their
full potential, and some government policies were counterproductive.
When international lending agencies encouraged Laos to increase revenue
collection, for example, it raised tariffs on imported goods which con-
tributed to inflationary pressures and increased smuggling. Laos also suf-
fered from mismanagement of foreign aid and often failed to achieve
macroeconomic targets. The total external debt stood at approximately $3
billion or around 150 percent of GDP and continued to grow. While this
was a significant debt burden, more than half the total was owed to Russia
which agreed in June 2003 to write-off 70 percent and to service the
remainder over 33 years.44
The dual nature of the Lao economy also continued, and in some ways,
worsened. As economist Yves Bourdet observed, “the spatial dimension
of growth is a critical factor in the development of regional economic dis-
parities that can exacerbate social, ethnic, and political tensions.” National
income in Laos had long been distributed unevenly among provinces and
different types of households. And the economic reforms introduced in
the 1990s exacerbated widening provincial income disparities as well as
those between urban and rural areas.45
Finally and most disappointing, Laos continued to be heavily depend-
ent on foreign aid. In the previous decade, official development assistance
had increased to the point it represented around 20 percent of GDP. At
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the same time, the composition of international aid shifted with grants
accounting for an increasingly smaller share and loans a larger one.
Among other things, this change in aid composition had important ramifi-
cations for the future growth of external debt, threatening creation of yet
another debt-strapped Third World state. The concentration of aid
dependency in a few sectors, like communications, public health, trans-
portation and social welfare, also had important, albeit unclear, implica-
tions. The Asian Development Bank remained the principal source of
external assistance. Other donors included Australia, Belgium, the Euro-
pean Union, France, Germany, the International Monetary Fund, Japan,
South Korea, Sweden, the United Nations Development Program, the
United States and Vietnam.46
Professor Hans Luther, an informal adviser to the Lao government for
many years, emphasized the downside of foreign aid dependence in a June
2003 interview as he prepared to return to Germany after a decade at the
National School of Administration in Vientiane.
Foreign aid is like a drug. You want more and more of it because it
makes development much easier for you. Instead of putting up your
own money for building roads and repairing them, you get rich for-
eigners to do it for you. There are also kickbacks and all kinds of
benefits. It is the easy way out in economic development. Now what
should a poor country like Laos do? They should be modest and have
some clear priorities. But most opt for foreign aid as it seems to
promise everything at the same time.
But people forget that with foreign aid, one does not necessarily
have ownership. There are grants but also loans which have to be paid
back. During the time I have been here the amount of foreign aid con-
tributed to the national budget has doubled.
Therefore, it can in fact be shown that this country is increasing its
dependence on foreign aid. Aid is not creating sustainable economic
growth, only aid-induced growth.47
Discontent and infighting in Laos
The aftershocks of the Asian financial crisis precipitated both leadership
changes and an unprecedented anti-government demonstration in Vien-
tiane. Lao President Khamtay Siphandone in August 1999 dismissed the
finance minister and the central bank governor after the latter admitted
efforts to combat inflation were “not entirely successful.” Amid persistent
reports the finance ministry and central bank disagreed over how to deal
with the ailing economy, informed observers agreed the dismissals were
the result of mismanagement of banking and fiscal policies. Seven weeks
later, police arrested several Lao students and teachers in front of
the presidential office where they were protesting the failure of the
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government to address the country’s economic problems. A brochure dis-
tributed by the students made nine demands, including resignation of the
government, dissolution of the National Assembly and conduct of free and
fair elections. The students also demanded the release of all political pris-
oners, amnesty for Lao exiles and dialog with opposition groups. While
not the first challenge to the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, this was
the first broad-based civil movement involving students, teachers and
other professionals dissatisfied with government policy. In the week
following the unprecedented public protest, police jailed an additional 25
students implicated in the affair.48
The October 1999 protests marked the beginning of an extended cam-
paign of opposition to LPRP rule which included a wave of mysterious
bombings. In mid-February 2000, Prince Soulivang Savang, Crown Prince
of Laos and heir to the throne, held a press conference in which he raised
his resistance profile, calling for assistance in dismantling the communist
regime. The prince’s grandfather, grandmother and father died in “reedu-
cation camps” after being imprisoned by the communists. Throughout the
spring, ethnic Hmong rebels staged hit-and-run attacks in central Laos,
prompting foreign embassies to issue warnings against travel in remote
areas. In early April, more than a dozen people, including several Western
tourists, were injured when a bomb exploded in a popular Vientiane
restaurant. The deteriorating security situation prompted Prince Soulivang
Savang to issue a press release in late April calling on the United Nations
to appoint a special commission to investigate the status of human rights in
Laos and the location and condition of all political prisoners. It also
prompted the Vietnamese government to dispatch troops and military
equipment to Laos to assist the government in putting down the unrest.49
The bombing campaign continued throughout 2000, including attacks in
Vientiane on the central post office in August and the international airport
in November. Another large explosion rocked Vientiane in mid-Decem-
ber, only hours before an ASEAN-EU ministerial conference was set to
convene. Termed “an event of great significance” by Prime Minister Sisa-
vath Keobounphanh, the conference was the largest international gather-
ing hosted to that time by the Lao government. Sporadic guerrilla raids
also continued throughout the year, including the brief occupation of a
border post in early July where rebels raised the royal flag on Lao soil for
the first time in almost 25 years. In between periods of denial, the govern-
ment alternatively blamed the attacks on exiled royalists or foreign-based
Hmong led by the former resistance leader, General Vang Pao.50
The government responded by cracking down on domestic opposition,
imposing an informal curfew in Vientiane in September 2000. It also
banned Internet use for anti-government activity, promising to prosecute
or expel violators. Aimed at Lao citizens accessing websites created by
Lao exiles, the new rules prohibited use of the Internet in the “wrong
way” by “lying, deceiving or persuading people inside or outside the
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country to protest against the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party and the
government.” In mid-November 2000, a little more than one year after the
abortive student protest in Vientiane, 15 people were arrested in Cham-
passack province after more than 200 students and civil servants staged a
pro-democracy rally. Regime credibility suffered yet another blow in late
2000 when it was confirmed that Khamsai Souphanouvong, son of the Lao
PDR’s first president, had been granted political asylum in New Zealand.51
The year-long opposition campaign did not pose a serious threat to
Party rule, but it raised questions about the legitimacy of the leadership
elected at the Sixth Party Congress. The 1996 congress represented a clear
setback for reform advocates as it strengthened the power of the Party
faction opposed to far-reaching reform. The inability of the government to
deal effectively with the regional financial crisis and the outbreak of
opposition combined to raise new questions about Old Guard leadership.
In a stubborn display of normalcy, the Party celebrated the twenty-fifth
anniversary of its rise to power in December 2000, four months after the
fact and amid very heavy security. A highlight of the celebrations was the
inauguration of a multi-million dollar museum memorial to veteran com-
munist leader Kaysone Phomvihane, yet another milestone in the person-
ality cult still being constructed eight years after his death. With Kaysone a
trusted Hanoi protégé and ally, Vietnam paid half the memorial construc-
tion costs and contributed many of the photographs and documents on
display.52
According to a widely read article in the Far Eastern Economic Review
written by Bertil Lintner and Shawn Crispin, two well-respected journal-
ists, dissension within the Party reflected three overlapping conflicts
between older and younger members, pro-Vietnamese and pro-Chinese
factions and northern and southern provinces. The article also suggested
the bombing campaign was the product of internecine struggle within the
Party and not the result of opposition groups. Others disputed both the
genesis of the intra-Party struggle and the instigators of the bombing cam-
paign. Lao expert Grant Evans, for example, suggested the bombing cam-
paign was conducted by anarchists opposed to the existing system. The
principal representatives of the Old Guard, which constituted a majority in
the Party, included President Khamtay Siphandone, Prime Minister Sisa-
vath Keobounphanh and Defense Minister Choummaly Sayasone. Foreign
Minister Somsavat Lengsawat, an ethnic Chinese from Luang Prabang
province in northern Laos, was the main proponent of the relatively more
progressive group opposing them.53
Confessions but no concessions
Following months of careful preparation, the Seventh Party Congress
opened in Vientiane in March 2001. The 452 delegates to the congress
represented approximately 100,000 Party members or roughly 2 percent of
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the total population. Representatives from the remaining communist
states – China, Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam – as well as neighboring
countries were also on hand. Preceded by months of intense, secret talks
among the Party’s senior leadership, the congress itself lasted only three
days. It was held amid very tight security measures, given the bombing
campaign that had rocked the capital for more than a year.54
Veteran Lao watcher Bourdet captured the spirit of the Seventh Party
Congress when he styled it “confessions without concessions.” In an effort
to conciliate the younger generation, the congress ratified cosmetic
changes to the composition of both the Politburo and Central Committee.
To placate an international donor community financing some 80 percent of
Lao development expenditures, it also adopted vague statements promis-
ing market-friendly economic reforms and improved governance.
Nonetheless, the Old Guard retained its grip on power with State Presid-
ent Khamtay Siphandone continuing as General Secretary of the Party.
Seven of the remaining eight members of the Politburo also retained their
posts with only the ninth member, deceased Vice President Oudom Khat-
tigna, being replaced. Two seats were added to the Politburo, bringing the
total to eleven; however, this change reflected a desire to give the top
leadership a younger look as opposed to signaling ideological renewal.
Two of the three new Politburo members were educated in Vietnam and
the Soviet Union while the third was the military chief of staff. Central
Committee membership was also expanded from 49 to 53 seats to add
younger Party cadre, but its average age remained relatively high at 56
years.55
Elements of surrealism bordering on schizophrenia characterized the
Seventh Party Congress. The confirmation of Old Guard control of the
Party, together with a proliferation of hammer and sickle flags around
Vientiane, contrasted sharply with an implicit repudiation of communist
economics. General Secretary Khamtay referred to socialism and stated
the Party still adhered to Marxist-Leninist principles but also recognized
that corruption and a lack of trained personnel contributed to the policy
failures of the 1990s. The Party set an annual growth target of 7 percent
for 2001–5 but remained vague as to the market-oriented reforms neces-
sary to achieve this optimistic goal. The long-term objectives approved by
the congress, tripling per capita income and eliminating poverty by 2020,
were equally unrealistic. With population growth per annum running at 2.8
percent, the population would double by 2025. At the same time, the sec-
toral distribution of growth remained concentrated in industry and ser-
vices while poverty was largely a rural phenomenon and could only be
addressed by raising rural growth.56
The Lao government was reshuffled in March 2001 to reflect changes in
the Party hierarchy. Bounnyang Vorachit, a former finance minister and
number six in the Party hierarchy, replaced the aging Sisavath Keoboun-
phanh, blamed for the policy failures of the late 1990s, as prime minister.
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The elevation of Bounnyang was a compromise between the military
faction of President Khamtay and the more ideological wing of former
President Nouhak Phoumsavanh, the only living member of the initial
resistance government of 1950. Other changes included the appointment
of Soukanh Mahalath, a former central bank governor, as finance minister
and the designation of Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsawat as a deputy
prime minister. At the same time, Somsavat was not elected to the Polit-
buro; and his command of foreign policy issues appeared weakened by the
elevation of Thongloun Sisoulith, chairman of the National Assembly’s
Foreign Affairs Commission, to the Politburo. Thongloun was also named
deputy prime minister in charge of the State Planning Committee.57
Consolidating power in the one-party state
In the National Assembly elections held in February 2002, nearly a year
earlier than expected, the Party consolidated its hold on power. The elec-
tions were pulled forward to bring them in line with the Five-Year Plan
and the Eighth Party Congress in 2006 in addition to accommodating
reforms promised to donor countries. All but one of the 166 candidates
approved by the Party to contest 109 available seats were Party members
with 53 high-ranking Party incumbents, mostly members of the Politburo
and Central Committee, running for reelection. No foreign poll observers
were invited or allowed, and the foreign media was restricted to monitor-
ing only the political campaign in Vientiane. As a result, the official elec-
tion results, indicating 99.23 percent of the 2.5 million eligible voters went
to the polls, were impossible to verify but questionable in a country where
voters in remote areas might have to walk two days to reach a polling
station.58
President Khamtay carried out an unexpected cabinet reshuffle in
January 2003, changing his economic team in a bid to improve the fragile
economy. Among the changes announced, Chansy Phosikham, a former
governor of the state bank, was named finance minister; and Phoumi Thip-
phavone was moved from the commerce ministry to governor of the state
bank. The cabinet reshuffle consisted of a rotation of old power-holders,
as opposed to an injection of new blood into the system, and produced no
dramatic changes in economic policy or management.59
In February 2003, officials unveiled a statue of the legendary fourteenth
century ruler, King Fa Ngum. He ruled over the Kingdom of Lan Xang
(million elephants), an expansive empire which stretched from southern
China over much of what is now mainland Southeast Asia. The celebration
of Fa Ngum lasted four days; and according to Catherine Raymond, Direc-
tor of the Center for Burma Studies at Northern Illinois University, it
“was organized in close accord with classical descriptions of rituals for
consecrating Buddha images considered important enough to be patron-
ized by the Lao kings.” This appeal to tradition was in stark contrast to the
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harsh treatment meted out earlier to the direct descendants of the monar-
chy. Even more striking, the ruling Party sought to depict itself as the
direct descendant of a Lao monarch that had both unified the Lao people
and introduced them to Theravada Buddhism. A variety of motives were
behind this radical shift in policy. In addition to providing a new basis for
regime legitimization in a “fractiously and ethnically heterogeneous popu-
lation,” a revival of respect for the monarchy served to build bridges to the
Lao exile community. It also countered Thai cultural influence centered
on an increase in the popularity of the Thai royal family among ordinary
Lao.60
In a related effort to shore up the one-party-state’s legitimacy, the
National Assembly in May 2003 amended the constitution and brought
forward legislation, pending since September 2001, to hold municipal elec-
tions for the first time since 1975. The legislation called for pilot elections
in the four provinces of Champassak, Luang Prabang, Khammuan and
Savannakhat to be followed by municipal elections nationwide. The legis-
lation also provided for an increased measure of financial autonomy for
municipal authorities.61
As the communist regime moved to buttress its legitimacy, sporadic
ambushes, bombings and dissident acts combined to create an atmosphere
of persistent insecurity. Rebel forces mounted repeated attacks on road
transportation, especially on Route 13 between Vientiane and Luang
Prabang. In June 2003, a bus was bombed near Thakhek in the south; and
in August, another bus was attacked in northern Laos and a bomb
exploded in the capital. Additional incidents were reported in October in
Vientiane and in the southern province of Savannakhet. The perpetrators
of the attacks remained unclear with the government attributing them to
bandits while foreign diplomats ascribed them to a mixture of ethnic
minority rebels, anti-communist exiles and disaffected members of the Lao
armed forces. The Lao Citizens Movement for Democracy (LCMD)
announced in mid-July 2003 the initiation of a revolution to overthrow the
government. Allegedly representing 20 opposition groups, the LCMD
claimed to have begun military operations in 11 Lao provinces.62
Thereafter, the U.S.-based Fact Finding Committee (FFC), consisting
of anti-communist Lao exiles and their American supporters, issued a
stream of press releases, making unverifiable claims of military success
against the Lao army. Government officials admitted only that limited
fighting had broken out in a few areas while the Thai military reported
minor incidents along the border. In February 2004, the German-based
Committee for Independence and Democracy in Laos claimed respons-
ibility for small explosions in Vientiane and central Savannakhet province
to call attention and demand regime change towards democracy in Laos.
The upsurge in attacks drew media attention to the sorry plight of the few
remaining Hmong resistance forces. Numbering around 3,000 people,
including women and children, they were surrounded by the Lao army and
164 Challenges and prospects
allegedly subjected to a deliberate policy of starvation. As the Lao army
continued to battle small groups of Hmong rebels, roughly 1,000 of them
surrendered their arms and returned to civilian life in early 2004 under a
government resettlement program. Ironically, as the rebel threat lessened,
Laos faced a new challenge in the form of HIV/AIDS transmission. UN
health officials and NGO representatives joined in warning the Lao people
were increasingly at risk of contacting HIV/AIDS as a growing number of
road projects turned Laos into a regional transportation hub.63
Despite a long history of security concerns, there was scant evidence
the LPRP was likely to move away from one-party rule in the foreseeable
future. Events after 1999 appeared to represent the most serious challenge
to Party rule since it came to power in 1975; however, there was little to
suggest the attacks, raids and bombings constituted a serious threat to the
regime. The Party responded promptly and aggressively with a familiar
mix of repressive measures, symbolic gestures and cosmetic reforms.
Whatever the claims of groups like the LCMD and FFC, there was no
evidence of a sustained, credible threat to the regime. Signs of increased
transparency or improved governance were equally scarce.
Lao foreign affairs
At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1999, Lao Foreign Minister
Somsavat Lengsawat criticized member states for responding individually,
not collectively, to the regional crisis. He also reminded his colleagues of
the goals in the 1998 Hanoi Plan of Action, a six-year plan covering the
period 1999–2004, to reduce disparities in economic development among
member states. With a divided ASEAN offering limited assistance, Laos
turned to old friends and allies, China and Vietnam, for counsel and
support.64
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Vientiane expanded its
ties with Beijing as China moved to increase its influence in Laos as part of
a broader strategy of economic expansion into Southeast Asia. Chinese
President Jiang Zemin paid the first ever visit of a Chinese head of state to
Laos in mid-November 2000, reaching agreement on closer economic and
technical cooperation as well as more Chinese aid for Laos. Beijing later
praised the appointment of Prime Minister Bounnyang Vorachit in March
2001, a move widely reported in the international press as signaling a more
China-friendly Laos. With considerable Chinese aid focused on infrastruc-
ture projects, Laos announced in May 2002 the official opening of three
new roads, linking Vientiane with cities in China’s Yunnan province.
Other areas of bilateral cooperation included drug control, trade and
transportation and student exchanges. President Khamtay made an official
visit to Beijing in June 2003, praising China’s economic achievements.
With bilateral trade and investment expanding, Chinese Vice Premier Wu
Yi visited Vientiane in March 2004, concluding 11 separate agreements in
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agriculture, chemical production and hydropower exploration.65 China’s
economic presence in Laos was poised to expand in the coming years,
especially in northern Laos, as Beijing moved to become a regional power-
house in Southeast Asia.
Disappointed with the limited regional support available during the
Asian financial crisis, Laos turned to Vietnam for guidance and aid, rein-
vigorating political ties and expanding commercial relations. At the
request of the Lao government, Vietnamese troops intervened in Xiang
Khouang province in mid-2000 when the Hmong rebellion escalated and
Lao army casualties mounted. The Ho Chi Minh National Politics Institute
in Hanoi also offered a series of “refresher” courses for Lao officials.
According to the official Vietnam News Agency, Lao trainees at the polit-
ical academy “studied Marxism–Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, social-
ist renovation in Party and administrative building work, and conducted
practical studies.”66 Evidence of expanded economic ties could be seen in
deeper cooperation between border provinces as well as stepped up cross-
border and barter trade. Vietnamese investment increased in strategic
sectors of the Lao economy, like agro-processing, construction, forestry
and transportation; and Hanoi provided financial and auditing assistance
to Vientiane. The Vietnamese provision of foreign aid to Laos was note-
worthy because Vietnam at the time was the world’s second largest recipi-
ent of overseas development assistance. The Lao case illustrated what
economist Bourdet termed “international fungibility,” a situation in which
Western aid to one country (Vietnam) freed domestic resources to be used
by that country to expand its influence in another country (Laos).67
In May 2002, during an official visit to Vietnam by President Khamtay
Siphandone, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to the
Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Development Triangle first announced in 1999
as well as subregional infrastructure development, such as the East–West
Development Corridor linking Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
Laos and Vietnam later concluded Vientiane Agreement 2002, a frame-
work for future economic cooperation. Milestones reached in 2002
included the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Agreement on
Friendship and Cooperation and the fortieth anniversary of the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations. In June 2003, the chairman of the Lao
National Assembly addressed the National Assembly of Vietnam in words
suggestive of how little had changed in the official Lao–Vietnamese rela-
tionship since the creation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930.
Over the past 70 years, the two nations have stood shoulder to shoul-
der in the struggle full of hardships and sacrifices. Following Ho Chi
Minh’s immortal words “Helping someone means assisting yourself,”
the Vietnamese people sent their beloved to Laos to help the revolu-
tionary cause.
On behalf of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, the National
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Assembly, the Government, the Fatherland Front, and the Lao people
of all nationalities, allow me to express the deep gratitude to the Com-
munist Party, the National Assembly, the Fatherland Front, and the
people of Viet Nam for their valuable support to the Lao revolution-
ary cause.
We are determined to follow the words of President Kaysone
Phomvihane: “We should preserve and protect the great friendship,
the special solidarity and the all-round Laos–Viet Nam cooperation
like protecting the pupils of our eyes and will educate our next genera-
tions to be forever faithful to this solidarity, not allowing enemies or
opposition forces to destroy it.”68
Thereafter, the official exchange of visits continued as did expansion of
border cooperation and other agreements. For example, Laos and
Vietnam in November 2004 concluded an agreement to promote wildlife
protection along their border, especially in areas where endangered
species were in peril.69 Vietnam clearly remained the dominant political
influence in Laos, but it lacked the resources to compete long-term in the
economic sphere with rival China.
Border issues and the resettlement of Hmong refugees resident in Thai
camps dominated Lao–Thai relations. Other topics of mutual interest
included the creation of special economic zones to promote trade and
investment, drug trafficking and the Thai purchase of Lao electricity.
Laos’s love-hate relationship with Thailand was ever present as exempli-
fied by a rancorous exchange in mid-2001 in which Lao officials strongly
objected to a planned film about the Thai patriot and heroine, Thao
Suranaree. Thai history books claim she saved her country from Lao
aggression in 1826, but Lao historians say the story was fabricated for
political purposes. Thailand has long been the dominant cultural influence
in Laos due to the similarity of their languages, and “Thai lifestyles and
values purveyed by television programmes and other cultural products
find a receptive market in Laos.” The Thai monarchy is also widely
respected. Thai Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn visited Laos in May 2001
and again in November 2002.70
In June 2001, Laos and Thailand announced plans to create a bilateral
tourism network, linking four Thai provinces with two Lao provinces; and
in August, the two neighbors established an arbitration panel to resolve
commercial and investment disputes. Thailand in June 2002 agreed to
extradite 17 Lao nationals who had sought refuge in Thailand after an
abortive attack on a Lao border post in July 2000, finally deporting them
in mid-2004 after a Thai court rejected their extradition. Amid Lao com-
plaints that anti-Vientiane elements continued to operate in Thailand,
Laos and Thailand in October 2003 concluded an 18-point border security
cooperation agreement. By the end of the year, 670 kilometers of the land
border had been fixed, leaving only 32 kilometers or less than 5 percent of
Challenges and prospects 167
the total to be marked. Laos and Thailand in March 2004 scrapped visa
requirements for their citizens in an effort to boost tourism. They also laid
the foundation stone for a two kilometer bridge, funded by Japanese
loans, linking Mukdahan in Thailand with Savannakhet town and provid-
ing a more direct route to the Vietnamese port of Danang.71 Thailand will
remain the dominant cultural influence in Laos, but China’s economic
presence one day could overtake that of now preeminent Thailand.
Focused on related issues like border security, narcotics control and
trade, Lao relations with Cambodia were much less extensive than those
with its three big neighbors, China, Thailand and Vietnam, reflecting a
lower level of commercial opportunity and ideological concern. In mid-
2000, Cambodia and Laos initiated an official survey of their common
border, the first such demarcation since Cambodia gained independence
from France in 1953. In January 2001, Laos and Cambodia agreed to open
their border although officials from both states agreed it would be years
before it could be opened completely due to the absence of roads linking
Cambodia’s interior provinces to Laos. Prime Minister Bounnyang Vora-
chit made an official visit to Phnom Penh in August 2001 where he high-
lighted the progress of the joint border commission and encouraged
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to build roads in the border
provinces. In turn, Hun Sen encouraged construction of a railroad linking
the two states and tied into a proposed ASEAN rail network. As demarca-
tion of the border continued, Laos and Cambodia explored new opportun-
ities to boost bilateral cooperation in other areas related to national
development.72
Bilateral relations with the United States were dominated by long
familiar issues, including human rights concerns, trade talks and the search
for MIAs. A new issue involved the fate of two naturalized American cit-
izens, ethnic Hmong and members of an anti-Vientiane organization, the
Lao People’s Liberation Front (LPLF), who disappeared on the Lao–Thai
border in April 1999. Laos claimed to have no knowledge of their where-
abouts and participated in at least two joint fact-finding missions to deter-
mine their fate; nevertheless, Washington maintained Vientiane was not
cooperating fully to resolve the issue. Lao opposition groups, including the
Lao Human Rights Council, Laos Institute for Democracy, United Lao
Action Center and Hmong International Human Rights Watch, used the
issue, together with related human rights abuses, to slow progress in
improving Lao–American commercial relations.73
Citing increased cooperation in areas like counter terrorism, accounting
for MIAs and counter narcotics, the Bush administration in early 2003
supported passage of legislation to normalize trading relations with Laos.
Even as the White House continued to support new legislation, opponents
in the Lao–American community and their congressional supporters suc-
cessfully delayed action for almost two years, citing concerns about the
two Americans missing since 1999, a U.S. citizen detained in June 2003,
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imprisonment of pro-democracy activists and the renewed persecution of
Christian ethnic minorities. Consequently, the U.S. Congress did not
approve normal trading relations with Laos until late November 2004,
capping a seven-year effort by successive administrations to end the
country’s isolation. And the measure passed the U.S. Senate only after
opposing senators succeeded in passing a resolution condemning human
rights violations in Laos. At the time, U.S. communities were welcoming
some 15,000 Hmong refugees from Laos, resettled from holding camps in
Thailand. Their transfer largely ended the lingering legacy of the Second
Indochina War. Refugee support groups say tens of thousands more
Hmong scattered throughout Thailand could claim asylum, but no more
were added to the official departure list, and the United States was
unlikely to take many more. Meanwhile, the search for American MIAs in
Laos continued.74
Japan remained the principal donor to Laos. With the Lao PDR in the
throes of a severe economic crisis in September 2000, Japan extended a
substantial debt relief package; and in December 2001, it approved loans
totaling $62 million to fund a second bridge across the Mekong. Japan
later wrote off debts owed by Laos for construction of the Nam Ngum
Dam; and in December 2003, Laos welcomed a Japanese commitment of
$1.5 billion in aid for Mekong River regional development. On the multi-
lateral level, the International Monetary Fund approved in principle a
three-year, $40 million loan in April 2001, eight years after its last loan in
1993. However, renewed concerns about macroeconomic policies later
delayed distribution of the second tranche of the loan. The Asian Devel-
opment Bank continued its financial assistance to Laos, launching an
ambitious poverty alleviation program, with an emphasis on primary edu-
cation, revenue collection and private sector development. In June 2004,
ADB approved a $17.7 million loan to Laos to improve rural roads.75
Other aspects of Lao foreign policy were noteworthy. A North Korean
delegation, led by Kim Yong-Nam, president of the Presidium of the
Supreme People’s Assembly and titular head of state, visited Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam in mid-2001 in an effort to shore up international
support in the communist world. A 12-point communiqué issued at the
end of his visit to Laos reported agreements on public health, double taxa-
tion and cultural exchange. During an official visit to Moscow in August
2001, Foreign Minister Somsavat supported Russia’s opposition both to an
enlargement of NATO and to U.S. plans to scrap the 1972 ABM Treaty.
He also hailed Moscow’s cooperation with ASEAN and its support for the
creation of a nuclear free Southeast Asia. In turn, Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov emphasized Russia’s interest in giving “practical content” to its
relations with Laos. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reciprocated
with an official visit to Laos in November 2004 to discuss economic
and trade issues. Less than two years later, as mentioned earlier, Russia
agreed to write-off the bulk of its Lao debt. Finally, the Indo–Lao Joint
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Commission continued to meet, concluding new agreements on trade
cooperation and the protection of investments. India also expanded its
defense ties with Laos, including the training of Lao air force pilots, and
extended a $10 million loan in support of a power transmission project. In
return, the Lao PDR continued to support India’s candidacy for a perman-
ent seat on the UN Security Council.76
Foreign aid dependent Cambodia
The Cambodian economy in 1998 suffered its worst performance since the
country moved to a market orientation at the turn of the decade. Eco-
nomic, political and climactic factors combined to reduce economic growth
to less than 2 percent with the varying GDP figures reported by different
international bodies once again highlighting data collection problems in
Cambodia. The suspension of external aid, due largely to Prime Minister
Hun Sen’s ousting in 1997 of coalition partner, Prince Norodom
Ranariddh, contributed to the poor performance as did a decline in fiscal
revenues due to tax shortfalls, notably royalties on logging. In addition,
the agricultural sector continued to deteriorate in the wake of a series of
droughts and floods beginning in 1996. Foreign direct investment in Cam-
bodia, as in Laos and Vietnam, declined sharply since the majority of
investors were from the ASEAN states badly affected by the 1997–8 finan-
cial crisis. An economic bright spot was the garments sector where exports
boomed in the late 1990s after Cambodia concluded normalized trading
relationship agreements with the United States and the European Union.
Garments became the largest single export item in 1998, accounting for
just under 40 percent of all exports.77
Economic performance improved after 1998, but the Cambodian
economy remained fragile. As the political climate stabilized, bilateral and
multilateral donors once again extended financial aid. The Consultative
Group for Cambodia met in Paris in May 2000, pledging $548 million in
assistance over a 12-month period. The agricultural sector, the mainstay of
the Cambodian economy, showed signs of recovery until massive flooding
struck in September 2000 just before paddy rice harvesting time. With
some 200,000 hectares of paddy destroyed, the adverse effects of one of
the worst floods in the last 100 years offset a robust expansion of industry
and services. On a more positive note, foreign direct investment increased
as the regional financial crisis bottomed out; and exports continued to
expand, due largely to the buoyant garment industry. GDP growth aver-
aged 7 percent in 1999–2000, dropping to around 6 percent in 2001.78
Despite the improved performance of the Cambodian economy, addi-
tional economic reforms were urgently needed. Citing progress in fiscal
reform, control of illegal logging and military demobilization, the central
theme of the May 2000 meeting of the Consultative Group for Cambodia
was the issue of governance, widely recognized as the single biggest
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obstacle to economic and social development in the country. International
donors, along with representatives of the private sector and civil society,
urged Cambodia to fight corruption, build credibility in the legal and judi-
cial systems, protect property and individual rights and press ahead with
public administration reform. In so doing, participants emphasized that
good governance was essential both to the development of a private sector
and to attract the foreign direct investment necessary to stimulate long-
term economic growth and reduce aid dependency.79
Cambodia like Laos remained dangerously dependent on foreign aid.
At the dawn of the new millennium, approximately one-third of the
government budget came from foreign assistance. International donors
increasingly linked aid packages to economic and political reforms, but
Cambodia’s progress toward those reforms was both slow and spasmodic.
In a working paper published in 2000 by the Cambodia Development
Resource Institute (CDRI), a private think-tank based in Phnom Penh,
several Cambodian specialists examined the impact of large-scale aid on
the Cambodian economy.
The scale of aid is such that it distorts the economy. In an aid-related
version of “Dutch disease,” a high proportion of Cambodia’s scarcest
resource, educated people, is pulled toward employment in donor
agencies and international non-governmental organizations or
attached to projects as salary-supplemented counterparts. At the same
time, donors and NGOs virtually take over the funding of education,
health care, social welfare, rural development etc., while government
spends most of its funds on defense and security.80
While elements of the CDRI critique were controversial, the Cambodian
case of aid dependency was surely extreme, on a par with that of Laos; and
its long-term consequences were deeply concerning, if not always well
understood.
Prospects for the Cambodian economy
The Cambodian economy slowed in 2003 with the Asian Development
Bank estimating GDP growth at 5 percent, down from 5.5 percent in 2002,
the fourth consecutive year of slowdown. Robust growth in the export-
oriented garments sector, combined with a recovery in agriculture, under-
pinned limited expansion. The garment industry by 2003 was employing
230,000 workers and generating more than 10 percent of GDP and 80
percent of total exports. Activity in the services sector was weakened by
lower tourist arrivals due to the SARS scare and domestic political uncer-
tainties. Anti-Thai riots at the beginning of the year, combined with a pro-
longed delay in forming a new government following July elections, hurt
investment and consumption and also delayed official transfers. The fiscal
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deficit in 2003 narrowed to 6.1 percent of GDP, down from 6.6 percent in
2002, and continued to be financed mainly by grants or concessionary
loans. Spending on economic and social transfers was higher than bud-
geted but defense-related outlays were lower. The inflation rate remained
low, at 1.2 percent in 2003, reflecting a strong fiscal stance, relative
exchange rate stability and generally stable food prices. Debt repayment
remained a topic of discussion, but according to ADB estimates, Cam-
bodia remained the least indebted country in the region with a little over
$2 billion in foreign debt compared to almost $2.5 billion for Laos and
close to $12 billion for Vietnam.81
The short-term outlook for the Cambodian economy remained favorable
with ADB forecasting annual GDP growth rates around 4.5 percent over
the next two years. Despite donor criticism of the slow pace of reform, the
positive outlook for Cambodia reflected the fact that its economic reforms,
unlike those in Laos but similar to those in Vietnam, were generally on
track. Further growth was contingent on expansion in export-oriented man-
ufacturing, primarily garments, and an upturn in tourism and construction.
Both the garment industry and tourism stood to benefit from a stronger
world economy. Garment exports to the United States would also benefit
from the elimination of a major competitor after August 2003 when the
United States imposed an import ban on Myanmar. A forecast increase in
global rice prices would boost growth in the agricultural sector, increasing
both rural incomes and domestic consumption. Government efforts to redi-
rect expenditures, with the demobilization of the armed forces a prime
example, would reduce military spending, leaving additional funds available
for economic and social development. Better public financial management
and renewed emphasis on structural reforms, together with WTO member-
ship, would help the investment climate. Cambodia was admitted to the
WTO in September 2003, albeit under very stringent conditions; but the
Cambodian senate did not approve accession until September 2004. Based
on China’s experience after joining in 2001, Cambodia’s accession would
likely provide a short-term stimulus to importers and exporters. Ongoing
efforts to integrate more closely with neighboring states in the Greater
Mekong Subregion, together with infrastructure improvements coming into
place as part of GMS initiatives, stood to promote trade and tourism.82
At the same time, economic growth in Cambodia, largely centered on
the garments industry and tourism, was not broad-based. As a result, long-
term prospects for sustainable growth were clouded by diverse challenges
in agriculture, industry and services, the three sectors expected to lead the
economy. Structural problems hampered expansion in agriculture. Farmers
enjoyed limited access to productive land, irrigation, improved seeds and
finances, hindering efforts to increase productivity, diversification and com-
mercialization. With the nation’s highways and roads in poor condition, it
would take a sustained infrastructure development program to improve
market access for rural households. Infrastructure improvements were also
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needed to increase the attractiveness of Cambodia to tourists, a central
component of the services sector. The absence of developed infrastructure,
combined with more stable political environments in China and Vietnam,
also deterred industrial investment in Cambodia (and in Laos). Con-
sequently, China and Vietnam would remain tough economic competitors
in both agricultural and garment exports. Cambodian-made garments also
faced increasing competitive pressure after 1 January 2005 when WTO
rules phased out the garment quota system and Cambodia’s bilateral trade
agreement with the United States expired.83
Direct foreign investment in Cambodia dropped off in recent years due
to reduced investment in the garments industry and the closure of foreign
banks. Increased competition in the industrial sector made it difficult to
reverse the trend. The full benefits of WTO membership remained contin-
gent on improvements in both infrastructure and telecommunications
along with passage of the controversial legislation necessary to improve
market access. The financial sector remained weak and unable to serve
effectively as a bridge between savers and potential lenders; therefore,
access to credit continued to limit private sector growth. Public health
issues, from tuberculosis to HIV/AIDS to drug use, were other constraints
on economic development. Finally, there remained the high transaction
costs associated with conducting business in an environment characterized
by weak and corrupt governance, including the lack of judicial, legal and
regulatory frameworks conducive to private sector development. Unless
and until these constraints were rigorously addressed, sustained develop-
ment and the associated goal of poverty reduction would remain for Cam-
bodia more objectives than realities.84
Hun Sen consolidates power
Cambodians went to the polls in July 1998 in an electoral exercise highly
reminiscent of May 1993. Election rhetoric was couched in the lofty terms
of democratization, but the electoral process was again clouded by the
familiar dynamics of rivalry and intimidation among contending factions.
As Cambodian observer Pierre Lizée rightly noted, the elections were in
many ways a step backwards as much as a step forwards.
To that extent, the 1998 elections and the series of political develop-
ments surrounding them represented not so much a first step in an
overdue process of democratization of the political environment in
Cambodia, but rather a movement full circle to precisely the situation
of autocracy which these elections were supposed to remedy.
In this context, as Lizée continued, “the elections were not about who
would form the next government” as much as “about what the very rules
of political power would be” in Cambodia.85
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In the July 1998 elections, Hun Sen’s CPP (Cambodian People’s Party)
garnered some 42 percent of the vote, Prince Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC
(National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Coop-
erative Cambodia) about 32 percent and former Finance Minister Sam
Rainsy’s SRP (Sam Rainsy Party) approximately 14 percent. With the
elections grounded in a proportional representation system, the National
Election Committee, dominated by CPP supporters, determined the
following seat distribution in the 122-seat National Assembly: 64 seats for
CPP, 43 for FUNCINPEC and 15 for SRP. While CPP was awarded a
majority of seats, it still lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to form a
government. Both FUNCINPEC and SRP protested the formula used to
distribute Assembly seats was not in line with election results; however,
the decision of the National Election Council remained unchanged.
Following an extended period of mutual recriminations marked by out-
bursts of violence, Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh announced in late
November 1998 the formation of a coalition government with the former
as prime minister and the latter as president of the National Assembly.86
After years of turmoil, 1999–2001 marked three years of notable polit-
ical stability. Even though the CPP had gained only a slim, contested
majority in the 1998 National Assembly elections, Prime Minister Hun Sen
was successful in aligning the de jure distribution of government power
with the de facto distribution of bureaucratic and military power. He
established dominance over the Cambodian political scene with Prince
Ranariddh ceasing to play a meaningful role and his FUNCINPEC col-
leagues either cooperating with the CPP or dropping out of politics. In the
words of Milton Osborne, a veteran Cambodian observer, Hun Sen
remained in that “long tradition of Cambodian rulers for whom politics is
a zero-sum game.” Sam Rainsy remained the most vocal government
critic, but his political effectiveness was diminished by the limited number
of SRP seats in the National Assembly and his own tendency to spend
large amounts of time outside Cambodia. Continuing in fragile health,
King Norodom Sihanouk played an increasingly marginal role.87
At the same time, attempts to improve governance in Cambodia faced a
political culture with a long history of factionalism and violence, com-
pounded by the absence of the rule of law. Even as Cambodians tried to
create a democratic culture, corruption remained endemic with the pre-
vailing climate most accurately described as a culture of impunity. In
March 2000, for example, authorities discovered the existence of over
6,000 “ghost” civil servants who were on the payroll but did not show up
for work. In late November 2000, an estimated 70 members of the Cambo-
dian Freedom Fighters, a group of anti-communist, anti-Vietnamese Cam-
bodian expatriates, attacked multiple targets in Phnom Penh, killing eight
people. Two weeks later, a bomb exploded in downtown Phnom Penh.
The attacks posed no immediate threat to the stability of the Cambodian
government, but they did result in the postponement of a scheduled visit
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by Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong. The downstream impact of the
violence on tourism, foreign investment and the planned demobilization of
the army was uncertain.88
The relative calm following the 1998 National Assembly elections
enabled the Cambodian government to address a number of long-delayed
but important issues, namely a Khmer Rouge tribunal, military demobi-
lization and commune elections. The question of a trial for former Khmer
Rouge leaders attracted worldwide interest following the movement’s
demise in the latter half of the 1990s. The issue sparked ongoing contro-
versy between the coalition government and the international community
with Hun Sen’s mood swinging back and forth between condemnation and
support for a trial. Rejecting a UN-proposed international tribunal, he
argued it would violate Cambodian sovereignty and could spark a renewed
civil war if former Khmer Rouge guerrillas rose up in support of their old
leaders. Apparently willing to let bygones be bygones, Hun Sen remained
under heavy pressure from donor states, notably the European Union,
Japan and the United States, to establish a tribunal. In January 2001, the
legislature finally passed a tribunal bill; however, the Cambodian Constitu-
tional Council later took exception to it on the grounds references in the
bill to a 1956 Penal Code could be construed to recognize the outlawed
death penalty. It was not until August 2001 that a new version of the bill,
without the death penalty, was signed into law by King Sihanouk.89
Compared to earlier UN recommendations, the tribunal proposed in
August 2001 was a hybrid in that it contained a mixture of Cambodian and
international prosecutors and judges. Certain other procedures in the bill
were also less than the international community desired in that they failed
to address key issues raised by UN legal experts. These included the
immunity granted former Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sary in
1996 and the inclusion of international standards aimed an guaranteeing
fairness. In the ensuing debate, the global community continued to insist
on a trial in the belief the failure to conduct one would have serious ramifi-
cations for Cambodia’s culture of impunity.90
In June 2003, six years of contentious negotiations with the United
Nations finally led to a compromise agreement in which the Hun Sen
government accepted a mixed tribunal comprising local and international
judges operating under Cambodian law. Because the agreement required
ratification by the National Assembly, subsequent preparations for the tri-
bunal were delayed almost a year by difficulties surrounding formation of
a coalition government after the July 2003 elections. As preparations for
the trial continued, some UN member states remained reluctant to quan-
tify in advance financial support for the proceedings.91
In part to free up funds for the social sector, the Cambodian govern-
ment, at the prompting of the international donor community, planned to
demobilize by 2004 some 31,500 soldiers out of a total defense force of
more than 133,000 personnel. Some 11,500 were to be cut by 2000 with
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additional reductions of 10,000 each in 2001–2 and 2003–4. In prompting a
broader demilitarization of Cambodian society, demobilization was also
expected to have a positive impact on the single most serious source of
violence in Cambodia, the widespread presence of ill-trained, poorly paid
soldiers. Some progress in demobilization occurred in 2000; however, a
pilot project aimed at 1,500 soldiers in four provinces was widely criticized
on the grounds the reintegration of former soldiers into civilian life was
poorly managed, threatening to make them a pool for military entrepre-
neurship and violence. Related concerns were raised four years later when
the Intercontinental Hotel in Phnom Penh replaced striking workers with
demobilized soldiers, prompting charges of strike-breaking. A report by
the authoritative International Crisis Group described the demobilization
program as a “magnet for corruption” concluding an army of 100,000 was
still too large for Cambodia’s needs. As the troubled demobilization
program proceeded, it remained dogged by controversy, causing the
World Bank in mid-2003 to reduce its support for the project.92
The Council of Ministers approved a draft commune election law in
August 2000 whose provisions disappointed international observers
because the draft law exhibited an almost total disregard for public
opinion as mobilized by election networks. The National Assembly passed
the law in January 2001, paving the way for commune elections, planned
originally for 1995, to be held in February 2002. With elections scheduled
in all 1,621 communes, the elections represented an important step in the
process of decentralization as well as a significant opportunity to link local
and national power configurations throughout Cambodia.93
Hun Sen in control
The commune elections in February 2002 were the first elections at the
local government level held in post-colonial Cambodia. When compared
to the two previous general elections, the 2002 commune elections went
off rather well with competing political parties and international observers
judging their conduct acceptable if not entirely free from violence and
intimidation. Enjoying a prolonged monopoly over local government, a
well-organized political network and abundant human and financial
resources, the CPP won a resounding victory, garnering 62 percent of the
votes, 68 percent of the total seats and 97 percent of the top offices. While
it won a majority of posts in most councils, the election results marked the
first time the CPP would have to share local power with the SRP and
FUNCINPEC. In this sense, the elections opened a new vista of competi-
tion for the opposition, especially the SRP.94
The 2002 commune elections were a wake-up call for FUNCINPEC.
The CPP achieved a net vote gain of 20 percent over the 1998 general elec-
tions while FUNCINPEC dropped 8 percent. The poor performance of
FUNCINPEC was attributed to the poor leadership of Prince Ranariddh,
176 Challenges and prospects
and related to his leadership failure, the party’s alliance with Hun Sen’s
CPP. As Kheang Un and Judy Ledgerwood later pointed out, “FUNCIN-
PEC adopted a policy stance based on the principle of 4Cs – coalition,
cooperation, and competition without confrontation” vis-à-vis the CPP.
The principle of 4Cs brought political stability, but it did not translate into
an equal partnership. As a result, many Cambodians no longer saw
FUNCINPEC as a viable alternative to CPP. In a state where political
patronage remained at the heart of the system, FUNCINPEC had little to
offer its members. The widespread perception that royalist party FUNC-
INPEC’s link to King Sihanouk was no longer a significant factor in
national elections left the king deeply disturbed and led to his threat later
in the year to abdicate.95
As the decade progressed, the question of royal succession became an
increasingly important issue. Article 13 of the 1993 Constitution provided
for the Throne Council to select a successor within seven days of the death
of the king, indicating the organization and operation of the Council
should be determined by law. However, no law regulating the Throne
Council had been passed by the National Assembly. Even though King
Sihanouk was in his early 80s and in poor health, Hun Sen refused to
discuss the issue, arguing it would be disrespectful to the monarch to
discuss a successor while he was still alive. A suggestion by maverick
Prince Norodom Chakrapong that a successor should be chosen by
popular vote was rejected by both Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. In con-
trast to the Lao situation where the regime in recent years had reached out
to the memory of the monarchy to buttress its legitimacy, Hun Sen viewed
the monarchy in Cambodia as a political threat to be curbed. He made it
clear he would not tolerate in the future an activist king able to challenge
the prime minister’s constitutional powers. In any case, Hun Sen remained
in a position to determine a successor to King Sihanouk as the CPP con-
trolled a majority of votes in both the Throne Council and the National
Assembly. Worried and angry over the issue of succession, King Sihanouk
periodically repeated threats to resign in a half-hearted attempt to force
Hun Sen to act.96
Regime treatment of religion was another arena in which Cambodia
differentiated itself both from Laos and Vietnam. An overwhelming
majority of Cambodians, well over 90 percent, are nominally Buddhist,
with approximately 6 percent Muslim and less than 1 percent Christian.
On the surface, Buddhism in recent years made a remarkable recovery
from the Khmer Rouge period when it was outlawed and many senior
monks were murdered. In traveling around the country today, one sees
many new wats built or under construction and a growing number of
young men entering the monkhood. Recent estimates put the total
number of wats at 3,980 with almost 60,000 Buddhist monks in the
country. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that many
contemporary monks are not well trained in their religion. Moreover,
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some violate the severe disciplinary code and strict tenets of their faith,
participating in worldly pleasures like smoking, drinking alcohol, taking
drugs and consorting with females.97
The politicization of the Buddhist clergy was also an increasing source
of controversy. Activist Buddhist monk Sam Bunthoeun, who spoke out
against corruption and in favor of the rule of law, was gunned down at
Wat Lanka during the 2003 national election campaign in what some
observers viewed as a politically motivated murder. Twelve monks were
later threatened with expulsion from their Phnom Penh pagoda after sup-
porting the opposition Sam Rainsy Party in the elections. The participa-
tion of monks in the general elections and their broader involvement in
Cambodian politics remained an extremely sensitive issue for the Sangha
and the country at large. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea had
encouraged a renaissance of Buddhism in the 1980s in an effort to enlist a
traditional form of legitimation in support of the regime. Monks were
accorded the right to vote, officially recognizing their participation in
political activity, but the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, the
forerunner to the CPP, demanded the monks link the Buddhist religion to
the revolutionary development of the country. The restrictions placed on
the Sangha led to the emergence of opposition within the Buddhist hier-
archy itself as well as a proliferation of illegal monks, operating outside
the sanction of the Sangha. While the Hun Sen government was unlikely
to be satisfied with anything less than the full support of the Sangha, past
experience suggested the Sangha would only be trusted by the people as
long as it was seen as independent of politicians.98
Like their Buddhist counterparts, the minority Cham Muslim commun-
ity faced harsh treatment during the Pol Pot regime. International
observers believe the atrocities suffered by both groups could prove key in
proving the Khmer Rouge leadership guilty of genocide in any future
trials. According to Bjorn Blengsli, a Norwegian anthropologist who has
studied religious change among the Chams, the number of religious
centers has more than doubled since 1970 from 122 mosques to an esti-
mated 268. In the current war on terrorism, the Muslim community has
been a source of public interest and concern for other reasons. In May
2003, the government arrested three foreigners suspected of ties to
Jemaah Islamiyah, a clandestine Southeast Asian organization associated
with al-Qaeda. The government also closed two Islamic schools and
expelled a community of foreign religious teachers. The historically quies-
cent Cham minority traditionally practiced a syncretic form of Islam,
incorporating elements from Buddhism and pre-Islamic belief systems.
However, in recent years, religious activists representing the conservative
Dawa Tabligh movement and the orthodox Wahabi strain have arrived,
preaching a more austere version of Islam. Funded from sources in
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, these organizations want to purify
Cham Islamic practice by ridding it of Buddhist influence. Their efforts
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have been successful with an estimated 40 percent of Chams converting to
the Dawa Tabligh and Wahabi branches of Islam. The traditional Cham
leadership has long enjoyed close ties with the Cambodian People’s Party;
however, recent developments were a source of concern to the govern-
ment. Events in Thailand in April 2004, where Thai security forces killed
107 militants in the mostly Muslim south of the country, sparked new fears
and arrests in Cambodia because members of the Muslim minority have
long studied in southern Thailand. In November 2004, a UN official sug-
gested Cambodia was in danger of becoming a breeding ground for terror-
ists, a warning dismissed by the Cambodian government.99
National elections held in July 2003 produced significant new gains for
the Cambodian People’s Party. Its share of the popular vote, with more
than 80 percent of eligible voters participating in the election, increased
from around 42 percent in 1998 to more than 47 percent in 2003. In turn,
the royalist party FUNCINPEC continued its decline, garnering less than
21 percent of the vote compared to almost 32 percent in 1998. The Sam
Rainsy Party increased its vote share from a little more than 14 percent in
1998 to almost 22 percent in 2003, surpassing FUNCINPEC for the first
time. In the process, a significant rural–urban split in voting patterns sur-
faced. CPP remained strong in the countryside, but SRP did very well in
Phnom Penh and other urban areas, buttressing its claim to have become
the principal opposition voice in Cambodia. FUNCINPEC was clearly a
diminished factor in national politics, largely due to Prince Ranariddh’s
inept leadership, factionalism within the party, ineffectual alliances with
the CPP and King Sihanouk’s marginalized role. UN observers judged the
2003 elections relatively free of corruption and violence, especially com-
pared to previous balloting; however, Human Rights Watch documented a
troubling list of rights violations in the run-up to balloting.100
Under the proportional representation system, CPP increased its
parliamentary majority from 64 to 73 of the 123 seats, FUNCINPEC
dropped from 43 to 26 and SRP increased from 15 to 24. While the CPP
commanded an overwhelming majority of National Assembly seats, it
lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to form a government. Constitu-
tional provisions designed to reconcile warring factions in 1993 had the
opposite effect a decade later. Article 82 of the 1993 constitution called for
the president, vice presidents and members of each commission of the
National Assembly to be elected by a two-thirds majority vote. While the
Royal Government of Cambodia was constituted as a separate body,
article 100 of the constitution called for the president of the National
Assembly, with the agreement of the two vice presidents, to recommend a
member of the winning party to the king for the purpose of forming a
government. In effect, this meant the CPP needed to form a two-thirds
majority coalition in the National Assembly in order to elect a president
who could then recommend to the king a CPP member to form a govern-
ment. The two-thirds requirement, unique in the annals of parliamentary
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government, posed a major obstacle to a stable transition to a new govern-
ment.101
The 1993 constitution called for the National Assembly to convene
within 60 days of the election, but no time limit was set for the formation
of a new government. After the 1998 elections, CPP was successful in per-
suading FUNCINPEC to join a coalition government; however, FUNCIN-
PEC united with SRP in 2003, refusing to form a government with Hun
Sen as prime minister. After CPP rejected an SRP proposal from embold-
ened leader Sam Rainsy to form a tripartite government, the stalemate
continued with efforts to reach a power-sharing agreement stretching into
2004. In the interim, sporadic violence, mostly targeted at FUNCINPEC
and SRP officials and associates, kept Cambodia in a state of considerable
political tension. It was only in June 2004 that Hun Sen and Prince
Ranariddh finally reached a power-sharing deal in which Hun Sen retained
his position as prime minister and Prince Ranariddh continued as presid-
ent of the National Assembly. Under the terms of the agreement, which
involved an increase in cabinet seats from 80 to 207, CPP took 65 percent
of the cabinet seats, including key portfolios like foreign affairs, telecom-
munications and commerce and FUNCINPEC got the remaining 35
percent. The creation of so many new ministerial positions, done to
appease members of both parties by offering them lucrative positions in
return for their support, added a heavy burden to the Cambodian
economy. The related issue of corruption once again came to the forefront
at the end of 2004 with the release of a U.S. Agency for International
Development commissioned report depicting a corruption-ridden Cambo-
dian state apparatus.102
The formation of a new government meant Cambodia could now deal
with crucial legislative business, like ratification of its accession to the
World Trade Organization and establishment of a tribunal to try former
Khmer Rouge leaders. It also marked the consolidation of Hun Sen’s
control over the Cambodian political system. FUNCINPEC appeared to
be finished as an independent political party, leaving the SRP as the only
meaningful opposition. At the swearing-in ceremony for the new govern-
ment, which the opposition boycotted, Hun Sen spoke of the coalition
lasting at least 20–30 years. In complete control of all forms of security in
Cambodia, no one in the foreseeable future looked to be in a position to
challenge him. Concerned with the future of democracy in Cambodia,
King Sihanouk again offered to abdicate, a threat he withdrew a week
later after Supreme Monk Tep Vong begged him to remain on the throne.
King Sihanouk later announced his retirement and was succeeded in
October 2004 by his son, King Norodom Sihamoni.103 The creation of the
coalition government, after a year-long battle in which opponents failed to
oust Hen Sen, displayed for all to see his growing inability to tolerate any
form of dissent. A win for the culture of impunity, it marked not a bench-
mark on the road to greater democracy in Cambodia, a signpost which
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might have served as a beacon for Laos and Vietnam, but instead a serious
threat to return Indochina to a region composed of three one-party states.
Cambodian external affairs
In December 1998, Cambodia regained its seat at the United Nations, sus-
pended in the aftermath of the July 1997 political crisis. Prime Minister
Hun Sen later addressed the UN General Assembly in October 1999.
Cambodia’s entry into ASEAN in April 1999 opened yet another arena
for Cambodian foreign policy. ASEAN membership gave Cambodia the
opportunity, absent for three decades, to gain leverage in regional affairs.
As with Laos, it also enhanced Cambodian security, offering the potential
for increased regional trade and investment as well as a venue for conflict
resolution. In November 2002, Cambodia hosted summit meetings of
heads of state of both the GMS and ASEAN in Phnom Penh, highlighting
Cambodia’s integration into both regional and global economies. It also
hosted the thirty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 2003 and the
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in September. By early 2004, Cam-
bodia was actively seeking a seat on the UN Security Council.104
Cambodia maintained traditionally close ties with Vietnam, including
frequent official visits at all levels. For example, Communist Party chief Le
Kha Phieu, chief commissar of Vietnam’s occupation force inside Cam-
bodia in the 1980s, visited Phnom Penh in June 1999. Vietnam also
remained a consistent supporter of Cambodia within ASEAN, working to
overcome reservations regarding Cambodian accession to membership. It
was thus symbolic that Cambodia acceded formally to ASEAN in a small
ceremony in Hanoi in April 1999. At the same time, the CPP leadership
balanced its close personal relationship with the leadership of Vietnam,
dating back to their time as ideological allies, with ancient, grass-roots
anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodia. Both FUNCINPEC and SRP
resorted to anti-Vietnamese rhetoric during the 2003 national elections,
and some Cambodians of Vietnamese heritage were turned away at the
polls. Recurrent problems included Vietnamese Hmong highlanders cross-
ing into Cambodia to escape religious or other persecution in Vietnam and
Cambodian villagers near the border complaining of alleged Vietnamese
encroachments on Cambodian territory. A new note of discord surfaced at
the end of 2003 when Cambodia asked Vietnam for compensation for loss
of life and property due to flooding attributed to an unannounced release
of water from a Vietnamese dam on the Se San River which flows into
Cambodia. When Vietnam stonewalled discussions, Cambodia pushed the
issue which had wider implications as the Yali Falls Dam on the Se San
River was only the first of six dams being constructed there by Vietnam.105
In part to balance its relationship with Vietnam, Phnom Penh
responded positively to Beijing’s overtures to grow China’s presence in
Cambodia. Accepting the status quo, China appeared content with a
Challenges and prospects 181
situation in which no foreign state, including Vietnam, had a dominant
position of influence in Cambodia. In turn, the Hun Sen government wel-
comed China’s benign attitude at a time when Chinese investment was
increasingly important to the Cambodian economy. Chinese President
Jiang Zemin visited Cambodia in November 2000, a landmark visit which
reflected China’s growing interest in the region. Following his visit, the
dedication of the new National Assembly building, funded by China, illus-
trated China’s growing role. Beijing also opposed a Khmer Rouge tri-
bunal, concerned with global scrutiny of its past support for the Pol Pot
regime, and quietly pressured Cambodia not to conduct any trials. In
November 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji announced Beijing was for-
giving all foreign debt owed by Cambodia, some of which dated back to
the 1960s. Cambodia and China later concluded a military agreement in
November 2003 in which Beijing funded equipment and training, and Hun
Sen led an official CPP delegation to China in April 2004. In March 2004,
Cambodia reached agreement with a state-run Chinese company to
conduct a feasibility study for a $39 million hydropower plant, including an
option to build and operate the project.106
Cambodia’s relationship with Thailand remained sound if marred occa-
sionally by outstanding bilateral issues and a resurgence of mistrust. Thai
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai visited Phnom Penh in mid-June 2000,
signing a border agreement based on Franco-Siamese pacts concluded in
1904 and 1907. The ceremony was soon followed by a new border contro-
versy in which Cambodian developers, building a cross-border casino,
allegedly encroached on Thai territory opposite Poipet. With Thai citizens
flocking to the 12 casinos in operation on the Thai–Cambodian border by
April 2001, additional casino construction remained a sensitive issue with
Thailand. Other bilateral questions included suppression of narcotics and
other illegal activity in the borderlands, increased trade and investment
and joint fishery ventures. Bilateral relations took a turn for the worse in
January 2003 when violent anti-Thai protests in Phnom Penh underscored
historical animosities between the two kingdoms. The immediate cause of
the violence was a remark falsely attributed to Thai actress Suwanan
Kongying, implying Thai sovereignty over Angkor Wat, symbol of Cam-
bodian identity. After Thai diplomats were forced to flee Phnom Penh,
Thailand responded by downgrading diplomatic relations, closing the
border and suspending trade and technical assistance. Full diplomatic rela-
tions were restored only after Cambodia met Thai demands for financial
compensation, justice for the perpetrators of the violence and a full
accounting of the entire incident.107
Despite persistent criticism of the Hun Sen government by domestic
and international NGOs, together with selected members of the U.S. Con-
gress, Washington largely refrained from criticizing the Phnom Penh
government. At the same time, the United States supported UN efforts to
bring former Khmer Rouge leaders to trial as well as the July 2003 elect-
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oral process, funding election observers in many Cambodian provinces.
Following the elections, the United States resumed direct aid to Cambo-
dia, suspended after the violence in July 1997, notably funding training
courses for the Muslim community in an effort to block inroads by reli-
gious fundamentalists. The Cambodian government praised the U.S. initi-
ative as part of its support for the war on terrorism. Many Americans also
remained very concerned with human rights issues in Cambodia. Members
of the U.S. House of Representatives in February 2004 wrote Prime Minis-
ter Hun Sen urging him to investigate the murder in January of Chea
Vichea, a prominent labor union leader. The Director of the State Depart-
ment’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, in a March
2004 press conference, described Cambodia as one of the world’s most
serious challenges. In July 2004, U.S. congressional leaders, including
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and Arizona Senator John McCain
expressed concern in separate statements that Hun Sen had stepped up
threats against Cambodia’s democratic opposition.108
Limits of regionalism
In the transition to ASEAN-10, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam focused
largely on subregional development within the Greater Mekong Sub-
region. The modest progress achieved toward GMS initiatives in the latter
half of the 1990s reflected both the enormity of the projects envisioned
and the limited resources of the Indochinese states. As Southeast Asian
specialists Mya Than and George Abonyi observed: “A central issue
facing economic co-operation in the GMS at this stage [was] the mobil-
ization of the extensive resources required for project implementation,
especially for infrastructure-related projects.” Infrastructure improvement
was a key GMS goal because inadequate infrastructure restricted trade
and contributed to related socioeconomic and political problems. Lacking
both the capital and management resources required to implement desired
projects, the GMS states found capital mobilization to be an especially
daunting challenge given the obvious gap between future promise and
present reality. Project implementation was further complicated by the
transborder character of most GMS projects. All of them involved two or
more economies, often with very different legal and political jurisdictions.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997–8 only compounded existing difficulties
in financing GMS initiatives.109
With Southeast Asia in the throes of a severe financial crisis, ASEAN
economic and political assistance to the GMS in general and to Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam in particular remained modest. With the exception of
the ASEAN-MBDC and AEM-MITI initiatives discussed earlier, there
was limited ASEAN policy coordination, financial assistance or other
cooperation. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their annual meeting in
August 2000, in the face of widespread criticism for failing to deal with the
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economic and social fallout of the regional economic meltdown, refused to
modernize structures to deal with the new situation. Instead, they relied
on the long-standing ASEAN practices of consultation and consensus
building, including noninterference in the internal affairs of member
states. After the meeting, Vietnam, in its role as ASEAN chair, affirmed
its intent to support the noninterference policy. Asked if ASEAN had
rejected a UN proposal to appoint an ASEAN troika to mediate in
Myanmar, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Phan Thuy Thanh responded,
“ASEAN always operates on the principle of consensus, respect for
independence and sovereignty and non-interference into each others’
internal affairs.”110 In January 2001, Hans Eichel, the German finance
minister, succinctly captured the prevailing situation when he said Asia
had “no chance” of creating a common market or a common currency in
the near future because the region was too economically and politically
divided.111
In response, the Indochinese states mostly turned inward for solutions
to their economic problems. The prime ministers of Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam met in October 1999 in the first of a series of mini-summits,
announcing the creation of an Indochina development triangle, including a
shared power grid, expanded aviation and telecommunication ties and
upgraded road links. The new subregional initiative raised concern among
other ASEAN states who feared the three less developed members were
forming a block within the association. Under the GMS umbrella, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam concluded a cross-border trade agreement in
November 1999; and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam signed an
air transport agreement in March 2000. Vietnam Airways linked the three
Indochinese capitals, Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Vientiane, for the first time
with a single flight later in the year.112
At a second mini-summit in January 2002, four months after the 9/11
terrorist attacks threatened to rekindle the Asian financial crisis, Cambo-
dia, Laos and Vietnam announced plans to coordinate infrastructure
development in the border provinces of Ratanakiri and Stung Treng in
Cambodia, Attapeu and Sekong in Laos, and Kontum, Gia Lai and
Daklak in Vietnam. This initiative was in line with the 1998 Hanoi Plan of
Action which called for a reduction in poverty and the elimination of the
development gap among ASEAN members. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
joined other ASEAN states in condemning the 9/11 attacks, issuing a dec-
laration of joint action to counter terrorism; however, the attacks had little
impact, economically or politically, on the three Indochinese states. At a
third mini-summit in November 2004, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
agreed to expand tripartite development projects, targeting their border
provinces and focusing on agriculture, education, environmental conserva-
tion, health, industry, tourism and trade.113
Earlier, China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand had concluded an Agree-
ment on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong River which
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took effect in June 2001 and was intended to develop the river as a major
transportation means. In commenting on the Mekong agreement, Joern
Kristensen, chief executive officer of the Mekong River Commission, high-
lighted the challenges involved in the potential opening of a major ship-
ping route from Simao in Yunnan province to northeast Thailand.
Nobody can deny that there is a need for social and economic devel-
opment in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. And nobody would want
to deprive the people living along the Mekong of their equal right to
social development, food security and freedom from poverty.
But it is necessary, when development is planned, that those
involved keep in mind that the Mekong, with all its might, with its
great old civilization and its richness in natural resources, is a truly
inter-related, fragile and sensitive eco-system that calls for wise devel-
opment and good management so that it will continue to cater for its
ever growing population.114
Mekong River Commission scientists warned in March 2003 the lower
Mekong basin was facing serious environmental degradation; however,
when Mekong river levels later dropped to unusually low levels, MRC offi-
cials argued the culprit was inadequate rainfall and not upstream Chinese
dams. Independent observers agreed low rainfall was partly to blame for
low river levels, as was increased water use by growing populations; but
Chinese dams on the upper stretches of the river, combined with the blast-
ing of river rapids and other obstacles to improve navigation, were thought
by many to be major contributors to downstream problems. Consequently,
the impact of mainstream dams on Mekong water levels looked set to
remain in the foreseeable future a major source of GMS dialog and
discord.115
In February 2002, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam launched a
regional planning initiative for the cross-border development of the lower
Mekong river basin. Known as the Basin Development Plan, the process
was designed by the Mekong River Commission to identify and seek
investment for high priority, sustainable projects. Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen, in a March 2002 lecture at the National University of
Singapore, called on ASEAN to play “big sister” to the smaller groupings
in the region, encouraging faster development and ensuring synergy
among their projects. Regarding the GMS, he urged ASEAN to help
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to build an economic development triangle,
arguing accelerated GMS development would reduce the development
gap among ASEAN members. As economic growth picked up in Asia,
ASEAN economic ministers in July 2002 adopted the so-called “10 minus
X” principle, allowing member states able to open their markets in areas
like aviation, telecommunications and financial services to move forward
without waiting for the others. A recognition of the differing development
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stages of the ASEAN-10 grouping, the formula was a radical departure
from past practice where long accepted procedure was to progress in
unison.116
Meeting in Phnom Penh just prior to the annual ASEAN summit, GMS
leaders in November 2002 endorsed a subregional power distribution
agreement, laying the foundation for an ambitious program of hydropower
development. Meant to facilitate electricity export from the Lao PDR to
neighboring states, the integrated grid was hailed by proponents as a
major contribution to making Laos “landlinked” as opposed to “land-
locked.” Critics feared the agreement would accelerate dam construction
on the Mekong and its tributaries, precipitating ecological and social disas-
ter. The foreign ministers of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar
later met in Vientiane in August 2003 to develop a five-fold Economic
Cooperation Strategy centered on investment and trade promotion, agri-
cultural and industrial development, transportation links, tourism and
human resource development. In a sweeping vision short of specific
details, Southeast Asian leaders at the 2003 ASEAN summit in October
pledged to establish a common market by 2020. To succeed, analysts
agreed the lofty rhetoric to establish an economic community in far-off
2020 would necessitate swift and concrete action in areas like labor law,
custom regulations and judicial reform. ASEAN leaders also agreed at the
summit to endorse a set of shared sociopolitical values and principles, a
first hint the grouping, like the European Union, might attempt to require
members to adhere to certain minimum political standards. The declara-
tion gave no clue as to what those shared values might be, and common
political ground was scarce in an organization which included a military
government in Myanmar, authoritarian communist regimes in Laos and
Vietnam and a nascent democracy in Cambodia, not to mention incipient
democracy in states like Brunei and Indonesia.117
Thereafter, the parade of agreements continued. In a one-day summit
in the northern Burmese town of Pagan, leaders of Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Thailand in November 2003 signed another pact committing
their nations to boosting trade and investment, improving cooperation in
agriculture and industry, promoting tourism and developing human
resources. In December 2003, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
concluded an open skies agreement, allowing air carriers from each
country to exploit markets in the others without trade barriers. In March
2004, the Mekong River Commission announced a new initiative, the
Challenge Program on Water and Food, intended to improve the lives of
the 55 million people living along the river and to protect the environment
by finding new ways to grow more food using less water.118
With Laos scheduled to host the upcoming ASEAN Summit, Foreign
Minister Somsavat in March 2004 reviewed progress toward creation of a
Vientiane Action Plan to replace the Hanoi Plan of Action. In so doing, he
pointed out an important lesson to be drawn from the Hanoi plan was that
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only one-third of its programs had been implemented. He also stressed the
complexities involved in successfully promoting regional integration.
The HPA [Hanoi Plan of Action] was drawn up during a much more
peaceful political climate, but at a time when ASEAN was exposed to
financial crisis, which brought about a plan with a strong emphasis on
economy recovery. In preparing the VAP [Vientiane Action Plan], we
are now faced with a complex political situation as a result of war,
conflict and the use of force in many regions, and more gravely, the
global threat of terrorism. On the economic front, the focus is now on
the acceleration of increased sustained economic growth, intra-
ASEAN integration and improved relations between ASEAN and
other regional groupings.119
The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 2004 closed with a joint com-
muniqué reaffirming member commitment to the establishment of a Euro-
pean-style ASEAN Community by 2020, comprised of interrelated
economic, security and sociocultural entities. Declaring progress in estab-
lishing an ASEAN Economic Community, the foreign ministers pared
down a proposal for a complementary security grouping, exposing prac-
tical limits to the development of a regional organization similar in author-
ity and responsibility to the European Union. Vietnam and other new
members adamantly rejected proposed timetables for everything from
democratic rule to the creation of national human rights commissions. A
proposal to establish a regional peacekeeping force by 2012 was also
shelved. In the end, concrete initiatives were reduced to little more than
statements of principle with no timetables or deadlines established. With
both the European Union and the United Nations urging ASEAN to push
Myanmar to make democratic reforms, the grouping fell back on long-
familiar arguments that its core policy of noninterference in the internal
affairs of member states precluded it from chastising Myanmar and that
constructive engagement was more effective than sanctions in bringing
about reform. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen later strengthened
ASEAN’s collective stance behind Myanmar, saying his government
would not participate in an Asia-Europe forum unless the military-ruled
state was also admitted.120
At the 2004 ASEAN summit in Vientiane, the original six ASEAN
members agreed to accelerate free trade efforts in the region, scrapping
tariffs between them by 2007, three years earlier than planned. In an adap-
tation of the so-called “10 minus X” principle, the remaining four member
states, including Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, were given until 2012 to
follow. Observers agreed the moves were taken to improve ASEAN’s eco-
nomic position vis-à-vis China. Faced with increased Chinese economic
competition, ASEAN also signed a landmark accord with China which
aims to remove all tariffs by 2010, as part of a wider plan of action to
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cooperate in information technology, military affairs, politics, security,
transportation and tourism. ASEAN also announced a Vientiane Action
Program at the 2004 summit which fleshed out last year’s agreement to
create an ASEAN Community along the lines of a unified Europe.121
Longer term, there were reasons to be cautiously optimistic. General
knowledge of and interest in the GMS will increase over time among
ASEAN investors. In addition, the adjustments to regional frameworks
for trade and investment required by ASEAN and AFTA will facilitate
cross-border linkages and investment throughout the subregion. More-
over, ASEAN should become over time more effective in developing
mechanisms through ASEAN-MBDC, AEM-MITI and elsewhere that are
more efficient in mobilizing and channeling resources to the GMS. Finally,
the financial crisis at the end of the century highlighted the need for local
economies to develop and expand capital markets in order to be less
reliant on foreign capital for investment in areas like infrastructure devel-
opment. While this will take time, there is every reason to believe that
regional capital markets able to finance regional projects can and will
develop.
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7 Continuity and change
The 30-year war in Indochina largely defined the 30 years of relative peace
which followed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. But the twin themes of
continuity and change which mark the contemporary relationship of these
three states have their origins in the more distant past. With the creation
of French Indochina in the second half of the nineteenth century, it
became virtually impossible for nearly 100 years not to discuss Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam as a whole. Nonetheless, the preceding analysis has
made clear the unique character of the revolutions, reforms and regional
interests of each state. In so doing, it has highlighted the paradoxical
nature of their relationship as they struggle to adapt and respond to the
challenges and opportunities of a new millennium.
Dreams of union
With the nineteenth-century occupation of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam,
the French government set out to recreate a space in the heart of South-
east Asia. The hyphenated name Indo-Chine, initially applied to the amal-
gamated territories of Annam, Cambodia, Cochinchina and Tonkin,
suggested an empty space to be imagined, molded and developed. Indo-
Chine was a region in transition, an in-between place, betwixt India and
China, occupying the unknown zone of the hyphen, the gap. As the French
consolidated their colonial rule, the hyphenated designation was gradually
dropped as if to signal the creation of a new identity and society. The “in-
between space,” the unknown zone of the hyphen, became somewhere
new, somewhere French; it became French Indochina. Formally adopted
by decree in 1887, the politicized term l’Indochine française eliminated in a
simple, linguistic sense both Chinese and Indian influence, replacing them
with an entirely new French domain of cultural hegemony.1
From the outset, l’Indochine française was an artificial construct. Prior
to French intervention in Vietnam, 1,000 years of Chinese rule were fol-
lowed by 900 years of independence during which time the regions of
Vietnam existed most often as separate and rival political societies. France
occupied Cochinchina in 1862, designating it a colony, and established
protectorates over Annam and Tonkin in 1884. The French then estab-
lished a protectorate over Cambodia in 1863. France also claimed Laos as
a tributary of Vietnam; and when French officials were unable to docu-
ment their claim, they resorted to gunboat diplomacy to round out their
empire in 1893. In annexing the inland kingdoms of Laos, which almost
disappeared when neighboring states were consolidated earlier in the
nineteenth century, the French likely prevented Laos from being absorbed
by Thailand and Vietnam. The hill tribes of Indochina, a remote, isolated
people attached only loosely to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, were the
final component of the variegated colonial empire established by the
French. Despite obvious, fundamental social differences, the French set
out to unite the disparate, culturally distinct areas of what are now Cam-
bodia, Laos and Vietnam under the umbrella term l’Indochine française.
French methods of governance varied from region to region; and while
French efforts to carry out a colonial civilizing mission (mission civil-
isatrice) resulted in a certain unity of policy in some areas, the comparison
remains largely one of contrasts. Not only were the cultures and societies
of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam unique but French rule in each of the
components of its colonial regime was also fundamentally different. Fur-
thermore, the picture of French colonialism which emerges from the
limited indigenous literature available hardly squares with the image of
French Indochina as a model of modernity. In contrast to the suggestion
“that colonies were ‘laboratories of modernity,’ where disciplinary power
and the latest techniques of social engineering could be deployed,”
contemporary research more often points to the absence of modernist
impulses in key sectors of the imperial project.2
The full extent to which the colonial period and the subsequent 30-year
war transformed the traditional relationship of Vietnam and its neighbors
also must be recognized. Hanoi’s twentieth-century ambitions to dominate
all of Indochina can be understood largely in terms of the French model.
One of the peculiarities of French colonial administration was its heavy
dependence on educated Vietnamese to staff the bureaucracies, not only
of Annam, Cochinchina and Tonkin, but also Cambodia and Laos. The
Vietnamese traveling throughout Indochina at the turn of the century,
often in the employ of their colonial masters, viewed the region in ways
that did not coincide with those of their French overseers or with ASEAN-
10 concepts promoted today. As increasing numbers of Vietnamese sup-
ported French colonial projects throughout Indochina, their contacts with
the peoples of Cambodia and Laos also increased, dramatically changing
their perceptions of the subregion.
In the aftermath of World War II, the Vietnamese leadership pursued a
revolutionary vision of the area as an Indochinese communist bloc, a view
increasingly at odds with the policies of their noncommunist neighbors,
especially Thailand. The result was a third regional conflict in the late
1970s which pitted Vietnamese troops against their former Chinese com-
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rades-in-arms in the north and Thai-backed Cambodian communists in the
south. By 1980, all that remained of Vietnam’s post-WWII revolutionary
vision was its so-called “special relationship” with the Lao PDR and
tenuous ties to the remaining fragments of its pre-Geneva 1954 Cambo-
dian allies.
A decade later, the 1991 Paris Accords marked the end of the Indochi-
nese Communist Party’s dream of Vietnam as the revolutionary edge of
socialism in Southeast Asia. In agreeing to a comprehensive political set-
tlement of the Cambodian conflict, the Vietnamese relinquished control of
“the Indochinese epicentre of their revolutionary regional politics.” In this
sense, as an anonymous Vietnamese official told the French journalist,
Jean-Claude Pomonti, the agreement marked “la fin de l’Indochine,” the
end of Indochina.3
Similarly, Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN in 1995, followed by the entries
of Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999, marked the end of Hanoi’s dream
of building Southeast Asian socialism on Vietnamese terms. The road to
ASEAN-10 marked a diplomatic triumph for a wider form of regionalism
in that it constituted formal recognition in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
that the Indochinese Communist Party’s internationalist view of
Indochina, as promoted by Ho Chi Minh in the 1930s, was finally dead.
Vietnamese entry into ASEAN, followed by the accession of Laos and
Cambodia, also confirmed the end of the Cold War, together with the con-
clusion of a long period in which ideology was the determining factor in
regional relations.
Economic reforms
Over the last two decades, economic reform in Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam has gone well beyond so-called socialist renovation or a mere
fine-tuning of their previous command economies. What began around
1979 as minor repair to the existing economic system developed into a pro-
found, enduring reform process which included the reduction, if not the
elimination, of central planning, price deregulation and other features of
an outward, market-based development model. Only a few years ago, the
economies of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were significantly different
from those of most other Asian states, but today, it is the similarities that
are more striking.
Peasant families in all three states now enjoy access to land in some
form of constitutionally guaranteed, long-term tenure with elements of
ownership. In Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, rural households are the
main elements of agricultural production as they are in most Asian states.
While cooperatives and collectivized farming have not totally disappeared
from the scene, especially in Vietnam, they have receded into the back-
ground and are no longer the ruling institutions that once differentiated
their farming practices from those of their Asian neighbors.
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The people of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam also enjoy an entirely new
relationship to the market. They can generally choose what they grow to
eat at home or sell in the marketplace with prices negotiated between the
contracting parties. Where the state once controlled the production and
distribution of resources, the market has now become the primary means
to allocate resources for production and consumption. In the process, the
role of the government, most especially in the agricultural sector, has
become increasingly similar to that of other Asian states. Even in Laos
and Vietnam, where the state remains a major actor in setting economic,
political and social agendas, it is no longer as intrusive as it once was.
Likewise, the governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have rede-
fined their role vis-à-vis the industrial sector. Shared characteristics of this
new role include a progressive withdrawal from many state enterprises,
increased autonomy for other state companies, deregulation of prices,
greater reliance on markets, broader opportunities for the private sector
and the active pursuit of foreign investment. State enterprise reform has
gone hand in hand with banking reform because one without the other
would not allow viable firms access to the credit they need and would not
punish troubled firms engaged in distress financing. Conversely, in the
absence of state enterprise reform, banking reform would be unlikely to
produce a better allocation of capital because state enterprises, unre-
strained by market forces, would continue to engage in short-term, expedi-
ent behavior. While Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have demonstrated
considerable determination to reorganize and rationalize the state sector,
more work remains to be done in Laos and Vietnam. Laos has not con-
ducted thoroughgoing structural changes and continues to subsidize state
enterprises. Vietnam earmarked 2,143 state enterprises for restructuring in
2003–5 but was already well behind schedule after the first year. Once the
backlog was cleared and the target reached, Vietnam would still be left
with 1,866 state enterprises. Future reform measures must consider how
best to continue equitization (privatization) in Vietnam as well as how
best to manage those state enterprises not equitized.
Economic reforms have not occurred simultaneously in all three states,
but the general direction of change has been the same. The end result has
also been similar – modification beyond recognition of the former socialist
system. Today, in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, socialism no longer con-
stitutes an economic program or a blueprint for social and cultural trans-
formation. Instead, it has been transformed in Laos and Vietnam into an
element of political rhetoric which earnestly proclaims “the one-party
state has no intention of allowing liberal-democratic reforms.”4 Cambodia
is the exception in this regard. The 1993 general elections introduced an
element of pluralism in the political system; thereafter, the economic pol-
icies of the Cambodian government eliminated virtually all remaining
traces of socialism in the Marxist-Leninist sense.
The economic reform process in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has in
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many important respects been internally driven. Much of the change
implemented was the product of peasant alienation or other discontent
over the inefficiencies of the command economy and the authoritarian
tone of the one-party state. Domestic pressure and bottom-up adaptations
of the prevailing model played important roles in shaping reforms
intended to break the low productivity stalemate. Despite the proliferation
of foreign models and some pressure from allies, the timing and sequence
of Vietnamese reforms, in particular, appear to have been drawn primarily
from Vietnamese experience. Hanoi officials often spoke of learning from
the South, and many of their ideas and policy models were sourced in
southern Vietnam, a region which experienced a capitalist model more
recently than any other communist-ruled state. Admittedly, many Viet-
namese policies resembled those found in other command economies, but
this was mostly because the problems they addressed and the institutional
frameworks within which they worked were also much alike. Early on,
selected reform measures undertaken by Cambodia and Laos mirrored the
Vietnamese experience, but over time, both states increasingly developed
local solutions to local problems.
At the same time, diverse regional and international developments,
including economic reform in China, dramatic growth in neighboring
Asian economies and the breakup of the Soviet Bloc, sanctioned and
accelerated the reform process in all three cases. The “new world order”
of the 1990s led to an entirely new international situation for Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam. As economic aid and political support from the
Comecon states evaporated, Western trade, cooperation and finance
became of decisive importance to the success of stabilization, reform and
development efforts. In more recent times, the 1997–8 financial crisis, the
SARS outbreak and the avian influenza (bird flu) epidemic impacted neg-
atively on development plans, emphasizing the dynamic nature of the eco-
nomic challenges facing these three states. On the positive side, the
prevailing climate of uncertainty helped stimulate, out of necessity, eco-
nomic efficiency whose need was recognized and introduced by the
agenda-setting elite, most especially in Vietnam.
Political reform
Economics and politics are intrinsically related dimensions of a single
social reality, and the requirements of a protracted war decisively shaped
until 1975 both the economic and political structures of Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam. The decision to wage war was “based on overriding political
priorities” that produced “inevitable and enduring economic and social
legacies.” Victory was the only criterion for economic efficiency through-
out the war; and in this, the communists were supremely successful. As a
result, many communist leaders could not imagine that economic and
political policies so effective in wartime would prove counterproductive in
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peace. And there was no way anyone inside or outside the Communist
Party could openly discuss this risk.5
The governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have undergone
dramatic and far-reaching economic reforms in recent years; however, the
emphasis politically, with the notable exception of Cambodia, has
remained on stability and control. Limited political reforms in Laos and
Vietnam were undertaken within the framework of a one-party state, but
the communist parties in both states remained unwilling to accommodate
meaningful dialog or criticism. On the contrary, an important objective of
the political reform process in both Laos and Vietnam has been to
strengthen the credibility of the Party and the state as legitimate forces of
change. In neither case have the restrained, sporadic reforms to date
resulted in a noticeable shift toward greater popular participation in polit-
ical life.
In Vietnam, there was a brief flowering of political reform after 1986,
but this period was cut short in 1989 by China’s massacre of pro-
democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe. Thereafter, the Party insisted on retaining
rule even as it adopted a goal of economic reform along market lines.
There was widespread agreement the state had a key role to play in the
reconstruction of Vietnam, but there was little recognition in Party circles
that, to be successful, it would have to be a new and far different role from
the one played in the past.
In April 2001, Nong Duc Manh replaced the much maligned Le Kha
Phieu as general secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party and
embarked on a program of legal reform and bureaucratic transparency.
Having served for nine years as chairman of the National Assembly, Manh
brought to his new post both seniority and considerable experience in con-
sensus building. When national elections were held in May 2002, a revised
candidate selection process placed a premium on high political, legal and
ethical standards. For the first time, potential candidates were required to
declare their assets in support of their bid for candidacy. General Secret-
ary Manh worked hard to make Party members more accountable, attack-
ing the pervasive corruption found at the highest levels of both Party and
state. However, even as he pursued reforms intended to make the state
more efficient and subject to law, it remained important to distinguish
between political liberalization and the creation of what might be con-
sidered a law-governed state. In Vietnam under Manh, the objective
remained one of preempting domestic opposition and keeping the Party in
power, not bringing about its demise.
In Laos, the collapse of communism in Europe, culminating in the
implosion of the Soviet Union, drove the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party to reaffirm its ties with Asia’s remaining communist states, notably
China. To underscore the point, General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane
was the first foreign leader to visit Beijing after Tiananmen. Thereafter,
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Lao PDR leaders repeatedly stressed the continuing supremacy of the
Party, emphasizing that any and all political reform in Laos would occur
under its auspices. When LPRP officials went to great lengths to make the
2002 National Assembly elections appear meaningful, for example, most
observers viewed Lao conduct of the polls as indicative of a general shift
on the part of Lao authorities toward being less embarrassed about the
Party’s role.
In a related event, the Lao government celebrated a national holiday in
January 2003 to mark the birthday of fourteenth-century King Fa Ngum.
This was the first time the communist regime had acknowledged the role
of the past monarchy and marked a new phase in nation-building and the
reconstruction of a Lao national identity. In seeking new sources of legiti-
macy from Buddhism to the monarchy, the communists signaled a deter-
mination to continue LPRP control of all aspects of life and society in
Laos, allowing no other political parties to function.
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party and the Vietnam Communist
Party may continue in the years ahead to use economic performance to
retain governing legitimacy; however, experience would suggest they will
find real limits to this development model. No communist-ruled society to
date has been successful with a similar approach. At some point, increased
respect for human rights and religious freedoms, in conjunction with
democratic reforms, are virtually certain to become preconditions for
Party survival in both states.
With the possible exception of elections held in 1955 after Cambodia
received independence from France, the Cambodian people until the last
decade had never experienced any form of truly democratic process or
government. On the contrary, violence has long been the standard means
for resolving political (and other) disputes in Cambodia. At the outset of
the 1990s, Cambodia had experienced two decades of civil war in the wake
of the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970, interrupted only
by four years of “peace” under the Khmer Rouge, a period of terror and
mass murder in which at least one million people died. Following the Viet-
namese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in December 1978, compet-
ing factions in Cambodia continued their bloody conflict. Prospects for
creating an enduring democratic government in this milieu were virtually
nonexistent according to any known theory of democratic formation.
A fragile peace between warring factions, struck after 13 years of civil
war, was only just holding when the United Nations sponsored elections in
May 1993. Widely considered free and fair, more than four million people,
an estimated 89 percent of registered voters, went to the polls. Exactly
what Cambodians voted for in 1993 remains a subject of hot debate. What
they received was a semblance of political pluralism in a shift from a one-
party, Leninist state to a coalition government which brought a modicum
of stability and a tentative political truce. In the process, Cambodia
stepped back in time, becoming a constitutional monarchy with Norodom
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Sihanouk returning to the throne he relinquished in 1955. Over the next
few years, the actions of the Cambodian elite, in “Cambodia’s most recent
externally imposed political transition,” were driven less by power sharing,
an oxymoron when applied to Cambodian politics, than by power building.
For much of this period, King Sihanouk was justly credited with holding
together a fragile peace between Cambodia’s competing factions.6
Violence again swept the Cambodian political system in July 1997. The
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by co-premier Hun Sen executed a
savage coup, shattering the organization and leadership of coalition
partner and primary rival, the National United Front for an Independent,
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), led by
Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Crushing the FUNCINPEC military organi-
zation and mangling its political structure, Hun Sen established himself in
full control in Cambodia. Following a year in which the CPP consolidated
its power, Hun Sen’s party received a strong plurality in the July 1998 elec-
tions. A new coalition government was then formed with Hun Sen as
prime minister and Prince Ranariddh as National Assembly president, a
position with little political power.
Over the next four years, Hun Sen continued to consolidate his position
as the single most powerful politician in Cambodia, marginalizing the role
of King Sihanouk and supplanting the dwindling power of FUNCINPEC.
The CPP swept both the February 2002 commune elections and the July
2003 general elections with the opposition Sam Rainsy Party outpolling
FUNCINPEC for the first time. Increasing its plurality, the CPP failed to
win the two-thirds majority necessary for Hun Sen to create his own
government. And it took almost a year for CPP and FUNCINPEC to form
a new coalition government. In the process, Hun Sen displayed a growing
intolerance for any form of political opposition or dissent, an attitude
which boded ill for the future of democracy in Cambodia. Enjoying a mon-
opoly on political power and in control of all forms of security, Hun Sen
appeared to be moving away from a maturing democratic process and
toward a return to an effective one-party state in Cambodia.
Ironically, the People’s Republic of China may in the end hold the key
to democratic reform in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Chinese support
for the conservative leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party has
helped to stymie even modest reform efforts in Vietnam. Meaningful
political reform in Vietnam is not necessarily contingent on a liberalization
of the Chinese political system, but its prospects would likely improve if
China initiated similar reforms. In turn, Vietnam would appear to be
central to the adoption of related reforms in Laos. If Vietnam were to
begin to implement truly democratic reforms, in the shape of a multi-party
system with free and open elections, the Lao PDR would most likely
follow suit given Hanoi’s longtime political influence in Vientiane. Addi-
tional democracy in Vietnam would also deepen support in Cambodia for
the rule of law and other conditions sustaining democratic civil society. In
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all three countries, any movement toward meaningful democratic reform
would likely embolden donor states to make future assistance increasingly
conditional on incremental reform steps.
Regionalism
In Indochina, the anti-colonial struggle gave birth to a vision of close
cooperation after independence. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam remain
linked today by friendship agreements concluded after 1975. Once viewed
as fundamental, these agreements have become increasingly irrelevant as
economic reforms have expanded, spawning wider regional and inter-
national initiatives. In the process, the prevailing concept of Indochina,
born out of nineteenth-century French colonialism, became more and
more anachronistic. The contemporary reform process in Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam thus signaled not the rebirth of an economic unit, but the end
of an epoch. From the ashes of the old Indochina, a new phoenix arose
grounded on free market principles in which old economies sought com-
parative advantage in new contexts.
Following France’s defeat in the First Indochina War, the U.S. govern-
ment aimed to be the prime mover in the development of the Mekong
subregion, a goal later frustrated by its own defeat in the Second
Indochina War. American initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s mirrored the
French approach, focusing on south to north, east to west relationships
and touting the economic benefits of large projects with subregional
implications, most especially dam construction on the Mekong and its trib-
utaries. A farsighted Ford Foundation Report published in 1961 emphas-
ized the need for environmental and social studies to catch up to technical
proposals for dam construction, a process which really only began in the
1990s.7
International lending agencies, like the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and the World Bank, championed throughout the 1990s elements
of the earlier Franco-American approach. The notable exception was the
inclusion of China’s Yunnan province in the subregional grouping pro-
moted by the Asian Development Bank. Bureaucrats from Manila to
Washington, D.C. advocated subregional cooperation grounded largely on
infrastructure development and integration in transportation, telecommu-
nications, energy, trade and investment. It was only in December 2001 that
ADB finally adopted a more balanced approach, addressing sensitive and
complex issues, like human resource development and environmental
degradation, and emphasizing the need to harmonize policies and proce-
dures in addition to developing physical linkages. The new strategy took
what ADB officials described as a “multisectoral and holistic” approach to
regional cooperation, replacing the eight priority sectors of the 1990s with
five strategic thrusts.8
This redirection of the earlier development model, aspects of which
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could be traced to the French colonial era, was welcomed in Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam. It reflected a more accurate understanding of their
capabilities and requirements, as well as those of the other member states
of the Greater Mekong Subregion. Unfortunately, with an estimated $15
billion in investment required over ten years, progress toward completion
of the new plan has been necessarily slow. Investors remained hesitant to
lend to countries with uncertain stability and poor credit records.
Similar to Indochina, ASEAN was a byproduct of the colonial occupa-
tion of most of Southeast Asia. As professor Mark Beeson has pointed
out, “the very idea of a distinct Southeast Asian region, which ultimately
provided a basis for the original ASEAN grouping and the subsequent
ASEAN Plus Three initiative, was itself an artifact of British military plan-
ning during World War II.” In this sense, “ASEAN did not so much create
a Southeast Asian political space” as it indigenized “an existing one that
had been given de facto expression by the activities of the colonial
powers.” Following World War II, the Cold War served to entrench exter-
nal influences, dividing the region along ideological lines. The end of the
Cold War opened new opportunities for a wider regionalism with new
forms of cooperation and coordination grounded in formal political initi-
atives and agreements.9 Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam took advantage of
the changing circumstances to join ASEAN in the 1990s.
As a regional grouping, ASEAN-10 has promised much but delivered
little in part because regional initiatives continue to be both driven and
constrained by internal and external factors. The economic and political
diversity of Southeast Asia make any form of cooperation more challeng-
ing and complex than it was in Europe. Intraregional trade and investment
are modest, and the ASEAN economies are generally not complementary
and often competitive. The possibilities for enhanced regionalism are also
constrained, as they have been for more than a century, by the strategic
concerns and tensions of outside players, particularly China, Japan and the
United States. The war on terrorism, to take a contemporary example, has
had a major impact on the region’s development and sense of regional
unity, once again demonstrating the difficulties involved in articulating and
implementing a region-wide response to a strategic crisis. In this instance,
the response of Southeast Asian states has been diverse and uneven with
each country reacting to the war in ways that serve its own immediate
political objectives.10
Geographically, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are situated in the
fastest growing region in the world with Cambodia and Laos sandwiched
between China, Thailand and Vietnam, three of the world’s most dynamic
economies. Developmentalists, politicians and academics often find the
spatial content of development plans beguiling; but the reality is that busi-
ness opportunities are relatively limited, especially in Cambodia and Laos.
Mostly inhabited by poor farmers with limited spending power, low levels
of education and few marketable skills, niches for profitable investment
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remain few and far between and geared largely to the exploitation of
natural resources. Given their small populations, collectively 19 million
people or only 4 percent of the ASEAN total, limited home markets and
underdeveloped infrastructures further dampen overseas investment
prospects. As a result, both Cambodia and Laos are at risk of becoming
little more than a place to build a bridge, road or railway, a transshipment
point between the more economically vibrant areas of China, Thailand
and Vietnam. Consequently, their governments have reason to be both
optimistic and wary of the benefits each can reap from inclusion in
regional development programs. In the end, one of the most tangible
benefits may be found in the diplomatic sphere where Cambodia and Laos
will likely find centuries-old problems of dependence on China, Thailand
or Vietnam to be more evenly balanced.
Broader regional issues include how best to deal with country-specific
goals, for example Chinese construction of upstream Mekong dams, when
they conflict with regional goals. No real forum exists to work out such con-
flicts. Moreover, there is limited support for challenging the ASEAN way
of consultation and consensus building or the policy of noninterference in
the internal affairs of member states. In addition, enormous uncertainty
and legitimate concern exists as to the total impact of many proposed
regional development projects, like the downstream economic, environ-
mental and social impact of mainstream dams or the impact of road con-
struction on HIV/AIDS transmission. Potential investors also continue to
face serious obstacles, like the need for a strong legal framework and a
transparent corporate culture to encourage and support investment.
A related issue is how best to ensure that development and growth
plans in the Greater Mekong Subregion are compatible with related
ASEAN schemes. A year-long study published in early 2004 by McKinsey
and Company, a management consulting firm, argued ASEAN was losing
its competitive edge because it remained “a collection of disparate
markets.” To make the region more competitive, the report recommended
an accelerated integration scheme centered on the elimination of nontariff
trade barriers, enhanced tariff reform, creation of a level playing field for
capital and improved regional collaboration.11 As ASEAN attempts to
accelerate its integration process to regain its competitive position, poorer
countries like Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, unable to implement reforms
as quickly as their neighbors, are in serious danger of falling further and
further behind. It took ASEAN 25 years to establish the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) and another ten years for the ASEAN-6 to imple-
ment it. Even today, many businessmen rightly consider unconvincing
AFTA’s efforts to project Southeast Asia as a single, integrated market.
Based on the ASEAN experience, the differences in social, economic,
legal and political systems among the GMS countries in general, and Cam-
bodia, Laos and Vietnam in particular, make achievement of a similar
level of integration a challenging and lengthy process.
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Imperfect past, uncertain future
In discussing the economic and political reforms implemented in Cam-
bodia, Laos and Vietnam over the last three decades, one is struck by par-
allel themes of continuity and change. All three states seek to build a new
future while also accommodating the past. As their political economies
modernize along different lines, they often demonstrate related character-
istics, if not common traits. At the same time, they make different modifi-
cations and adjustments to exploit the unique strengths of their individual
cultures and to mask their weaknesses in separate ways. In the process, all
three states display a certain respect for hierarchy and an appreciation for
order, moral responsibility and achievement.
In an economic condition not dissimilar to other Asian states, Cam-
bodia, Laos and Vietnam must overcome related dilemmas, beginning
with sound, growth-oriented macroeconomic policies. The Vietnamese
case can be dealt with in short order as the economy has performed well in
recent years with strong GDP growth achieved and macroeconomic
stability maintained. Vietnam successfully managed both the Asian finan-
cial crisis in 1997–8 and the downturn in the world economy in 2001, dis-
playing admirable adaptability in successive economic crises demanding
very different responses.
The macroeconomic performance of the Lao PDR was reasonably good
into the mid-1990s but deteriorated rapidly at the end of the decade.
Internal factors initiated the decline which was then fueled by the Asian
financial crisis. Soft budget constraints, revenue shortfalls and an increase
in capital expenditure contributed to the deterioration. One lesson to be
drawn from the Lao experience is that one-party rule can facilitate the cre-
ation and implementation of a rapid transition program, together with
improved short-term macroeconomic performance. Longer term, the
absence of transparency and democracy, together with the socioeconomic
conditions found in a country like Laos, may have the reverse effect with
the emergence of a bargaining economy contributing to macroeconomic
instability.12
Blessed with substantial hydropower potential, the Lao PDR can antici-
pate relatively high growth rates if it can sustain a well-managed macro-
economic condition. Unlike other countries mired in slow growth, the
challenge facing Laos is not so much generating growth as it is shaping
growth to benefit all its citizens. A related dilemma is the perilous state of
agricultural productivity and rural infrastructure as the two factors inten-
sify the inequitable impact of rapid urban, industrial growth. If not
addressed, the dual nature of the Lao economy, with standards of living
improving in urban areas as they decline in rural ones, will exacerbate
political pressures, compounding long-standing ethnic and social tensions.
In Cambodia, financial instability has been an acute problem for
decades and the capacity to manage the economy by macroeconomic
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means has yet to be fully developed. A high level of dollarization, a situ-
ation in which the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency with the local riel
playing a secondary role, is a unique feature of the economy. On the
supply side, this condition is a product of sizable international assistance,
private transfers and export earnings. On the demand side, it is encour-
aged by political uncertainty and limited confidence in the local currency.
Dollarization helped limit the exchange rate impact of the external shock
and inflationary pressures after 1997 but constitutes a serious complication
for Cambodian officials hoping to create both sustainable growth and
steadfast poverty reduction.
It must also be recognized that putting the macroeconomic houses of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in order, an ongoing challenge that is far
from done, will not have a significant impact on that large portion of the
rural population that is barely monetized. The subsistence population is
not strongly affected by inflation rates nor is it affected immediately by
improvements in the investment climate, banking sector or other institu-
tional developments designed to attract foreign direct investment. On the
contrary, the macroeconomic framework has its strongest and most rapid
effect on the urban population, even when it sets the stage for programs
with secondary effects on the general population. Consequently, the
trickle down benefits to the bulk of the population, especially in Cambodia
and Laos where a high percentage of people are dependent on agriculture,
would be relatively small. This is not an argument against macroeconomic
reform but rather a plea for understanding its short-term impact on the
vast majority of citizens in agricultural economies.
In all three states, public sector spending must be brought in line with
tax revenues, and inflation rates have to be carefully controlled. Some
success in reducing the fiscal deficit has been achieved in Vietnam, but
ongoing progress in containing inflation requires additional public sector
retrenchment. Increased revenue generation in all three states is an essen-
tial leg of any broad-based program designed to correct the budget deficit.
Accelerated human resource development is another requirement
common to all three states. In Cambodia and Laos, the economy is kept
afloat by a combination of bilateral and multilateral aid, a condition
described by some observers as a form of cargo cult society in which cit-
izens have come to see external aid as a permanent facet of the national
economy. Increasing talk of donor fatigue in both Cambodia and Laos
make any expectation of international aid ad infinitum, except assistance
tied to specific projects or performance criteria, totally unrealistic.
Low-cost labor industries, especially garment making, are a major con-
tributor to Cambodia’s export revenues, as is rice which is beginning to be
exported again although not at prewar levels. Tourism linked to the
Angkor temple complex has also become an important foreign exchange
earner, one that has come at the cost of environmental degradation, espe-
cially around Siem Reap. Timber removal in both Cambodia and Laos
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remains a corrupt, scandalous process, combining rapid deforestation and
lost government revenues. Cambodia joined the World Trade Organi-
zation in September 2003, but the benefits of WTO membership are uncer-
tain and likely to be long term. Optimists argue membership will generate
badly needed foreign investment and broaden Cambodia’s manufacturing
base. Pessimists say it will prompt the government to lower tariffs, leading
to increased agricultural imports which will impact the livelihood of
already impoverished farmers. Most everyone agrees attracting investors
to Cambodia will remain a hard sell given the weak legal infrastructure,
uncertain political stability and rampant corruption.
The present tax system, which is incapable in all three countries of gen-
erating sufficient government revenues to cover essential expenditures,
has been and will continue to be an important factor in ongoing macroeco-
nomic difficulties. In Vietnam, the relationship between taxpayers and tax
authorities has changed dramatically since the process of tax reform
began. New tax regimes have been introduced, replacing systems more
appropriate for the old economy, and administrative procedures have
improved. The central objective has been to operate a tax system that gen-
erates adequate revenue within an internationally compatible and
competitive system. The challenge for Vietnam is to continue to reform
the tax system in a way which protects government revenues yet remains
friendly to business. Cambodia and Laos face similar challenges in
strengthening tax administration, revenue collection and expenditure man-
agement. In all three states, tax reforms are urgently needed which create
a system capable of providing an adequate, stable source of revenue.
Trade policy also remains a common concern. Vietnam continues to
pursue WTO membership, but its achievement of this objective is heavily
dependent on more dramatic tariff reductions as well as increased flexibil-
ity in the areas of insurance, telecommunications and finance services.
WTO member states are looking for trade conditions equivalent to or
better than the market access Vietnam granted to the United States in
2000. In Laos, the sale of electricity to Thailand accounts for almost 30
percent of total exports and constitutes some 15 percent of government
revenues. Completion of the Nam Theun 2 hydropower station, a prob-
lematic project scheduled for end 2009, could increase government rev-
enues by another 5 percent. But hydropower is not the panacea for Laos.
Thailand is the single customer, and maintenance and repair costs are
high. Moreover, Laos faces core problems of productivity and production.
It is unable to compete with its neighbors which means it imports more
than it exports, threatening to institutionalize its dependence on foreign
aid. In Cambodia, the garment industry, a pillar of the new economy, faces
a serious threat of direct competition from China and Vietnam. Cam-
bodia’s market access will increase with WTO membership, but the
garment industry cannot survive without improving its competitiveness.
Finally, all three states need to streamline both legal and policy
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environments to pave the way for increased foreign direct investment.
Investment figures in Vietnam, despite a reputation for corruption,
improved in recent years but are still below levels in the 1990s. Improved
credit ratings and the composition of the foreign investment community,
which is dominated by Asian investors, help account for Vietnam’s recent
success. Yet investors still complain about cumbersome administrative
procedures and unequal service costs. In the wake of the Asian financial
crisis, foreign direct investment approvals in Laos dropped sharply from
$2.6 billion in 1996 to just $20 million in 2000. The loss of confidence
caused the kip to plummet against the U.S. dollar, increasing the govern-
ment’s dependency on foreign aid to finance both public investment pro-
jects and a severe current account deficit. With some progress in
macroeconomic stability and structural reforms, foreign direct investment
levels in Laos improved in recent years, primarily in the hydropower
sector. In Cambodia, investors continue to complain about high tax rates
and corruption along with the inability of the government to treat
investors in a consistent, transparent manner.
A final word
The governments of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have succeeded in
implementing economic reforms to the degree they have introduced major
modifications to the structure of economic relations in their respective
countries and the role of the state in their economies. The extent to which
these governments have improved the livelihoods of their citizens is
another issue. Their ability to build upon the economic reforms in place is
also uncertain. Political reform is a separate but related issue which has
proved to be even more challenging. In the political arena, too often it has
been a question of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose, or the more
things change, the more they remain the same. All three states have
clearly gone beyond the end of the beginning, but each must continue to
build on the reforms in place if it is to progress down the road to sustained
economic and political development. Once again, the devil is in the detail.
A failure to accelerate current reforms would have the additional effect of
jeopardizing already halting regional integration plans as the slouching
“Tigers” of Asia look to restore their competitive edge in the global
economy. Along the way, only one thing seems certain. The governments
of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam will surely need less continuity and more
change.
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